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Abstract
INTRAPERSONAL EXTERNALITIES are outcomes from a decision which affect
the payoffs from future decisions. Positive intrapersonal externalities repre-
sent self-investment in one’s future self, such as learning a musical instrument
or exercising. Negative intrapersonal externalities represent a disinvestment in
one’s future self, such as eating sugary food or smoking a cigarette. An individ-
ual who succumbs to the lure of an immediate payoff in lieu of future potential
earnings is considered to be choosing myopically, and it is hypothesised that
addictions are one such situation. This failure of the decision-making system to
optimise its choices contrasts with delay discounting, in which an individual is
assumed to choose rationally but to discount the future, and impulsive disinhi-
bition, in which an individual is assumed to be unable to control their actions
even while they state a preference for an action they do not take. This thesis
starts by measuring the relationship between delay discounting and impulsive
disinhibition with a range of addictive behaviours in a large online study, and
finds that while they are consistent predictors there is further variance to ex-
plain. It then examines the validity of the intrapersonal externalities model, and
finds that it adds independent variance beyond delay discounting and impul-
ii
sivity in predicting smoking behaviour; there is no evidence that performance
in intrapersonal externalities tasks is related to trait impulsivity. It also uses in-
trapersonal externalities in the laboratory to study advice seeking and taking in
an impulsive decision-making context, which would be incompatible with de-
lay discounting or impulsive disinhibition theory. This thesis concludes that the
intrapersonal externalities model has been shown to be a viable third model to
understand addictive decisions, and suggests that it could be extended to study
social addictions.
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CHAPTER 1
General Introduction
A young daughter has to be alternately encouraged and threatened by her par-
ents before she will practice her piano. Reading the notes and moving her
hands fast enough to play a melody is difficult, and her clumsy attempts at
playing Chopsticks are unrewarding. She is often lured by the temptation of
hanging out with her friends, or watching a television show. Fast forward ten
years, and the daughter is on the cusp of adulthood; she plays the piano for her
local church – a new song nearly every Sunday, and because of her sightreading
skill she only has to practice the song once to get the hang of it – and she studies
Music at school, where she finds it easy to dissect songs in order to explain how
they are so emotionally powerful.
Some actions have consequences that outlast the initial decision and change the
potential outcomes of future decisions. For the daughter, practicing a musical
instrument is difficult and unrewarding initially but it becomes more enjoyable
as her skill improves and she can sightread new songs. Crucially, it benefits
1
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her even when she is not playing the instrument: when she listens to music
she not only hears the sounds, she also appreciates the performer’s finesse and
the skill gone into shaping the music, which makes the experience all the more
enjoyable. Differences in the adult brain after musical training in childhood are
detectable neurologically (Skoe & Kraus, 2012).
The negative situation is more well studied – where actions have initially pos-
itive consequences but in the longer term they lead to a suboptimal result. For
example, eating sugary food may feel good immediately afterwards but over
the long term eating too much will lead to obesity, which will negatively af-
fect the individual’s quality of life in all areas – even when lying in bed. The
same situation occurs in all addictions, whether ’hard’ addictions like substance
abuse, or ’soft’ (behavioural) addictions like gambling (Potenza, 2006).
I identify two major classes of models that attempt to explain why individu-
als choose to consume addictive substances. Psychopharmacological models
emphasise individual differences in the cognitive system that make one more
or less susceptible to impulsivity, such that an individual cannot avoid actions
that they know are bad for them. Normative economic models emphasise in-
dividual differences in the degree to which one discounts the future, such that
an individual subjectively undervalues future negative consequences because
of the delay before they occur. The implications of the psychopharmacological
model are that individuals do not have self-control and so while they realise
that consuming a substance will negatively affect their happiness, they cannot
stop themselves. In contrast, the normative economic model states that individ-
2
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uals are rational when theymake a decision - they just do not care enough about
the future. Both of these models have drawbacks. If individuals are slaves to
their impulses, then why do some individuals manage to stop their addictive
consumption? And why do impulsive people not become addicted to every-
thing? If individuals are rationally addicted, then why do many addicts claim
to want to stop?
The central claim that this thesis examines is whether there is evidence for
a third class of model originating in the cognitive decision-making and be-
havioural economic literatures. Essentially it posits that the decision-making
system has difficulty learning the mix of immediate and future consequences
that stem from an action, and this leads people to not taking into account the
long-term consequences of some decisions. These long-term consequences are
called intrapersonal externalities. In economics, externalities refer to consequences
of an individual’s decisions that affect others’ wellbeing (e.g. pollution). A self-
ish economic actor will not take externalities into account when making a de-
cision. In the same vein, interpersonal externalities refer to consequences that
change the value of options available to one’s future self, such that an individ-
ual ignores their future self’s potential choice payoffs when making a decision.
According to themodel, my happiness today is based onmy history of previous
decisions, including the time 3months agowhen I decided to go for a run rather
than stay in bed. That choicemademe slightlymore healthy today than I would
have been otherwise, which ever so slightly increases my potential subjective
utility from both staying in bed and going for a run next time I wake up. This
3
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set of consequences is hard to learn, especially as one of the decisions (staying
in bed 3 months ago) was not made, and so individuals concentrate on the
immediate consequences of actions rather than trying to decipher the long term
ones.
No one can wake up one day and decide to be a concert pianist, and no one
decides to become an alcoholic. That is not to say that people do not wake up
and decide to be a concert pianist, or even to succumb to the lure of alcoholism,
but ultimately these decisions have to be followed up by repeated actions over
a long period. Such grand choices are commitments that can be broken, as so
manyNewYears resolutions are every year, rather than decisions. The intraper-
sonal externalities model recognises this, and so the long-term eventualities are
the result of a set of individual choices. Both eventualities occur after repeated
choices to practice the piano, or have another drink, over many years. The unit
of analysis is therefore the individual decision. Positive intrapersonal external-
ities represent a self-investment in one’s future, whereas negative intrapersonal
externalities represent a disinvestment.
The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) includes three criteria in its definition of substance
dependence which mirror some of the decision-making processes that occur in
situations with conflicting long and short-term incentives. First, an individual
has increased tolerance of the substance, so that they need amarkedly increased
amount of the substance to achieve the same effect as previously. In decision-
making terms, this indicates that the history of drug-taking behaviour has an
effect on the utility of current drug-taking behaviour. Second, an individual de-
4
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sires to cut down on use of the substance. In decision-making terms, this could
indicate that the individual is aware of the long-term consequences of consum-
ing the substance, even while they succumb to its short-term lure. Third, the
individual continues using the substance despite knowledge that it causes or
exacerbates physical or psychological problems. In decision-making terms, this
again represents an understanding of the long-term negative consequences of
consuming the substance over a long period. The DSM-V is expected to contain
a new category of "behavioural addictions", which includes behaviours such as
pathological gambling which do not involve consumptino of exogenous phar-
macological substances. Nevertheless, although parts of this thesis concentrate
on addictive substances, mostly nicotine smokers, both these and behavioural
addictions are simply an important example of a situation in which a choice
has both long and short-term consequences which conflict. Actually these con-
flicting choices describe many situations which are understood to lead to sub-
optimal outcomes; individuals over-indulge in everything from sweet foods to
Internet use, and under-invest in everything from exercise to studying. Addic-
tion is, in the context of this thesis, an extreme example of a situation where
long and short-term incentives are not in alignment.
This general introduction starts by (1.1) relating the origin of the normative eco-
nomicmodel, which in the research field of choice over time is reflected in delay
reward discounting. This is followed by (1.2) some extensions to the decision-
making model from behavioural economists, which use psychological insights
to take account of situations where behaviour does not match the normative
5
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION
accounts. In the area of choice over time this leads to a description of intrap-
ersonal externalities as another situation where individuals do not conform to
normative expectations. Then it moves away from economic decision-making
and (1.3) describes some of the psychopharmacological accounts, which have
a separate origin. Finally, (1.4) the ways that intrapersonal externalities could
theoretically overlap or integrate with the other models are explored.
1.1 The Normative Decision-Making Model: Delay
Discounting as a Rational Choice
1.1.1 Rational Choice and Expected Utility Theory
Expected utility theory (EUT) was first proposed by Bernoulli (1738, cited in
Starmer, 2000) but was not taken up in the literature until von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947, cited in Starmer, 2000) showed that it could be derived
from axioms that seemed logical, and could be applied to strategic situations
in which individuals had to make decisions; this began the field of game the-
ory. EUT logically describes what an individual should do if they are ratio-
nal. Each option in a decision has outcomes and respective probabilities that
each outcome will occur, thus in EUT the expected utility of any option is the
probability-weighted sum of utilities of consequences. EUT takes account of an
agent’s attitude to risk in the shape of the utility function, which can be linear
if the agent is risk neutral, concave if the agent is risk averse or convex if the
6
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agent is risk loving. The rational agent should act to maximise expected utility
(Schoemaker, 1982).
1.1.2 Delay Discounting
In the area of choice over time, delay discounting has been used to examine in-
dividual decisions under the assumption of rational choice (Becker & Murphy,
1988). In order to account for individuals’ preferences for immediate rewards
over future ones, a discounting function is applied based on the time until the
reward is received. Delay discounting has been studied both from a psycho-
logical and an economic perspective (Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991). This is
because it has the advantage that it presents a logical framework that allows
it to fit into mathematical models of decision making, and so has been used to
make policy recommendations (Monterosso & Ainslie, 2007).
Delay discounting is typically researched by giving peoplemultiple forced choices
between an immediate reward and a larger delayed reward. Afterwards, an in-
difference point is calculated where the individual subjectively values both the
immediate and delayed options the same, and after calculating several of these
for a range of delay periods it is possible to calculate a discount curve. The
shape of the discounting curve was debated for some time, with the two candi-
date curves being the exponential curve and the hyperbolic curve. These imply
different choice dynamics in intertemporal choice situations (Ainslie, 1975).
The exponential curve assumes that as the delay increases by equal increments
the proportion of the reward that is discounted is constant (e.g. 10% per day).
7
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Figure 1.1: Exponential and hyperbolic delay reward discounting curves
Therefore, if two options are both discounted according to the exponential func-
tion then preference between them will be constant as a function of time; this is
time consistency. In contrast, the hyperbolic curve assumes that the proportion
of a reward that is discounted changes as a function of time, so that an equal
increment in delay will produce a larger decrement in reward value at short de-
lays than long ones (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998). The two curves are plotted in
Figure 1.1, where the lines crossing indicates that hyperbolic discounting leads
to steeper immediate discounting than exponential discounting, but that the
rate of discounting decreases over the longer term. This leads to the situation
where an individual might say that they prefer a course of action in the future
that would be advantageous in the long term (such as refraining from drink-
ing), however as the time draws nearer they switch to the short-term preference
8
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(Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995). Empirical research generally favours the hyper-
bolic function (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Rachlin et al., 1991; Rachlin,
Siegel, & Cross, 1994), implying that individuals have time inconsistent prefer-
ences (Rachlin, 2000). This distinction is explained in full detail in Chapter 2,
where the two models of discounting are empirically compared.
The validity of delay discounting, as an individual difference that is associated
with addiction, is evidenced by the finding that individuals with a range of dif-
ferent addictions discount future rewards more than control subjects do (Bickel
et al., 1999; Kirby & Petry, 2004; Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997; Vu-
chinich & Simpson, 1998). Additionally, there is evidence that people change
their addictive substance consumption habits in advance of an announced price
rise (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001). This behaviour is surprisingly forward thinking,
because individuals must recognise that in the future they will choose myopi-
cally, and therefore it is inconsistent with the view that addicts choose compul-
sively.
1.2 Intrapersonal Externalities: A Psychologically-
Informed Model of Choice Over Time
1.2.1 Systematic Deviations from Rational Choice
Historically, economics has argued that its assumptions about how individu-
als make decisions are inconsequential, as long as the theories explain the ag-
9
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gregate data (Lewin, 1996). However, experimental research has noted many
systematic deviations from EUT that are troubling. Two such situations were
created by Allais (1953). In the common consequence effect, two decisions are
made between pairs of gambles. The second pair of gambles is derived from
the first pair, except that a common consequence of both pairs is removed. If
individuals conform to EUT, then if they choose the first choice from the first
pair, they should also choose the first choice from the second pair, since the sec-
ond pair is the same as the first except that both choices in it have a common
consequence removed. However, it has been found that individuals instead
systematically switch from one choice to the other between pairs (Rubinstein,
1988). A similar situation is the common ratio effect, in which again two deci-
sions are made between pairs of gambles. The second pair of gambles is again
derived from the first pair, except that a common ratio of their probabilities is
removed from both gambles. Given that both pairs of gambles are the same
except that the second pair of gambles has lower probabilities, rational agents
should choose the same gamble in each pair in both decisions – but experimen-
tal research finds that humans switch systematically. Recent evidence however
seems to show that these effects are not stable over time. de Kuilen andWakker
(2006) set up a repeated common consequence effect and found that perfor-
mance converged towards the expected utility level when participants had ex-
perience of the payoffs and even when they repeatedly played the game as a
thought experiment. This suggests that the irrational decisions noted by Allais
(1953) can be overcome and that the cognitive decision-making mechanism is
10
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION
not inherently irrational.
Preference reversals are another systematic deviation from rational choice that
have been extensively studied (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Lindman, 1971).
In a typical task, participants are presented with a choice between two gambles,
one with a high probability of winning a small reward and the other with a low
probability of winning a large reward. Participants are then given a distraction
task, before being asked to put a dollar value on each of the two previous gam-
bles. It has been found that participants typically put a higher dollar value on
the gamble with a large reward, but choose the gamble with the small reward
in the first instance (Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990). Given that these two
methods are just different ways of asking the same question, its findings are
puzzling for EUT. However, preference reversals can be reduced when gam-
bles are presented as relative frequencies (Tunney, 2006). This suggests that the
difficulty that human participants have is in utilising the Bayesian probability
formats that are usually used in such research (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995).
Another deviation from EUT was reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1981),
who described the phenomenon of framing, whereby decisions are affected by
the context in which they are presented. Specifically, participants tend to be
loss aversive. When presented with two pairs of stochastically identical gam-
bles, in which the outcomes of the first gambles are presented as gains and the
outcomes of the second gambles are presented as losses, participants system-
atically switch choices between the two pairs. This suggests that people treat
gain probabilities and loss probabilities differently from one another.
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Another problem was reported by Rabin (2000), who noted that given someone
who rejects a gamble with a 50% likelihood of gaining $11 and a 50% likelihood
of losing $10, EUT predicts an implausibly high level of risk aversion if the
gamble is scaled up to a potential loss of $1000, where participants should not
accept the gamble even if the potential reward is $100,000. Similarly, Samuelson
(1963, cited in Rabin, 2000) showed that EUT predicts that if people will turn
down a gamble where they have a 50% chance of losing $100 and a 50% chance
of gaining $200, they will also turn down 100 of these gambles strung together.
This suggests two things; first, it is further evidence that people treat potential
gains and losses differently from one another, and second, that there must be
some mechanism whereby individuals group gambles together.
EUT was not developed based on psychological plausibility. There was no di-
rect evidence that humans used probabilities and valuations at all when mak-
ing decisions, so the utility function may have just been a theoretical concept
without basis in the brain. However, research has found neurons in the mon-
key cortex that seem to fire at the rate at which probabilities and valuations are
presented, suggesting a decision-making system very similar to that presented
by EUT (Platt & Glimcher, 1999). This does not of course mean that EUT is
wholly psychologically plausible, but it does provide evidence that at least the
brain uses the general concepts of valuation and probability are used in making
decisions.
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1.2.2 Prospect Theory and Social Preferences: Extensions to EUT
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and later Cumulative Prospect
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) aimed to overcome the weaknesses of
EUT by introducing two important alterations. First, outcomes are weighted
by way of an inverse ’S’ function which centres around a reference point (see
Figure 1.2). The reference point can be considered as the position that the agent
was in before making the decision, or could also include some aspect of the
agent’s expectations. That is, in the terms of the laboratory experiments where
most research is done, if the agent expects to be paid a certain amount for their
participation, then they might be disappointed to be paid less and so consider
that to be a loss (Heath, Huddart, & Lang, 1999).
Figure 1.2: How gains and losses are weighted in Cumulative Prospect theory.
From Starmer (2000).
The reference point addresses the finding from framing research that gains are
13
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not treated the same as losses. Since people are loss aversive, the losses portion
of the function is steeper than the gains portion, which has the effect that losses
are given a higher weighting than equivalent gains. The curve in both portions
of the function addresses the finding that people do not treat twice the amount
of a gain as giving twice as much utility. The power law function was chosen
because it fits the data, but it was also noted that this is psychologically plausi-
ble, since it reflects the principle of diminishing sensitivity, a general principle
of perception (Camerer & Ho, 1994).
The second alteration to EUT is similar, but is instead applied to probabilities.
Probabilities are weighted according to an inverse ’S’ function shown in Fig-
ure 1.3 (Lattimore, Baker, & Witte, 1992). Therefore, probabilities that have a
low chance of occurring are over-weighted, and those that are almost certain
to happen are under-weighted. This addresses Rabin’s (2000) criticism of EUT
whereby risk aversion at relatively low stakes will imply an implausible degree
of risk aversion at high stakes, although Rabin’s criticism came much later, and
probability weighting was included for other reasons detailed below.
These two alterations together also address the phenomena of the common con-
sequence and common ratio effects. In the common consequence effect, remov-
ing a common outcome from a pair of gambles will make a difference to how
the utility of the gambles are conceived since they will be weighted differently.
Small outcomes will be over-weighted, and large ones will be under-weighted.
Similarly, in the common ratio effect, removing the common probability of an
outcome occurring in a pair of gambles will make a difference to how the utility
14
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Figure 1.3: Probability weighting in Cumulative Prospect theory. From
Starmer (2000).
of the gambles are conceived, since they will be weighted differently. Gambles
with a low probability will be over-weighted, and gambles with a high proba-
bility will be over-weighted.
It is significant that these alterations to EUT were made primarily in order to
address findings such as the common consequence and common ratio effects.
However, even though the evidence for these has been weakened and they may
no longer need addressing, the two alterations are still on solid ground. This
may be due to their firm psychological foundation. The probability weight-
ing function and gains-losses function were modeled by Stewart, Chater, and
15
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Brown (2006) in their Decision by Sampling theory. The authors started from
a psychological perspective by assuming that people can only make decisions
by comparing a current option’s attributes (probability and payoff) with other
attributes stored in memory. By ranking the attribute involved in the current
decisionwith others experienced in the past, it is possible toweight the attribute
accordingly. This requires only that humans can sample the environment and
store it in memory, make binary comparisons, and have a concept of frequency.
The authors analysed the frequency of credit and debit transactions to UK bank
accounts and found that both roughly followed a power law, whereby there
were many more small than large transactions. This produces a curve whereby
the subjective value of a gain/loss will not necessarily double when the amount
of the gain/loss doubles. They also found that the curve for losses was steeper
than that for gains, representing the fact that there were more small losses than
small gains. This produces two different curves around the reference point, as
in prospect theory, with people acting loss-aversive. In practice this means that
a person’s utility function is relative to their usual transactions, so millionaires
would consider some amounts to be small that others would not. This seems
intuitively plausible.
A similar analysis was carried out but with probabilities, to argue that small
probabilities are over-weighted and larger ones are under-weighted. The au-
thors analysed the frequencywithwhich various probability-relatedwords (e.g.
”unlikely” or ”almost impossible”) are used in language, since probabilities and
probability-related words are both used well by humans (Wallsten & Budescu,
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1995). They asked participants to relate the words to probabilities, and then
compared the words’ frequencies in the British National Corpus, a collection
of the frequencies of words in the English language designed to be represen-
tative of the language as a whole, including both spoken and written English.
They found that words which denote small probabilities are over-represented
compared to words which denote large probabilities.
Beyond individual decision making, a wealth of evidence from social strategic
experiments has found that people do not conform to selfish ”rational” expec-
tations in social situations. In the well-known ultimatum game (Guth, Schmit-
tberger, & Schwarze, 1982), player one is presented with a sum of money and
then asked to offer a share of it to player two. The second player then decides
whether to accept or reject the offer. If it is accepted, both players take away
the sum of money that was agreed, but if the offer is rejected then both players
get nothing. The rational theory predicts that player one will offer a very small
amount of money to player two, and that player two will accept it since even
a very small amount of money is better than nothing. However, it is found
that on average about 40-50% of the total amount is offered. Furthermore, in
the dictator game, the second player is forced to accept the offer, so player one
does not have to worry about the offer being rejected, and so has an even big-
ger incentive to offer very little money. However, again, it is found that players
routinely offer around 50% of the total money.
One model was developed to explain this finding, inequality aversion (Bolton
& Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). In the model, unequal outcomes
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(especially unequal against the individual) alter the payoff schedules such that
the ratio of money for each participant in an experiment becomes important,
rather than simply the amount of money received by the individual.
An elegant finding contradicted the theory that it was inequality that particu-
larly galled the participants in ultimatum games. Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher
(2003) carried out a series of ultimatum games that showed that intentions are
perhaps the most important aspect. Four different games were used, in all of
which player one had the option of two different splits of the money to offer.
In all four games, player one had the option of an 8/2 split (in favour of player
one), but the other option was either 5/5, 2/8, 8/2 (so there was effectively no
option), or 10/0. When player two found that they had been offered 2, when
they could have been offered 5, they were much more likely to reject than when
they were offered 2 and they knew that the alternative was that they would be
offered nothing.
A theory of reciprocity (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006) is intended to take this find-
ing into account, which as in the inequality aversionmodel modifies an individ-
ual’s payoff schedules based on their desire to respond to kindness with kind-
ness and to revenge behaviours that they deem intentionally unfair. One po-
tential theoretical stumbling block for this theory is that when strategic games
are played with multiple people, the theory assumes that a kindness value is
generated for each other individual in the group. It may be that in games with
a lot of people, individuals are not considered individually but rather the whole
group is evaluated as if it was one individual. It would probably be difficult to
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ascertain in which situations individuals are considered alone and when they
are considered as part of a group.
Like Prospect theory, these social experiments which demonstrate diversions
from EUT seem to be due to limitations in the cognitive architecture that makes
decisions, and so they have been solved by augmenting EUT to take these psy-
chological factors into account. This is a recurring theme in decision making
research and one which this thesis adds to.
1.2.3 Addiction as a Cognitive Bias: Intrapersonal Externalities
and the Harvard Game
Addiction presents a relatively widespread situationwhere choices do not max-
imize long-term utility (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001). Smokers often tell others
about their quitting intention in order tomake it socially embarrassing to smoke
(Prochaska, Crimi, Lapsanski, Martel, & Reid, 1982), they sometimes set up
aversive consequences for smoking such as tearing up dollar bills for each
cigarette smoked above a daily maximum, and youth smokers overestimate
their chances of quitting in five years time (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001). Thirty-
eight million of the 46 million smokers in America in 1993 had tried to quit,
most several times (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001).
Choice over time can be studied from a cognitive decision making perspective
using intrapersonal externalities. Models of intrapersonal externalities postu-
late that when an individual makes a decision, they do not fully take into ac-
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count its effects on the utility of options available to the future self, and so in
effect these are a kind of externality applied to the future self (Read, 2001).
By ignoring the consequences of a choice on the payoffs available from future
choices, an individual is led down the Primrose Path to addiction (A. Goldstein
& Kalant, 1990). At each choice point they choose the option with the higher
immediate utility, yet they arrive at a suboptimal situation.
Intrapersonal externalities have been operationalized in theHarvardGame (R. J. Her-
rnstein, Loewenstein, Prelec, & Vaughan, 1993). In this cognitive task, partic-
ipants are asked to make repeated choices between two options. One option
(Meliorate) gives an immediately higher payoff than the other option, but re-
duces the payoffs from both options over a set number of future trials. Choos-
ing the other option (Maximize) leads to a consistently average payoff which
ultimately leads to a higher overall payoff. The Harvard Game therefore pre-
serves the tension in addictive decisions between an immediately higher payoff
versus the long-term negative consequences that that payoff leads to. Unlike
delay discounting however, the consequences of making the suboptimal deci-
sion in the Harvard Game do not have to be delayed for any significant length
of time. The Harvard Game is described operationally in full detail in Chapter
3, where it is used.
In this respect intrapersonal externalities have already been used to make pol-
icy recommendations (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001; Laux, 2000). Intrapersonal
externalities have a similar advantage to delay discounting, whereby they ex-
tend current decision making mathematical models in order to account for ap-
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parently irrational long-term choices.
The Harvard Game is unique in the area of choice over time, as it requires par-
ticipants to learn the payoff schedules through experience rather than just be-
ing explicitly told their options. This is psychologically plausible (Koritzky &
Yechiam, 2010), as one cannot ever be told the precise subjective payoffs from
drinking or not drinking, but must learn them from experience. It also means
that researchers can study in the laboratory how individuals learn to make self-
controlled or impulsive decisions. No one chooses to become an addict (or to
become a concert pianist). Each choice (to have another drink, or to practice the
piano) is made in isolation, but they add up to a payoff that is not the sum of
its parts.
Studying learning through experience has become a niche research area within
the decision-making literature, ever since it was found that individuals do not
make the same decisions once they have experienced the payoffs, compared to
being told their options (Rakow & Newell, 2010). As mentioned, individuals
seem to be risk-seeking when presented with small probabilities of large gains
but risk-averse when presented with small probabilities of large losses; how-
ever, when individuals experience repeated small probabilities of large gains
they are risk-averse, and when they experience repeated small probabilities of
large losses they are risk-seeking (Barron & Erev, 2003).
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1.3 Psychopharmacological Models of Addiction
There is a cluster of theories of myopic choice which are predominantly dis-
cussed in the psychopharmacological literature. They are sometimes described
collectively as impulsivity, with each theory a different dimension of the same
construct (de Wit, 2009; Meda et al., 2009).
1.3.1 Impulsive Disinhibition
Impulsivity encompasses a variety of definitions, including a tendency to act
without forethought, insensitivity to consequences, and an inability to inhibit
inappropriate behaviours (Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006).
Each definition lends themselves to different self-report questionnaires or be-
havioural tasks which are designed to measure them. Numerous studies find
that drug users score higher than non-users on self reportmeasures of impulsiv-
ity, sensation seeking and inattention (Sher & Trull, 1994; Slater, 2003; Tercyak
& Audrain-McGovern, 2003; Zuckerman, Ball, & Black, 1990), and also on be-
havioural measures of impulsivity (Fillmore & Rush, 2002; Lejuez et al., 2003;
S. H. Mitchell, 1999). Although behavioural measures and self-report mea-
sures tend to be unrelated (Reynolds et al., 2006), indicating that this class of
measures is broad and inconsistent. Intriguingly, impulsivity seems to increase
when an individual starts using an addictive substance, which may cause a
negative feedback loop (de Wit, 2009; Dick et al., 2010).
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1.3.2 Sensitivity to Reward
After alcohol intoxication the heart rate increases, and it has been suggested
that this may reflect an epigenetic (where the social environment cues genetic
triggers) predisposition to alcohol dependence (Conrod, Pihl, &Vassileva, 1998).
As the blood alcohol content increases (but not when it decreases), some alco-
holics and men at risk of alcoholism have an exaggerated heart rate response
(Conrod, Peterson, Pihl, & Mankowski, 1997; J. R. Wilson & Nagoshi, 1988).
Individuals experience the stimulating effects of alcohol when their blood alco-
hol content is increasing (Davidson, Hutchison, Dagon, & Swift, 2002; Fried-
man, Carpenter, Lester, & Randall, 1980), and so the higher heart rate at this
point may reflect the subjective experience of more stimulating effects (Hold-
stock, King, & de Wit, 2000) and fewer sedative effects (King, Carroll, Newton,
& Dornan, 2002). Furthermore, questionnaire data show that the heart rate
response to alcohol is related to reward seeking (Brunelle et al., 2004). Essen-
tially, in the language of economic decision-making, individuals who consume
addictive substances experience higher subjective utility from them (through
reward sensitivity) than individuals who do not. The evidence is, however,
inconsistent. Gilman, Ramchandani, Crouss, and Hommer (2012) found that
heavy drinkers, compared to social drinkers, reported lower subjective alcohol
effects and showed a reduced neural response to alcohol in the brain’s reward
system. This result suggests that heavy drinkers consume more alcohol be-
cause they need more before they get the same subjective effect. One way to
consolidate these disparate findings is to split the subjective utility of alcohol
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intoxication (which is high in heavy drinkers), from the sensitivity to alcohol
intoxication (which is low in heavy drinkers, although this may be the result of
heavy drinking rather than an antecedent. It could be that heavy drinkers have
a short time to habituation).
1.3.3 Risk-Taking
When clinical psychologists and economists characterize behaviour as ’risky’,
they mean different things (Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011). For economists,
risk is a variance in results but with the same expected value (e.g. 10% chance
of £1000 and 90% chance of nothing is more risky than 100% chance of £100,
but they have the same expected value). For clinical psychologists, risk is a
behaviour that has potential negative consequences – it can harm oneself or
others. Here the clinical psychologists’ meaning is used.
Addictions are risky behaviours; almost a third of all deaths from cancer in the
United States each year are directly caused by tobacco use (Lejuez et al., 2003).
Both adults and adolescents are aware of this, yet they continue to smoke, sug-
gesting that they are willfully taking a risk. Smoking is related to other real-
world risky behaviours; daily smokers, as opposed to nonsmokers, are more
likely to be in traffic accidents (Difranza, Winters, Goldberg, Cirillo, & Biliouris,
1986), are less likely to wear seat belts (Eiser, Sutton, & Wober, 1979), and en-
gage in more high-risk sexual behaviours (Valois, Oeltmann, Waller, & Hussey,
1999). In the laboratory, the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al.,
2002) measures risk taking. Participants press a button to pump up an imagi-
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nary balloon; each time they pump the balloon they earn more money, but at
some point the balloon pops and they lose the money they earned. Participants
can stop pumping at any time before it pops and keep the money they have
earned up until that point. The number of pumps indicates how risk seeking
the participant is. Results have demonstrated test-retest reliability (T. L. White,
Lejuez, & Wit, 2008), and validity, in that daily smokers take more risks than
nonsmokers (N=60; Lejuez et al., 2003), although this result was not replicated
when smokers with co-morbidities were excluded (N=64; Dean, Sugar, Helle-
mann, & London, 2011). MDMA drug use was also found to be related to risk
taking in the BART (Hopko et al., 2006).
1.3.4 Time Perspective
The Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory measures the degree to which tem-
poral information about the present and future influences behaviour (Zimbardo
& Boyd, 1999). It includes three scales: two present-mindedness scales and
a future-mindedness scale. The Consideration of Future Consequences Scale
measures time perspective on a single scale between present- and future-mindedness
(Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994).
Daugherty and Brase (2010) found that both time perspective scales were as-
sociated with alcohol, tobacco and drug use, as well as a range of other future
oriented behaviours, and that the measures were still predictive even after de-
mographics, Big Five personality, and delay discounting were controlled for,
although the sample size (N=467) was not large enough to consistently distin-
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guish between subfactors of time perspective. This indicates not only that an
individual’s time perspective influences their decisions, but that time perspec-
tive does not overlap with delay discounting. Gellert, Ziegelmann, Lippke,
and Schwarzer (2012) found that the relationship between time perspective and
health behaviours was more subtle; time perspective moderated the relation-
ship between planning on health behaviours, such that for those who had a
limited time perspective it was important to plan in order to behave healthily.
1.3.5 Mindfulness
Mindfulness reflects living in the here and now. Like impulsivity, mindful-
ness emphasises the present, but unlike impulsivity, mindfulness stems from a
recognition that all things are impermanent (Marlatt, 2002). It means that those
who are mindful would actually be less likely to act on impulse, because they
aremindful of the consequences of their decisions and so do not act rashly. They
act under conscious control rather than from automatic thoughts or impulses
(C. Murphy &MacKillop, 2012). C. Murphy and MacKillop (2012) found zero-
order correlations between mindfulness and alcohol use and adverse conse-
quences of drinking, but these effects did not survive when including trait im-
pulsivity as a measure.
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1.4 Conclusion - Three Separate Models?
This thesis uses a cognitive perspective to approach the question of how deci-
sions are biased by being made over time, and emphasises the advantages of
logical models over descriptive ones. Although initial economic models were
implausible relative to the cognitive apparatus present in the human brain, later
models have utilised the insights from psychological research whilst still retain-
ing their logical basis. This is important because logical models make specific
predictions that are testable, and they extend other logical theories rather than
creating another theory for the specific domain they were created for. Decisions
are made in many domains and it is parsimonious to assume that there is only
one decision making system in the brain for all of them.
With this in mind, how do intrapersonal externalities integrate with delay dis-
counting and the impulsivity models? With regards to delay discounting, the
delay until a reward is received is another mechanism that makes it difficult
for an individual to decipher the long-term outcomes of each decision. While
it is difficult to learn that a previous decision is affecting the results of a cur-
rent decision, it is even harder to learn this if the previous decision was made a
month or more ago. Additionally, a future consequence can still be discounted
according to the individual’s personal delay discounting function.
Some impulsivity models can be integrated. Sensitivity to reward could be con-
sidered simply as part of an individual’s method of assigning utility to various
options, leading to a higher subjective utility being given to a drug reward.
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Similarly, risk taking is already part of the expected utility model (it is within
the boundaries of the model to discount a risky reward), and Prospect theory
even accounts for the psychological irrationalities of over or under-weighting
certain probabilities. For time perspective and mindfulness, the evidence for
their association with addictive behaviour is weak, especially once trait impul-
sivity is taken into account.
This leaves impulsive disinhibition, where the way forward to integration is
less clear, since it suggests that actions are taken on a whim, due to reasons
that are independent of deliberation. A strict reading of expected utility theory
would state that impulses reflect utility, but since regret can set in very swiftly
after an impulsive decision is made, this would imply an implausibly steep rate
of discounting. In the experiments that follow, impulsive disinhibition is mea-
sured as part of a broad trait impulsivity questionnaire in order to determine
its relationship with intrapersonal externalities.
There are other factors that are involved in the formation or perseverance of
substance use beyond the three literatures described above. They are not mea-
sured in this thesis due to the practical constraint of measuring the breadth of
factors which are potentially involved, because they were not broad enough to
account for a range of addictive behaviours, or because it was not clear whether
and how far they overlap with the literatures above. Some of them are never-
theless included in the Discussion chapter.
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1.5 Thesis Framework
This thesis examines the concept of intrapersonal externalities as measured
through the Harvard Game. It is useful to conceive of the following chapters
as contributing to the psychometric steps used when creating a new question-
naire (Rust & Golombok, 2008). Before creating a new questionnaire, it should
be determined that a psychological concept is not comprehensively measured
elsewhere, and so there is a need for the new measure. In Chapter 2 a large
online study demonstrates that despite using several methods of predicting im-
pulsive behaviour, there is further variance to be explained. A new question-
naire should also demonstrate that it is a valid measure, which means that it
should be related to other theoretically similar concepts; in Chapter 3 and 5 the
relationship between intrapersonal externalities, and smoking behaviour, delay
reward discounting and impulsivity are examined. Additionally, the criterion-
related validity (Rust & Golombok, 2008), whether the Harvard Game tests
the way it should given the theory of intrapersonal externalities presented in
this chapter, is studied in Chapter 3 by examining the relationship between in-
trapersonal externalities and participants’ understanding of the task. Finally,
Chapter 4 extends the Harvard Game to use it as a platform to research other
questions. If the Harvard Game represents a situation where participants strug-
gle to learn to choose between long and short-term rewards, then it should be
possible to use it to study the effects of advice-seeking and advice-taking on
impulsive decisions.
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Impulsivity, Delay Discounting and
Addictive Behaviours: An Online
Study
2.1 Chapter Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation for experiments: Overlap between measures
and unique variance accounted for
As described in Chapter 1, I have identified two major schools of thought re-
garding the origin of short-term decision making. Either individuals discount
the future according to a personal discounting function but make decisions us-
ing this function in an economically rational manner, or they are victim to their
psychopharmacology, which does not sufficiently control their impulses. This
30
CHAPTER 2: IMPULSIVITY, DELAY DISCOUNTING AND ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIOURS: AN ONLINE STUDY
chapter examines these competing, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, ap-
proaches to test how far they explain addictive substance use and dependency,
as examples of commonly understood short-term behaviours. Also included is
a broad Big Five measure of personality (Digman, 1990), since this taxonomy
has been shown to encompass a wide range of behaviours (Paunonen, 2003),
including relationships with addictive substance use.
In order to address this subtle question, a large sample of individuals is nec-
essary to achieve reliable results. This is because after including the demo-
graphics of age and gender, there are nine predictors, three of which might be
expected to be correlate with one another (delay discounting, trait impulsiv-
ity and conscientiousness). For this reason data were collected through a large
online social network application.
This chapter also aims to establish how well trait impulsivity, delay discount-
ing, personality and demographics together are associated with use and depen-
dency on addictive substances. This will determine how much space there is
for an alternative model of choice over time, or whether the current theories
simply need to be understood in more detail.
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2.1.2 The myPersonality project: Example of successful utili-
sation of online social networks for large-scale social re-
search
The Internet has made it possible for social scientists to inexpensively reach
large samples of research participants, sometimes hundreds of thousands of
people or more (Rentfrow, Gosling, & Potter, 2008). These samples are more
diverse and representative than theWEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized,
Rich and Democratic; Henrich, Heine, &Norenzayan, 2010) samples tradition-
ally used by researchers (Gosling, Sandy, John, & Potter, 2010; Gosling, Vazire,
Srivastava, & John, 2004), and the quality of data collected is as good or bet-
ter than in traditional pencil and paper methods (Pettit, 2002) or even national
surveys acquired via telephone polling (Chang & Krosnick, 2009).
In recent years there has been a remarkable shift towards more social and less
anonymous Internet use. Interactions between people using anonymous nick-
names, email addresses, or avatars are increasingly being replaced by inter-
actions within Online Social Networks (OSNs) that are based on real identi-
ties and connections that largely mirror offline social links (Clouston, Amin,
Verdery, & Gauthier, 2009; Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Mayer &
Puller, 2008). This presents a great opportunity in terms of research design,
solves problems related to anonymity that were characteristic to previous web
studies, and makes the data available on OSNs both far richer and on a larger
scale than has been available to social scientists in the past (Kleinberg, 2008).
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The most popular OSN today, Facebook (http://www.facebook.com), boasts
over 800 million active users (as of December 2011). Facebook allows its users
to create a personal profile, connect and communicate with their friends, and
interact in various applications and games. Users can share and comment on
content such as photos, videos, links or micro-blog entries. Importantly, Face-
book conveniently keeps track of friends’ activities and profile updates by au-
tomatically notifying its users about their friends’ actions.
Despite its popularity in society, Facebook is far from being fully understood
or even popular among social scientists, although a growing number of studies
involve Facebook (410 in 2011; R. E. Wilson, Gosling, & Graham, 2012). Due
to their role in the lives of millions of individuals and whole societies, Face-
book and other OSNs constitute an interesting research area in their own right,
but OSNs also provide excellent research grounds to collect data and carry out
experiments related to virtually any of the social sciences.
In May 2007 Facebook released an Application Programming Interface (API)
that allows developers unaffiliated with Facebook to create applications, such
as games or quizzes, and integrate them with the Facebook platform. Basic
OSN applications can be developed relatively easily as they are simply web-
sites with some additional fragments of code that facilitate interaction with the
OSN platform. Consequently, existing web questionnaires or other web-based
applications used for research may be converted into an OSN application with-
out much additional work. Studies using OSNs such as Facebook havemultiple
advantages:
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1. Size and Global Reach
As of December 2011, Facebook has over 845 million unique active users
per month, and 483 million users per day. It is available in more than
70 languages, and 80% of users are from outside the U.S. and Canada
(http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22). At the
end of 2011, more than 7 million applications and websites integrated
with Facebook (http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=137).
2. User related information
With the user’s permission, applications can conveniently access and record
an unparalleled set of data about the user through the FacebookAPI. Face-
book storesmost of its data in a network graph format, creating friendship
links between users, ”like” links between users and brands, statements or
activities, ”working at” links between users and employers, and ”study-
ing at” links between users and schools or universities. This format is
extremely convenient compared to the plain text format of most of the In-
ternet, which requires Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms to
interpret.
At the time of writing, the Facebook API contains data that falls into the
following broad categories:
(a) Demographic Profile containing unique id, name, profile picture,
age, gender, relationship status, romantic interests, geographical lo-
cation, place of origin, work and education history, political views,
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biography, link to personal website, and time zone.
(b) Likes, which represent endorsement or preference connection with
virtually anything. Users express their likes (and thus create a con-
nection) by pressing a like button that is pervasive on Facebook and,
increasingly, in other parts of the web. For instance, one may like
a friend’s picture, a comment on a friend’s picture, the ”Jesus” fan
page, a local pub, or an article on the BBC website.
(c) Social network, composed of friendship connections, connections
between user’s friends (thus, egocentric network), user’s significant
connections (e.g. spouse, parents, kids), and basic information about
user’s friends (depending on friends’ privacy settings)
(d) Photos and videos in which user has been tagged or that were pub-
lished by the user. This provides a direct link to users’ social activity
away from the web.
(e) Textual writings of users, including: status updates, comments, links,
and notes published by the user or their friends
3. Facebook of real people
Users’ unique identities benefit research methodologically by allowing a
researcher to note when a user retakes a questionnaire. Instead of multi-
ple submissions from the same user being a drawback of online research
(Birnbaum, 2004), they present an opportunity to do longitudinal studies.
A unique identity also makes it trivial to compare different questionnaire
35
CHAPTER 2: IMPULSIVITY, DELAY DISCOUNTING AND ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIOURS: AN ONLINE STUDY
responses together, and so as more studies and questionnaires are made
available the data becomes exponentially richer. It is also unnecessary to
ask people to complete the same questionnaire or enter the same demo-
graphic information twice for two different studies. Finally, it is easy to
set up an electronic system for users to automatically delete their research
information. This means that users have more control over their data than
in offline settings.
4. Convenient and Ecological
People already use OSNs extensively so it is convenient for them to partic-
ipate when they have the time and inclination, and in a physical location
that they choose (Reips, 2000). This makes it unnecessary for a researcher
to bring them into a laboratory. If a research project provides a service
that allows users to interact with their friends, then these interactions are
ecologically valid as they become part of the social behaviour that users
do of their own volition.
5. Low Cost
Recruitment of participants is a difficulty with web studies (Birnbaum,
2004). But if an OSN application is interesting for users, then they will
spread it themselves through the social network.
In June 2007 I developed a Facebook application called myPersonality, soon af-
ter the launch of the Facebook API that for the first time allowed independent
developers to integrate their applications with the Facebook platform. myPer-
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sonality offers Facebook users a set of genuine personality and abilitymeasures,
and then gives them personalized feedback on their results.
The number of measures provided by myPersonality is constantly expanding.
As of January 2012 there were more than 25 scales available that ranged from
the 336 item long IPIP NEO personality facets questionnaire to our own adap-
tive IQ test based on a 120 item long item bank. To date, over 6 million users
participated in the most popular questionnaire, the IPIP version of the NEO
Personality Inventory (Goldberg et al., 2006), and nearly half of them have al-
lowed us to anonymously record their scores and information stored in their
Facebook profiles. The great majority of this data, including records of on-
line behaviour, rich demographic data, friendship networks, and scores on the
other psychometric measures were made freely available to other academic re-
searchers on the myPersonality project website (Stillwell & Kosinski, 2011).
Users do not receive a payment or course credit for using myPersonality. This
provides better quality data, since unmotivated or careless participants may an-
swer randomly, skip, or misread the test items (Kurtz & Parrish, 2001). Chang
and Krosnick (2009) found that nonprobability Internet samples yielded the
most accurate self-reports of political views, although they were a more bi-
ased sample than telephone interviewing or probability Internet samples. In
myPersonality’s 336 item IPIP proxy for Costa and McCrae’s NEO-PI-R facets,
users actually pay a small sum (about $4) to participate, which helps to en-
sure that participants are highly motivated to complete this long questionnaire
accurately. The myPersonality sample is also more representative than those
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obtained in traditional studies:
1. Gender
According to Gosling et al. (2004), 71% of participants in 510 traditional
samples from 156 articles published in JPSP were female. In compari-
son, in their sample of web studies only 57% of participants were female.
Among our participants 63% are female (Figure 2.1), a gender bias that is
stronger than in on-line studies, but weaker than in the published sam-
ples.
2. Age
The Facebook population is still predominantly young, and so are myPer-
sonality users. The average participant is 23.5 years old and nearly half of
them (47%) are between 18 and 24 years old (Figure 2.1). However, the age
composition of the myPersonality sample seems to be very similar to that
of traditional studies. As estimated by Gosling et al. (2004), the average
age in the JPSP samples was 23 years, roughly equal to the web studies.
3. Geographic region
There are few international barriers in web-surfing and thus online based
studies are inexpensively available to geographically detached popula-
tions. myPersonality attracts more than 42% of respondents from outside
the US. Additionally, 44 countries are represented by more than 1000 re-
spondents. Consequently, the geographical diversity of our respondents
(note that myPersonality is currently available exclusively in English) is
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2.5 times higher than in the published samples reviewed by Gosling et al.
(2004), which had 17% of non-US participants.
Figure 2.1: Gender and age distribution of myPersonality users
At least in case of the basic demographic properties of gender, age and geo-
graphic region, our samples collected on Facebook are not less representative
than those obtained in traditional studies. Obviously, populations are defined
by a number of other demographic traits (e.g. race, education, income) but it is
not obvious why samples collected on Facebook should be particularly biased
for any of those traits. On the contrary, Facebook reaches groups often excluded
from samples, such as shy, socially or physically handicapped, or extremely
busy individuals. For example, as it is shown on Figure 2.2, racial composition
of the Facebook user base in the United States looks increasingly similar to the
one in the general population – a situation still rare in many other contexts (e.g.
Universities).
The following two experiments present data from three myPersonality ques-
tionnaires, two of which were added specifically for the purpose of this the-
sis. ’Today or Tomorrow?’ measures delay reward discounting, the degree to
which an individual discounts the value of a future reward due to the delay
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Figure 2.2: Relative saturation of the ethnicities on Facebook in the US (Mar-
low, 2009)
to receiving it, and it also includes questions on addictive substance use and
dependency. It has been completed almost 15,000 times since it was introduced
on 30th June 2010. The Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11; Stanford et al., 2009)
was added in October 2010 and has been completed more than 18,250 times.
The Big Five personality test was the first test added to myPersonality in June
2007, and is the default test that the vast majority of users take when they use
the application for the first time. It has been answered by more than 6 million
individuals, as well as being retaken almost 1 million times. This provides an
unprecedented dataset to study individual differences in cognition.
40
CHAPTER 2: IMPULSIVITY, DELAY DISCOUNTING AND ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIOURS: AN ONLINE STUDY
2.2 Experiment 1: Individual Differences Related to
Addictive Substances: Use and Dependency
The following results have been submitted for publication.
2.2.1 Introduction
About one third of tobacco smokers develop tobacco dependence, 15% of drinkers
become alcohol dependent and 15% of users of other drugs become dependent
(Anthony, Warner, & Kessler, 1994). This poses the question of why some
people try an addictive substance and become lifelong users whereas others
stop. Even in controlled animal studies which eliminate social influences, 17%
of animals persist in self-administering a drug despite negative reinforcement
(Deroche-Gamonet, Belin, & Piazza, 2004). This suggests there is an individ-
ual difference in vulnerability to addiction and that addiction is not just due to
opportunity or other social factors.
Many studies and meta-analyses of humans have established links between
personality measures and tobacco, alcohol and drug-use, however across all
addictive substances there are more studies that relate substance-use to per-
sonality than substance dependency to personality. Since the majority of users
of an addictive substance start when they are young (Grant & Dawson, 1998),
this confounds use and dependency, since older users of an addictive substance
are more likely to have high dependency. Although age can be statistically con-
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trolled for, it would be useful to comparewhether there are different personality
markers of substance use and substance dependency.
Leading theories in the psychopharmacological literatures assume that there is
a similar process underlying all addictions , whether it is an automatic stimulus-
response habit (Everitt, Dickinson, & Robbins, 2001; Tiffany, 1990), a drug-
induced loss of impulse control in the frontostriatal system (Jentsch & Tay-
lor, 1999), sensitization of the system that responds to incentives (Robinson &
Berridge, 1993), or disruption of hedonic homeostasis (Koob & LeMoal, 1997).
If there is an analogous process, then to the extent that personality factors are
related to cognitive and neurological substrates of impulsivity (Adelstein et al.,
2011; Caseras et al., 2006; DeYoung et al., 2010), similar personality factors
should be predictive of use and dependency across different types of addictive
substance, yet co-occurrence of addictions is rare (Sussman et al., 2011). In this
study we compare tobacco, alcohol, and other drugs.
Big five personality (Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1990) measures openness (lib-
eral vs. traditional), conscientiousness (organized vs. flexible approach to life),
extraversion (outgoing vs. less talkative), agreeableness (concerned by social
cohesion vs. assertive), and neuroticism (easily stressed vs. emotionally sta-
ble). Personality traits are associated with the outcome of therapeutic interven-
tions for substance dependency (Hooten et al., 2005), and understanding the
individual differences in drug use and misuse could help the development of
prevention programs and interventions to reduce addictive substance problems
(Mezquita, Stewart, & Ruiperez, 2010).
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Many researchers have reported links between big five personality andwhether
someone currently smokes. Malouff, Thorsteinsson, and Schutte (2006) meta-
analysed 9 studies with 4,730 participants and found that lower conscientious-
ness, lower agreeableness, higher neuroticism and higher extraversion (outside
the USA and Canada) correlated with being a smoker. Terracciano and Costa
(2004) studied an elderly American population and found that higher neuroti-
cism, lower agreeableness and lower conscientiousness correlated with being
a smoker. Munafo and Black (2007) found that higher extraversion and higher
neuroticism, as measuredwhen participants were 16 years old, predicted future
smoking between the age of 20 and 53. Hong and Paunonen (2009) used peer
reports of personality and found that lower conscientiousness, lower agreeable-
ness, higher neuroticism and lower extraversion were related to smoking sta-
tus. Additionally, a meta-analysis of another model of personality, Eysenck’s
tripartite taxonomy (measuring extraversion, psychoticism and neuroticism),
found that higher extraversion and higher neuroticism correlated with being
a smoker Munafo and Black (2007). Two studies also reported analyses of in-
teractions between personality factors; Hong and Paunonen (2009) found that
being both lower in conscientiousness and lower in agreeableness were related
to smoking, and Terracciano and Costa (2004) found that being both higher in
neuroticism and lower in conscientiousness were related to smoking. Littlefield
and Sher (2012) found that decreasing neuroticism over a 17 year time span in
young adulthood is associated with desisting smoking during that time. Over-
all, there is broad agreement that individuals with higher neuroticism, lower
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conscientiousness, and higher extraversion aremore likely to be smokers. There
have not been enough studies looking at interactions between factors to show
a clear weight of evidence.
Three studies reported the relationship between smoking dependency and big
five personality traits. Munafo and Black (2007) did not find a relationship
between personality measured at age 16 and number of cigarettes smoked be-
tween 20 and 53 for any of the big five traits using a sample size of 217. Lit-
tlefield and Sher (2012) found no relationship between changing personality in
young adulthood and changes in the number of cigarettes smoked. Shadel and
colleagues (2004) found that higher openness was related to motivation to quit
and the number of quit attempts in the past year.
Alcohol consumption is more common than smoking across most cultures; one
study at a Spanish university reported that just 3.5% of university undergradu-
ates did not consume alcohol (Mezquita et al., 2010). Consequently, researchers
rarely examine alcohol use except among adolescents (Nees et al., 2012) and in-
stead the emphasis is on the level of alcohol consumption. A meta-analysis ex-
amining links between alcohol involvement and personality (Malouff, Thorsteins-
son, Rooke, & Schutte, 2007) found that alcohol involvement was associated
with lower conscientiousness, lower agreeableness and higher neuroticism. Clark
and colleagues (2012) also found a relationship between lower conscientious-
ness and weekly alcohol use, but not for the other big five traits. Mezquita
et al. (2010) found that higher extraversion and lower conscientiousness were
related to alcohol consumed, whereas higher neuroticism was only related to
44
CHAPTER 2: IMPULSIVITY, DELAY DISCOUNTING AND ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIOURS: AN ONLINE STUDY
alcohol problems rather than alcohol consumed. Nees et al. (2012) studied the
correlates of early alcohol use in 14 year olds from a personality, behavioural
(risk taking, risk adjustment and delay aversion) and neuroimaging (activation
in reward-related brain regions) perspective. They found that personality dis-
positions accounted for by far the largest proportion of variance in alcohol use
(16%) compared with behaviour (0.6%) and brain responses (0.4%). Of the big
five traits, higher extraversion was a significant marker. Bottlender and Soyka
(2005) found that outpatients with higher neuroticism and lower conscientious-
ness scores were more likely to relapse 12 months after treatment for alcohol
dependence. Hopwood et al. (2007) found that there were few if any traits that
differentiated individuals with current alcohol abuse problems from those with
a history of alcohol problems, suggesting that the traits represent stable predis-
positions to substance use.
In contrast to alcohol, consumption of drugs is rarely separated into use and
dependency, probably because any drug use is not socially acceptable, even
though epidemiological studies find that half the US population have tried a
drug for a non-medical reason Anthony et al. (1994). A meta-analysis of sub-
stance abuse disorder, excluding alcohol, found that higher neuroticism, lower
conscientiousness and lower agreeableness were related to diagnosis (Kotov,
Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 2010). Higher neuroticism was found to be re-
lated to not completing a substance abuse treatment program (Scalise, Berkel,
& Van Whitlock, 2010). Bogg and Roberts (2004) studied conscientiousness
in depth and found that lower scores were related to drug use. Among specific
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drugs; ter Bogt, Engels, and Dubas (2006) found that MDMA users are more ex-
troverted than non-users but found no difference between heavy (three or more
tablets in a session) or light users. Terracciano, Lockenhoff, Crum, Bienvenu,
and Costa (2008) found that marijuana use was linked with higher openness,
lower agreeableness and lower conscientiousness, and cocaine/heroin use was
linked with higher neuroticism and lower conscientiousness.
Impulsivity and drug use are co-morbid (Stanford et al., 2009). Impulsivity
is a behavioural endophenotype that precedes drug exposure (Ersche, Turton,
Pradhan, Bullmore, & Robbins, 2010; Tarter, Kirisci, Habeych, Reynolds, &
Vanyukov, 2004) and increases with drug exposure (Dallery & Locey, 2005).
Furthermore, impulsivity is a multifaceted construct that includes inhibitory
control and heightened preference for immediate reward (delay discounting),
both of which have been consistently related to tobacco (Bickel et al., 1999;
Daugherty & Brase, 2010; Heyman & Gibb, 2006; Reimers, Maylor, Stewart,
& Chater, 2009; Stillwell & Tunney, 2012; Sweitzer, Donny, Dierker, Flory, &
Manuck, 2008), alcohol (Daugherty & Brase, 2010; Reimers et al., 2009), and
drug use (Belin, Mar, Dalley, Robbins, & Everitt, 2008; Reimers et al., 2009).
Measures of impulsivity are rarely used in tandem with big five personality,
andwhen they have inconsistent results have been found. Daugherty and Brase
(2010) found that steep delay discounting is related to frequency of tobacco and
alcohol use (but not frequency of drug use), but this effect was no longer sig-
nificant after accounting for time perspective and big five personality. Hair
and Hampson (2006) found that conscientiousness and trait impulsivity both
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predicted alcohol consumption in female college students but both accounted
for the same variance. Conversely, conscientiousness has a small correlation to
various behavioral measures of impulsivity (Edmonds, Bogg, & Roberts, 2009).
This raises the question of whether the broad personality measures are explain-
ing additional variance beyond the narrower impulsivity construct.
We make three unique contributions. First, it is known that impulsivity is re-
lated to addictive behaviors and that big five personality is also related to ad-
dictive behaviors, but not whether they both are together. We measure big five
personality, a trait measure of impulsivity, and the behavioural measure of de-
lay discounting in order to test whether and how broad personality traits ex-
tend our understanding of addictive behaviours beyond impulsivity. Second,
we study tobacco use, alcohol use and drug use in all participants, and also
include a measure of dependency for each. This allows comparison of how in-
dividual differences relate to substance use and dependency separately, and to
see whether the same measures are related to the three addictive substance cat-
egories. Finally, we look at interactions between the big five factors as markers
of substance use, since this is an understudied topic in the literature.
2.2.2 Method
Procedure
In order to maximize the sample size we used an online social network appli-
cation to collect a large dataset. All users of the Facebook online social net-
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work are able to add the myPersonality application to their account (Stillwell
& Kosinski, 2011), and more than 6m users have completed a questionnaire
so far. Users are initially presented with the Big Five questionnaire, and are
then given the option of completing more than 20 other personality measures.
Participants are only incentivized by the prospect of receiving individualized
feedback on the results of each questionnaire. The myPersonality application
appears within the Facebook website, surrounded by Facebook navigation and
advertising. Participants can stop using the application at any time by closing
the window or navigating away from the page.
The ’Today or Tomorrow’ questionnaire received ethical approval from the Uni-
versity of Nottingham School of Psychology Ethics Committee. Respondents
gave consent for their results to be used in an anonymised format for research,
were able to stop at any time without pressure by simply closing the browser
window, and were able to delete their information after completing the study
through an automatic formmechanismwithin the ’My Personality’ application.
Measures
Big five personality was recorded on myPersonality using the IPIP version of
the NEO personality inventory (Goldberg et al., 2006). Users are initially pre-
sented with a consent form, explaining how their information will be used for
research and that they can delete their information at any time by following
the automatic mechanism. Users then completed the Big Five questionnaire.
At the bottom of the questionnaire, they were asked to opt in to sharing their
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Facebook profile information, and from this their age and gender was recorded.
Users then received a graphical and textual description of their personality re-
sults.
Delay discounting was recorded on myPersonality using a questionnaire called
’Today or Tomorrow?’ Users were told that they would receive feedback on
their delay discounting function, which measures how much a user prefers
the present over the future. Participants were asked to make repeated choices
between two monetary amounts; varying amounts now compared to a larger
amount at some future point. A delay discounting parameter was calculated
for each participant using a hyperbolic discounting curve as explained in Still-
well and Tunney (2012), such that greater values reflect a sharper decline in the
subjective value of money as the delay to obtain the money increases.
Substance use was assessed at the beginning of the Today or Tomorrow ques-
tionnaire under a section labelled as optional. Users answered the question ’Do
you smoke?’ by choosing between ’daily or more’, ’less than daily’, or ’never’.
Users were then asked ’If you smoke at all, please answer the following ques-
tions’, and then presented with the questions from the Cigarette Dependence
Scale (CDS-5; Etter, Le Houezec, & Perneger, 2003). Users then answered
’Do you drink alcohol?’ by choosing between ’weekly or more often’, ’less than
once a week’, or ’never’. Users who drink at all were then asked to complete the
Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ; Townshend & Duka, 2005). Finally users
were asked ’Do you use drugs?’ and given the option between ’weekly or more
often’, ’less than once a week’ or ’never’. Users who used drugs at all were
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asked to complete the Assessment of Substance Misuse in Adolescents (ASMA;
Willner, 2000).
Trait impulsivity was assessed on myPersonality using the Barratt Impulsivity
Scale (BIS-11; Stanford et al., 2009) in its own section of the site. Users were
told that they would receive feedback on their overall impulsivity score and on
the three second order factors: attentional impulsiveness, non-planning impul-
siveness and motor impulsiveness.
Participants
A total of 18,278 users entered their smoking status, alcohol status or drug-use
status, although the vast majority of participants did not complete all of the
demographic, personality and impulsivity measures and so most analyses use
a subset. Raw correlations among all of the variables are shown in Table 2.1,
including the number of participants, which indicates how many completed
the various measures. 64% of participants were female, and the average age
was 23.02 years (SD=9.2 years).
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Table 2.1: Spearman 2-tailed correlations among the variables analysed. Correlations in bold are significant at p=.001 or below. Sex
is coded 0 = male, 1 = female. Nicotine, alcohol and drug-use are coded 0 = no, 1 = yes. Numbers in parentheses are the
N for that comparison.
Sex Ope Con Ext Agr Neu BIS-11
Delay
Nicotine Alcohol Drug CDS-5 AUQ ASMADiscounting
Age -.006 .023 .185 .033 .056 -.075 -.028 -.027 .306 .422 .135 .332 -.019 .042
(10526) (10297) (10297) (10297) (10297) (10095) (1812) (6069) (10175) (10090) (6794) (2333) (4372) (1160)
Sex .007 -.017 .036 .049 .179 .091 .027 <.001 -.022 -.029 .073 .058 .089
(10936) (10936) (10936) (10936) (10717) (1813) (6455) (10717) (10613) (7167) (2385) (4498) (1181)
Ope -.082 .205 .120 -.073 .009 -.058 .059 .084 .100 -.062 .006 -.064
(17768) (17768) (17768) (17402) (1810) (9003) (16899) (16653) (11154) (3680) (6784) (1622)
Con .231 .223 -.319 -.409 -.093 -.006 .018 -.107 -.017 -.064 -.124
(17769) (17769) (17403) (1810) (9003) (16900) (16654) (11154) (3680) (6784) (1622)
Ext .238 -.357 .117 .051 .086 .089 .050 -.024 .075 -.108
(17769) (17403) (1810) (9003) (16900) (16654) (11154) (3680) (6784) (1622)
Agr -.342 -.134 -.042 -.067 -.046 -.056 -.016 -.023 -.130
(17403) (1810) (9003) (16900) (16654) (11154) (3680) (6784) (1622)
Neu .179 .092 .038 <.001 .023 .137 .036 .213
(10717) (8807) (16552) (16314) (10923) (3593) (6588) (1572)
BIS-11 .200 .147 .127 .189 .093 .156 .268
(1163) (1743) (1729) (1386) (470) (949) (284)
Delay .113 .025 .072 .115 .085 .098
Discounting (8920) (8844) (6143) (2004) (3982) (1025)
Nicotine .376 .402 .217 .182
(17889) (12003) (7230) (1690)
Alcohol .303 -.070 -.061
(11936) (3950) (1691)
Drug -.006 .208
(2524) (4802)
CDS-5 .089 .228
(2908) (1009)
AUQ .075
(1287)
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2.2.3 Results
Raw correlations among all measures are presented in Table 2.1. In order to
assess the ability to predict whether a given user would use a particular addic-
tive substance, three hierarchical binary logistic regressions were used. They
examined the unique associations between the demographic, personality and
impulsivity measures, and smoking status, alcohol status, and drug-use status
as the criterion variables (coded as 1 = yes, 0 = no). In the first step, age and
gender were included as predictors, and in the second step the psychological
predictors were added. For all models there was a significant difference in vari-
ance between step 1 and step 2. The models are presented in Table 2.2 and
show that age, openness, lower agreeableness, BIS-11 impulsivity and steeper
delay discounting predicted smoking. Age, extraversion, lower agreeableness
and BIS-11 impulsivity predicted alcohol use. Openness, lower conscientious-
ness, lower agreeableness, BIS-11 impulsivity, and steeper delay discounting
predicted drug-use.
In order to assess the ability to predict whether a substance user would show
greater dependency, only users of a particular substance completed the Cigarette
Dependence Scale (CDS-5; Cronbach’s α=.88; Etter et al., 2003) which mea-
sured smoking behaviour, the Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ; This scale
counts the number of units consumed and so a reliability measure is inappro-
priate; Townshend&Duka, 2005) whichmeasured their alcohol intake, and/or
the Assessment of Substance Misuse in Adolescents (ASMA; Cronbach’s α=.81;
Willner, 2000) which measured their drug dependence. Three further hier-
52
CHAPTER 2: IMPULSIVITY, DELAY DISCOUNTING AND ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIOURS: AN ONLINE STUDY
archical linear regressions examined the unique associations between the de-
mographic, personality and impulsivity measures, and smoking dependency,
alcohol dependency and drug dependency. In the first step, age and gender
were included as predictors, and in the second step the psychological predic-
tors were added. For all models the difference in variance accounted for be-
tween step 1 and step 2 was significant. The models are presented in Table 2.2
and show that age, neuroticism, and delay discounting were associated with
smoking dependence. Only BIS-11 trait impulsivity was associated with alco-
hol dependence, and neuroticism and BIS-11 impulsivity were associated with
drug dependence.
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Table 2.2: Regressions showing the relationship between demographic, personality and impulsivity measures, and addictive be-
haviours. Bold relationships are significant at p<.05
Behaviour Smoking Alcohol Drug-Use
Yes/No CDS-5 Linear Yes/No AUQ Linear Yes/No ASMA Linear
Logistic Regression Regression Logistic Regression Regression Logistic Regression Regression
N = 1082 N = 282 N = 1081 N = 607 N = 869 N = 185
Wald χ2 p Odds t p Wald χ2 p Odds t p Wald χ2 p Odds t p
Step 1
Demographics
Age 32.73 <.001 1.04 6.12 <.001 43.233 <.001 1.06 -2.44 0.02 0.05 0.827 1 0.66 0.51
Sex 0.04 0.85 1.03 1.39 0.17 0.002 0.97 1 0.35 0.73 0.51 0.47 0.89 1.85 0.07
R2 Cox & Snell R2 =.03 R2 = .134 Cox & Snell R2 =.05 R2 = .01 Cox & Snell R2 =.001 R2 = .02
Step 2
Personality
Openness 14.99 <.001 1.72 -0.04 0.97 3.28 0.07 1.26 -0.11 0.91 10.76 0.001 1.77 -0.85 0.4
Conscientiousness 0.74 0.39 0.9 -0.15 0.88 0.14 0.7 0.96 -0.43 0.67 6.18 0.01 0.71 -0.04 0.97
Extraversion 3.11 0.08 1.2 0.33 0.74 11.7 0.001 1.39 0.4 0.69 0.52 0.47 1.09 -0.94 0.35
Agreeableness 12.45 <.001 0.65 1.08 0.28 8.89 0.003 0.71 0.02 0.98 4.74 0.03 0.73 0.09 0.92
Neuroticism 1.54 0.22 1.14 2.58 0.01 0.09 0.77 1.03 0.91 0.36 1.45 0.23 0.87 2.58 0.01
Impulsivity
BIS-11 13.44 <.001 2.57 0.22 0.83 12.3 <.001 2.4 2.79 0.01 10.61 0.001 2.71 4.14 <.001
Delay Discounting 24.94 <.001 1.96 3.32 0.001 1.84 0.18 1.19 1.33 0.18 6.82 0.01 1.52 1.57 0.12
Sig. χ2 = 143.21, p<.001 F=7.51, p<.001 χ2 = 114.48, p<.001 F=2.72, p=.004 χ2 = 65.33, p<.001 F=5.18, p<.001
R2 Cox & Snell R2 = .124 R2 = .199 Cox & Snell R2 = .100 R2 = .039 Cox & Snell R2 = .072 R2 = .209
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In order to distinguish which sub factor of BIS-11 impulsivity was predictive
of both substance use and substance dependency, all models were rerun using
the second order factors of the BIS-11 (attentional impulsiveness, motor impul-
siveness, and non-planning impulsiveness) instead of the overall score. It was
found that in all models except one, the only significant second order predictor
was non-planning impulsiveness. The exception was when predicting ASMA
scores, the only significant second order predictor was motor impulsiveness. In
all models, using the second order BIS-11 factors rather than the overall score
did not change the pattern of other significant predictors, except when predict-
ing whether a given user smokes, extroversion changed from p=0.08 to p=0.036.
It was surprising that we did not find a relationship between smoking and the
personality traits of higher neuroticism and lower conscientiousness given the
broad agreement in the literature of a link (Bogg & Roberts, 2004; Hong &
Paunonen, 2009; Malouff et al., 2006; Munafo & Black, 2007; Munafo,
Zetteler, & Clark, 2007; Raynor & Levine, 2009; Terracciano & Costa, 2004;
Terracciano et al., 2008). We therefore repeated the hierarchical binary logistic
regression but removed delay discounting and trait impulsivity as predictors,
leaving age, gender, and the big five personality traits (N=9715). This analy-
sis found that neuroticism (Wald χ2 = 25.99, p<.001) and lower conscientious-
ness (Wald χ2= 23.44, p<.001) were significant predictors. We also repeated
the analysis for alcohol use (N=9637) and again found that both neuroticism
(Wald χ2=7.59, p=.006) and lower conscientiousness (Wald χ2=27.78, p<.001)
were significant predictors. This indicates that these broad personality traits
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are capturing variance that can be more narrowly understood as trait impulsiv-
ity or delay reward discounting.
We also tested for interactions between personality traits associated with use
of the three addictive substances. We used the hierarchical method followed
by Terracciano and Costa (2004) where age, gender, and the five personality
traits are added, followed by the interactions between all pairs of traits to see
if they explain additional variance. For tobacco use (N=9715) there was a sig-
nificant interaction between openness and neuroticism (Wald χ2=8.28, p=.004)
such that being both open to experience and being emotionally unstable is re-
lated to smoking. For alcohol use (N=9637) there was a significant interaction
between openness and agreeableness (Wald χ2=4.75, p=.029), such that being
both open to experience and high in agreeableness is related to drinking. For
drug use (N=6434) there was again a significant interaction between openness
and agreeableness (Wald χ2=4.65, p=.031), such that being both open and agree-
able is related to drug use.
2.2.4 Discussion
We used a social network application to collect data on demographics, person-
ality, impulsivity, and addictive substance use and dependency from a large
sample of international participants. The percentage of variance accounted for
by the predictors was between 20.9% for drug dependency and just 3.9% for
alcohol consumption, indicating large differences in the explanatory power of
these same predictors between different drugs. Age and gender were poor pre-
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dictors overall; for smoking and alcohol, age was a significant marker, where
being older made one more likely to be a smoker, to be more dependent on
cigarettes, to use alcohol, and to drink more per month. None of the analyses
showed an effect of gender.
Among the big five personality factors, those which were associated with sub-
stance use were not associated with substance dependency and vice versa. The
most consistent marker of substance use was low agreeableness, which was re-
lated to smoking, alcohol and drug use but not dependency. Loukas, Krull,
Chassin, and Carle (2000) reported that individuals lower in agreeableness re-
ported stronger coping motives to use alcohol and weaker upbringing reasons
to limit drinking, which may generalise to other addictive substances in that
individuals lower in agreeableness are more resistant to parental pressure to
avoid addictive substances. Higher openness was also related to substance use
but not dependency; it predicted tobacco use and drug use and was marginal
for alcohol use (p=.07). Being open to new experiences includes being open
to trying addictive substances, but it does not relate to becoming dependent.
Surprisingly, low conscientiousness was only a factor in drug use (but not de-
pendency), and high extraversion was only associated with alcohol use (but not
dependency).
The only big five personality trait that was associated with dependency was
high neuroticism, which was related to both nicotine dependency and drug de-
pendency, whereas it was not related to use of any of the addictive substances.
In this study we used the Alcohol Use Questionnaire as our measure of alco-
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hol dependency, which simply counts the number of units consumed, but large
amounts of alcohol consumed is not necessarily the same as having an alco-
hol problem and the point at which consumption becomes problematic may be
different between individuals. This may explain why we did not find a rela-
tionship between higher neuroticism and our measure of alcohol dependency
– Mezquita et al. (2010) found that neuroticism was related to alcohol problems
but not alcohol consumed. It may be that neuroticism determines the point at
which an individual considers their addictive substance use to be problematic.
We also looked for interactions between the big five traits relating to addictive
substance use. For drinking and drug use there was a significant interaction be-
tween higher openness and higher agreeableness. This was surprising since in
our data low agreeableness is consistently associated with substance use, and
it could suggest that whereas low agreeableness allows one to resist parental
pressure, a combination of high openness and high agreeableness could make
one more susceptible to peer pressure. For smoking there was a significant in-
teraction between higher openness and higher neuroticism, indicating that if
one is open to trying new experiences and also prone to anxiety, then one is
more likely to try smoking. This effect does not match those found by previous
researchers; Hong and Paunonen (2009) found an interaction between lower
conscientiousness and lower agreeableness, and Terracciano and Costa (2004)
found one between higher neuroticism and lower conscientiousness. This dif-
ference may be related to our inclusion of measures of impulsivity.
The link between substance use and the personality traits of higher neuroti-
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cism and lower conscientiousness disappeared when trait impulsivity and de-
lay discounting were included as predictors. This indicates that these broad
personality traits are capturing variance in substance use that can be more nar-
rowly understood as trait impulsivity or delay discounting, which replicates
the conclusion of Hair and Hampson (2006) who studied alcohol consumption.
This finding demonstrates the value of including multiple individual differ-
ence measures that would be expected to be related to addictive behaviour, so
that they control for one another and the potential mechanisms underlying the
broad traits can be recognised.
Trait impulsivity as measured by the BIS-11 was predictive of both use and
dependency for alcohol and drugs, and of tobacco use but not dependency.
Post-hoc analyses of the three second order factors of the BIS-11 found that in
all cases the effect was driven by non-planning impulsiveness, except for drug
dependency which was linked to motor impulsiveness. Steep delay discount-
ing was still associated to addictive substances in half of the analyses even af-
ter taking into account conscientiousness and BIS-11 impulsivity. It predicted
smoking and smoking dependency, and drug-use, and for all analyses the effect
was in the expected direction even if it did not reach significance.
Given that the percentage of variance accounted for by this range of predic-
tors was as low as 3.9% (for alcohol consumption), and that even when a range
of predictors reached significance as in drug use which was associated with
three personality traits and two measures of impulsivity and yet just 7.2% of
variance was accounted for, we accept that there are many other potentially im-
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portant factors which are not included in this study. Other factors identified
in the literature include risk taking (Lejuez et al., 2003), impulsive disinhibi-
tion (Reynolds et al., 2006), sensitivity to reward (Brunelle et al., 2004), time
perspective (Daugherty & Brase, 2010), mindfulness (C. Murphy &MacKillop,
2012), and cognitive decision biases (Heyman & Dunn, 2002).
Two limitations with the study were first that the sample was a convenience
one. On the other hand, users were incentivized to answer honestly in all ques-
tionnaires because their only reward was to receive feedback on their results.
Additionally, the substance use questions were marked as being optional, so
users had no reason to lie. A second limitation is that we asked generic ques-
tions about drug use, whereas given the results of this research we would ex-
pect different individual differences to be associated with different drugs.
Using responses from a large online sample, we conclude that big five person-
ality traits explain unique variance in addictive substance use and dependency
even after accounting for trait impulsivity and delay discounting. Low agree-
ableness and high openness are consistently associated with addictive sub-
stance use, whereas high neuroticism is associated with substance dependency.
There are also other personality traits which are related to specific substances;
high extraversion is related to alcohol use and low conscientiousness is related
to drug use. We also found interactions between personality traits which hint
at a more complex relationship; although further studies should be undertaken
as results are inconsistent. Researchers should separate studies on the use of
addictive substances from those on dependency, as different individual differ-
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ences underlie the two processes.
2.3 Experiment 2: Effects of measurement methods
on the relationship between smoking and delay
reward discounting
The following results were published in Addiction (Stillwell & Tunney, 2012)
2.3.1 Introduction
Delay reward discounting (DRD) measures how a reward’s subjective utility
decreases as the interval before it is obtained increases. Steeper DRD has been
found to be related to a range of addictive behaviours, including smoking (Baker,
Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Bickel et al., 1999; Heyman & Gibb, 2006; Johnson,
Bickel, & Baker, 2007; Reynolds et al., 2007; Sweitzer et al., 2008), the suc-
cess of smoking cessation (Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007; MacKillop & Kahler,
2009), the initiation of regular smoking in adolescents (Audrain-McGovern et
al., 2009), drinking (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998), heroin and cocaine (Heil,
Johnson, Higgins, & Bickel, 2006; Kirby & Petry, 2004), opioids (Madden et
al., 1997) and marijuana (Johnson et al., 2010). However, the measurement
of DRD varies and it is possible that this may affect estimates of effect size or
cross-experiment comparisons (Mackillop et al., 2011). We therefore compared
multiple methods of measuring DRD to estimate whether the relationship be-
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tween DRD and smoking changed depending upon the measurement method.
In humans, DRD is typically measured by giving individuals repeated choices
between various immediate amounts and a larger amount delayed for various
lengths of time. Normally the rewards are hypothetical, but equivalent results
have been found whether DRD is measured using real or hypothetical rewards
(Johnson & Bickel, 2002). For example, an individual is asked to choose either
$500 today or $1000 in amonth. The point at which an individual switches from
preferring a delayed reward to an immediate reward allows estimation of how
much they subjectively value the delayed reward in today’s money.
In normative economics, it has been assumed that individuals have an expo-
nential discounting function. This has the implication that individuals are time
consistent. Using an exponential curve, a parameter k can be calculated which
represents the individual’s degree of DRD. This is shown in Equation 2.3.1,
where D is the delay in months, A is the amount of the reward and V is the
subjective value of the reward as determined by an individual’s preferences.
V = Ae−kD (2.3.1)
A large k indicates that the individual steeply discounts the future, whereas a
low k indicates that the individual is more willing to wait. However, in humans
DRD is typically found to follow a hyperbolic curve, such that small delays
have a proportionately larger impact than longer delays (Rachlin et al., 1991).
This is shown in Equation 2.3.2.
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V =
A
1+ kD
(2.3.2)
This accounts for time inconsistent preferences, where an individual switches
their preference from a delayed reward to an immediate reward as the time
before the reward is available decreases. The exact form of the DRD function
has important economic implications, as the regrets inherent in hyperbolic dis-
counting could be corrected through taxation (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001).
Although DRD has been conceptualised as a single stable trait that underlies
decisions about delay in all domains (Odum, 2011), it has been found in the
past that different methods or parameters used when measuring delay dis-
counting leads to different DRD parameter estimates. It is possible that these
variations could cause illusory or differing effects to be found between addic-
tive behaviours and DRD. We set out to confirm the effect of these method-
ological differences and to see how they might interact with different groups of
smokers.
The first is that there is evidence that the order that rewards are presented can
affect the derived DRD parameter. Randomizing the order of the immediate re-
wards leads to the highest rate of discounting, followed by putting the rewards
in an ascending order, and then in a descending order (Robles & Vargas, 2006,
2008; Robles, Vargas, & Bejarano, 2009). People who smoke tend to be higher in
impulsivity and impulsivity itself may lead to spurious findings that smoking
is associated with delay discounting. For example, assessing delay discounting
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requires people to repeatedly rate a higher distant reward that remains con-
stant against a smaller reward that changes. One measure of impulsivity, the
Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11; Koff & Lucas, 2011; Stanford et al., 2009),
measures a dimension called attentional impulsiveness (difficulty maintaining
attention), which has been found by some researchers to be most closely related
to DRD (de Wit, Flory, Acheson, McCloskey, & Manuck, 2007; Kirby, Petry, &
Bickel, 1999). Smokers might switch to the immediate reward earlier simply
because they want to stop choosing the same delayed reward. To mitigate or-
der effects, researchers have used a titrating procedure, where the immediate
amount decreases after the immediate amount is chosen, and increases after
the delayed amount is chosen, leading to an increasingly accurate assessment
of the switch point. Rodzon (2011) found no difference in the derived DRD pa-
rameter between a fixed procedure and a titrating procedure (although with a
sample size of just 24), but a titrating procedure still requires an initial amount,
against which future amounts could be anchored by the participant. This could
lead to unexpected effects due to trait impulsivity differentially interactingwith
the anchoring effect rather than differences in DRD. In the current experiment,
participants were randomly allocated to three groups where the immediate re-
wards were either presented in an ascending, descending, or randomized order.
The second parameter difference is that typically in DRD studies multiple de-
lays are used with anything from 6 hours to 25 years. Within a study, the DRD
parameters for each delay are calculated and then averaged. This averaging is
understandable if it is assumed that an individual has a single delay DRD pa-
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rameter accurately measured by their discounting function and that variations
around this are noise, however it may be that some individuals discount some
delays more than others. For example, smokers could plausibly be expected
to discount the distant future comparatively more than they discount tomor-
row, since smoking involves negative returns over a decadal timeframe. In the
current experiment, participants’ DRD parameters were calculated separately
for each delay and then compared to see whether smokers discounted certain
timeframes more than others.
The third parameter difference is the size of the delayed amount. Often $1000
is used, however when other amounts are used studies find that that smaller
amounts are discounted more steeply than large amounts (Grace & McLean,
2005; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; S. H. Mitchell & Wilson, 2010); this is com-
monly known as the magnitude effect. It is possible that larger amounts may
be discounted more by smokers than smaller amounts, since smoking involves
repeatedly choosing a smaller reward over a long-term health decline. In the
current study, $1000 and $100 were compared within-subjects at a time delay of
1 month.
We aimed to test whether these differences in DRD methodology would sys-
tematically bias the observed relationship between smoking and DRD, and to
see whether the relationship is only found under certain conditions. Since these
effects are subtle, a large sample size was necessary to achieve reliable results.
We therefore used an application which runs on the Facebook social network.
Nearly 9500 international users completed a multiple-item DRD task in return
65
CHAPTER 2: IMPULSIVITY, DELAY DISCOUNTING AND ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIOURS: AN ONLINE STUDY
for feedback on their results, and agreed to share their data with the researchers.
2.3.2 Method
Delay Reward Discounting Measure
Participants were asked tomake repeated choices between twomonetary amounts;
various amounts now compared to larger amounts at some future point. The
delays and amounts are a subset of those used in previous DRD research (Bickel
et al., 1999; Rachlin et al., 1991). The 15 immediate monetary rewards were
$1000, $950, $900, $850, $750, $600, $500, $400, $250, $150, $100, $60, $20, $10,
and $1, and the six delays were 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, and
5 years. These were all compared to $1000 at the future time point. Participants
were also asked an extra set of questions which asked for their preferences of
rewards at a delay of 1 month that were a tenth of the size of those above ($100,
$95, etc.) and compared to $100 at the future time point. This totalled seven sets
of questions, which were presented in a randomized order for each participant.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three groups. Within each set
of questions, the amounts were either presented in an ascending order ($1, $10,
[. . . ], $1000), descending order ($1000, $950, [. . . ], $1), or randomized order.
To calculate the participant’s hyperbolic DRD parameter (k) for each delay in
both their feedback and for the research, an indifference point was established
by calculating an average between the maximum immediate monetary amount
chosen and theminimumdelayedmonetary amount chosen (Bickel et al., 1999).
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The parameter was then calculated according to the hyperbolic DRD formula
mentioned above. Since the distribution of k is often found to be non-normal
(Bickel et al., 1999; Rachlin et al., 1991), the data were approximately nor-
malised using the natural-log transformation. The k parameter reflects the
steepness of the discount curve, whereby greater k values reflect a sharper de-
cline in the subjective value of money as the delay to obtain that money in-
creases.
Procedure
Users of the ’My Personality’ application on the Facebook social network (Still-
well & Kosinski, 2011) were invited to participate in a new questionnaire called
’Today’or Tomorrow?’ and told that they would receive feedback on their re-
sults. Users who chose to start the ’Today or Tomorrow’ questionnaire were
given further information about the study (Appendix A), including being told
that their DRD function would be estimated but that the rewards were hypo-
thetical. As ’My Personality’ is used by an international audience, users were
given the option to choose a currency that they either used or were most fa-
miliar with from 9 of the most widely used world currencies (British Pound,
Canadian Dollar, Euro, Filipino Peso, Indian Rupee, Indonesian Rupiah, Singa-
pore Dollar, South African Rand, United States Dollar). The delayed amounts
were based on a published study that used US Dollars, and so the amounts
were converted to the other currencies using the exchange rate from Google’s
exchange rate function on 22nd June 2010 (see Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3: Currencies used, including exchange rates from Google’s exchange rate function on 22nd June 2010
Name Symbol Conversion N Mean Age % % daily/ Mean(log(k))
used on ’My per $1 USD (SD) Male non-daily/ (SD)
Personality’ non-smokers
British Pound £ 0.68 915 25.0 (10.2) 38% 24/7/70 -.93 (.58)
Canadian Dollar $ 1.02 436 22.4 (9.2) 33% 17/6/76 -1.09 (.58)
Euro ¤ 0.81 644 24.7 (8.1) 42% 29/10/62 -.98 (.57)
Filipino Peso P 45.45 159 22.5 (6.1) 42% 11/14/75 -.73 (.60)
Indian Rupee Rs 45.65 156 23.1 (6.1) 56% 15/6/78 -.75 (.57)
Indonesian Rupiah Rp 9009 51 22.9 (6.1) 59% 16/6/78 -.59 (.67)
Singapore Dollar $ 1.38 184 20.3 (6.4) 41% 10/4/86 -.91 (.58)
South African Rand R 7.51 63 26.7 (9.1) 36% 32/5/63 -1.03 (.52)
United States Dollar $ 1 6430 22.8 (9.2) 36% 17/7/75 -.98 (.56)
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Figure 2.3: Screenshot of ’Today or Tomorrow’ questions on ’My Personality’.
Immediate amounts are presented in descending order and have
been converted into British Pounds.
Users were also asked to answer the question ”Do you smoke?” with answers
”daily or more”, ”less than daily”, or ”never”, and complete the Cigarette De-
pendence Scale (CDS-5; Etter et al., 2003). Users also completed the Alcohol
Use Questionnaire (AUQ; Townshend & Duka, 2005), and the Assessment of
SubstanceMisuse in Adolescence (ASMA; Willner, 2000) although these results
are not presented here. Users were told that completion of these questionnaires
was optional and would not affect their feedback. Users then completed the
DRD measure (Figure 2.3), including short instructions telling them to assume
no inflation (Kawashima, 2006). Finally, for feedback users were told which
quartile their calculated DRD parameter was in, and shown a graph with their
personal DRD curve compared to the mean DRD curve (Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4: Screenshot of ’Today or Tomorrow’ feedback on ’My Personality’.
The lighter curve is the participant’s personal DRD curve calcu-
lated from their DRD parameter. The darker curve is that of the
average person.
The ’Today or Tomorrow’ questionnaire received ethical approval from the Uni-
versity of Nottingham School of Psychology Ethics Committee. Respondents
gave consent for their results to be used in an anonymised format for research,
were able to stop at any time without pressure by simply closing the browser
window, and were able to delete their information after completing the study
through an automatic formmechanismwithin the ’My Personality’ application.
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Participants
From September 2010 to June 2011, 9454 unique users completed the full ’Today
or Tomorrow’ questionnaire, allowing their DRD parameter to be calculated.
Respondents were tracked using their Facebook user ID, which allowed repeat
respondents to be removed from the analysis. Of the 6549 who entered their
gender, there were 2504 males (38%) and 4045 females (62%). Of the 6154 who
entered their date of birth, the mean was 23.1 years old (SD = 9.1 years). Due
to the random condition allocation process, there were 2964 participants in the
ascending condition, 3195 in the descending condition and 3295 in the random-
ized condition. Table 2.3 shows the currencies chosen by participants and the
demographic and smoking characteristics of users of each currency.
2.3.3 Results
In order to examinewhether the exponential or hyperbolic discounting function
fit individuals’ DRD best, curves were fit for each participant using their 6 de-
lays (between 1 week and 5 years). Sums of squared deviations were calculated
for each participant’s 6 indifference points from the curves generated by the
discounting functions (Lagorio & Madden, 2005). It was found that the mean
deviation from that predicted by the discounting function was smaller for the
hyperbolic function (mean = 24150, SD = 32418, absolute difference = $155.40)
than the exponential function (mean = 31558, SD = 41236, absolute difference
= $177.65). For 86.8% of participants the hyperbolic function was a better fit to
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their DRD than the exponential function, which agrees with previous research
(Bickel et al., 1999; Lagorio & Madden, 2005; Madden, Bickel, & Jacobs,
1999). There was no significant difference in the percentage of daily, non-daily,
and non-smokers who were best described by the hyperbolic function.
Since the hyperbolic discount function best describes most individuals’ DRD,
for each participant estimated DRD log(k) parameters were averaged over the
six delays which used $1000 as the delayed amount. To test whether self-
reported smoking behaviour affected any effect of DRD order condition, partici-
pants were split into three groups: daily smokers, non-daily smokers, and non-
smokers. The validity of separating the daily and non-daily smoking groups
was confirmed by the CDS-5 scores of the two groups; daily smokers scored
16.03 (SD = 4.60, N = 1520), and non-daily smokers scored 7.06 (SD = 2.67, N =
502). In all analyses, the group sizes are unequal and we therefore used a Type
III sum of squares ANOVA method in which each effect is controlled for every
other effect, which ameliorates the problem.
Using the 9038 respondents who reported their smoking behaviour, a 3 x 3 be-
tween groups ANOVA examined whether the order that the items were pre-
sented in is related to delay discounting. Condition (ascending, descending,
and randomized) and smoking status (daily smoker, N = 1592; non-daily smoker,
N = 669; non-smoker, N = 6777) were the factors and log(k) was the dependent
variable (Figure 2.5). A main effect of smoking status was found (F(2,9038) =
58.98, MSE = .32, p <.001), and planned t-tests showed that daily smokers had
a steeper DRD curve than non-daily smokers (t(5887) = 3.02, p = .003), who in
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Figure 2.5: Mean DRD parameter (log(k)) for the ascending, descending and
randomized conditions, separated by smoking status. The identi-
cal differences for each condition illustrate that the three smoking
factors are affected equally by the three order conditions. Error bars
are standard errors.
turn had a steeper DRD curve than non-smokers (t(7444) = 3.24, p = .001). A
main effect of condition was found (F(2, 9038) = 11.20, MSE = .32, p < .001) and
planned t-tests found that all three conditions had different parameters from
one another (ascending was steeper than descending t(6157) = 2.48, p = .013;
randomized was steeper than ascending t(6257) = 3.37, p = .001; randomized
was steeper than descending t(6488) = 6.24, p < .001). However, no interaction
was found between smoking status and condition (F(4, 9038) = .38, MSE = .32,
p = .82);.the differences between smoking groups within each condition are the
same, so the different smoking groups are affected equally by the DRD order
condition.
To find out whether there were differences in the estimated DRD parameters
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Figure 2.6: Mean DRD parameter (log(k)) for the daily smoker, non-daily
smoker, and non-smoker conditions, at various delays. The simi-
lar curves indicate that the same differences between smoking sta-
tuses would be obtained no matter what delay length was used.
Standard error bars are too small to be seen.
at different delay lengths, and whether any differences were affected by smok-
ing status, a 3x3x6 mixed ANOVA was conducted with condition (ascending,
descending, and randomized) and smoking status (daily smoker, non-daily
smoker, non-smoker) as the between groups factors and delay length (1 week,
2 weeks, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years) as the within groups factor. There
was an effect of delay length (F(5, 45145) = 3195.15, MSE = .21, p < .001), such
that shorter delays led to a steeper discounting parameter being estimated. The
three-way interaction was not significant (F(20, 45145) = 1.37, MSE = .21, p =
.13), but there was an interaction between delay length and smoking status
(F(10, 45145) = 2.16, MSE = .21, p = .017). Figure 2.6 illustrates that for each of
the smoking groups, the estimated DRD parameters become shallower as the
delay length increased, but there was no clear pattern of changing differences
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between the smoking groups, indicating that similar results would be obtained
nomatter which delay periodwas used. Table 2.4 presents correlations between
individuals’ estimated log(k) parameters for various delays. It can be seen that
as the time difference between two delays increases, the correlation between in-
dividuals’ estimated DRD curves decreases (the smallest correlation is between
1 week and 5 years). This indicates that the delay length effect found in the
ANOVA above is not simply due to a missing parameter in the hyperbolic dis-
counting function which would affect the whole cohort of participants but not
groups, and so we might still have expected to find differences between smok-
ing groups. This nevertheless calls into question the estimation of a single DRD
parameter across various delay lengths, as an individual’s DRD parameter at
one delay may not be strongly predictive of their parameter at another delay.
Table 2.4: Pearson correlations of individuals’ estimated log(k) delay reward
discounting parameters at various delays. All correlations are sig-
nificant at p<.001
Delay 1 week 2 weeks 1 month 6 months 1 year
2 weeks 0.736
1 month 0.647 0.736
6 months 0.531 0.619 0.7
1 year 0.439 0.529 0.65 0.767
5 years 0.302 0.394 0.48 0.651 0.715
In order to investigate the effects of differing delayed rewards, the DRD param-
eters for $1000 in 1monthwere compared to the parameters for $100 in 1month.
A 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA with smoking status (daily smoker, non-daily smoker,
and non-smoker) as the between-groups factor, and delayed amount ($100,
$1000) as the within-subjects factor found a main effect of delayed amount (F(1,
8940) = 259.51, MSE = .17, p < .001), but no interaction (F(2, 8940) = 1.73, MSE
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Figure 2.7: Mean DRD parameter (log(k)) for the $1000 and $100 delayed
amounts in 1 month. The matching curves indicate that the
three smoking statuses are identically affected by the two delayed
amounts. Error bars are standard errors.
= .17, p = .18). These effects are shown in Figure 2.7 where the $100 delayed
amount is discounted more steeply than the $1000 delayed amount and daily
smokers discount more steeply than non-daily smokers. However, since the
shape of the curves are identical the same differences between smoking groups
would have been found no matter what delayed amount was used in the DRD
procedure. This analysis relies on the subjective difference between $100 and
$1000 being the same for all currencies. Despite our attempt to equalise them
using the exchange rate, it may still be that our monetary values are perceived
as larger or smaller for some currencies depending upon local prices. In order
to control for this effect, we repeated the analysis using only respondents who
picked the US Dollar as their currency. We again found a main effect of delayed
amount (F(1, 6362) = 159.44, MSE = .17, p < .001) but no interaction (F(2, 6362)
= .23, MSE = .17, p = .79), which corroborates our findings.
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The daily, non-daily and non-smoker groups differed by demographic charac-
teristics, particularly age; daily smokers were older than non-daily smokers,
who were older than non-smokers. To control for any effects of age, the main
analyses were repeated including age and gender as covariates (these are pre-
sented in Appendix B). The pattern of results replicated the current results,
indicating that irrespective of which method of measuring discounting is used,
the same effect of smoking group would be found.
2.3.4 Discussion
We found three methodological differences that may challenge the assumption
of a single DRD parameter across all situations. The order that immediate re-
wards were presented in led to differing derived discounting parameters, with
the randomized order demonstrating the steepest discounting, followed by the
ascending order, followed by the descending order. Also, smaller delay lengths
led to a steeper discounting function, and small rewards were discounted more
than large rewards. Finally, daily smokers demonstrated the steepest discount-
ing, followed by non-daily smokers, followed by non-smokers. Nevertheless,
despite the large sample size, there were no interactions between smoking sta-
tus and any of the above effects. This indicates that the difference in DRD be-
tween different smoking groups is remarkably robust to the method of mea-
surement: it does not matter what order the items are presented in, what de-
layed time is used, or what delayed amount is used. The results of this study
do however underline the importance of not directly comparing discounting
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parameters between studies, as the method of eliciting them is important.
Consistent with previous research (Bickel et al., 1999; Lagorio & Madden,
2005; Madden et al., 1999) it was found that a hyperbolic DRD curve fit bet-
ter than an exponential curve. This implies that individuals have inconsistent
time preferences and so may change their minds as the time before two re-
wards are available decreases. This has important implications for the external
consequences that economists use when calculating the negative impacts of be-
haviours such as smoking (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001), such that an individual
may not take their future self’s preferences fully into account.
There are other variables that could affect DRD that were not studied here.
It is known that individuals differentially discount different types of rewards
(Tsukayama & Duckworth, 2010), so it might be that daily smokers discount
cigarettes more than non-daily smokers. Additionally, this study does not shed
light on whether the difference in DRD is due to an acute nicotine effect or
whether it is a trait that may explain why people smoke, although there is
evidence that steep DRD leads to smoking rather than the reverse (Audrain-
McGovern et al., 2009).
Running an online study was successful in obtaining a large sample, and from
countries that are underrepresented in traditional research (Gosling et al., 2004),
but it did present a methodological problem specific to DRD in that the curren-
cies used by participants differ. In order to standardize amounts the exchange
rate was used, but it could be more appropriate to use a measure of purchas-
ing power which takes account of unequal prices for the same goods between
78
CHAPTER 2: IMPULSIVITY, DELAY DISCOUNTING AND ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIOURS: AN ONLINE STUDY
different countries. Additionally, the exchange rates on one date were used
throughout the 10 month study, however, exchange rates fluctuated during this
time, for example the USDollar to British Pound exchange rate peaked at 0.6513
and floored at 0.5984. Nevertheless, whichever exchange rate was used, the cal-
culated discounting rate would remain unaffected, and so discounting rates in
our experiment are comparable between currencies. However, since we found
that larger amounts are discounted less steeply, the purchasing power of a cur-
rency could affect how long people are willing to wait to receive it.
We found differences in DRD rate between users who picked different curren-
cies. Indonesian Rupiah users had the steepest DRD functions whereas Cana-
dian Dollar users were most self-controlled. Nevertheless, we view these dif-
ferences extremely cautiously because as well as the differences in purchasing
power between currencies we also cannot be sure that the selection biases for
’My Personality’ users are the same for each country. For example, users of
’My Personality’ in the United States are more likely to be sociologically repre-
sentative than users in countries such as India where internet use is less com-
mon and where only a certain sociographic would use our English-language
Facebook application. In conclusion, irrespective of how we measured DRD –
varying the order of the items, the length of the delay and the magnitude of the
delay – daily smokers had a shorter temporal horizon than non-daily smokers,
who in turn had a shorter horizon than non-smokers. This is strong evidence
that smoking is reliably related to DRD as a generalised behavioural prefer-
ence function, rather than only a particular method of measuring discounting.
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It also indicates to researchers that the method they use to measure discount-
ing should depend upon their convenience. However, researchers should only
compare discounting functions within studies, or effect sizes between studies,
as small changes in DRDmethodology can significantly affect the derived DRD
parameter.
2.4 Chapter Discussion
This chapter examined how trait impulsivity, delay discounting and personal-
ity is related to addictive substance use and dependency. The general findings
from Experiment 1 were that the conscientiousness personality trait did not
explain unique variance beyond the impulsivity measures, however delay dis-
counting and trait impulsivity were independent predictors. This conclusion
was further supported by Experiment 2, which found that the methods used to
measure delay discounting did not have an effect on its association with smok-
ing. Since the methods were hypothesized to be related to BIS-11 impulsivity,
specifically the motor impulsiveness subfactor, this indicates that trait impul-
sivity does explain why how an individual responds to the delay discounting
task is related to smoking.
Importantly, Experiment 1 found that orthogonal personality traits were related
to substance use and dependency. This indicates that in order to answer the
question of what individual differences confer vulnerability to addiction, it is
necessary to study individuals who have at least tried the addictive substance.
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Otherwise, a researcher might be measuring traits which determine whether
an individual tries a substance, rather than vulnerability to its addictive prop-
erties.
Between 4% (for alcohol dependency) and 21% (for drug dependency) of vari-
ance in substance use and dependency was accounted for by the psychological
and demographic measures included. This indicates that there is substantial
variance in addictive behaviour still to be accounted for, even though we used
a broad set of predictors. The following chapter concentrates on smoking, as it
is a well-defined addictive behaviour (as opposed to drug use) that is common
enough to find in a student sample but rare enough that it does not represent
a large proportion of the population (26% of myPersonality users smoked). In
our models, 12.4% of variance in smoking use was accounted for, which was
average among the addictive substances.
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Validity of the Simplified Harvard
Game
3.1 Chapter Introduction
Impulsivity is a risk factor for drug dependence, but the mechanisms underpin-
ning this association are unclear. One possibility is that impulsive individuals
have an impaired capacity to represent abstract global consequences, allowing
immediate rewards to dominate behaviour despite incurring a long term dis-
advantage. This could occur in either the the domain of losses or gains, or in
both. There is also a question of whether participants learn a conscious under-
standing of the payoffs involved in their choices.
In this chapter, the validity of a task called the Simplified Harvard Game (SHG)
is tested by examining whether an impairment in representing global conse-
quences is related to smoking behaviour. The payoffs in the SHG are then re-
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versed into the loss domain in the Credit Card Game, the results of which sug-
gest that impulsive disinhibition may not be the reason that smoking behaviour
is related to performance on the SHG. In the second half of the Chapter, two ex-
periments probe participants’ understanding of the SHG.
3.2 Experiment 3: Impulsivity and acute nicotine ex-
posure are associatedwith discounting global con-
sequences in the Harvard game
The following results are accepted for publication in Human Psychopharmacology:
Clinical and Experimental (Hogarth, Stillwell & Tunney, in press).
3.2.1 Introduction
Although impulsivity is a risk factor for drug dependence, it is not clear how
impulsivity influences decision making to drive addiction. The existing liter-
ature demonstrates that impulsivity and drug use are co-morbid (Stanford et
al., 2009), and impulsivity is found both prior to drug exposure (Ersche et al.,
2010; Tarter et al., 2004; Verdejo-Garcia, Perales, & Perez-Garcia, 2007) and
to be augmented by drug exposure (Dallery & Locey, 2005; Heil et al., 2006;
Setlow, Mendez, Mitchell, & Simon, 2009; Winstanley, 2007). The implication
is that impulsivity and drug exposure are reciprocal, and individual suscepti-
bility to this vicious circle arguably determines the longitudinal transition to
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clinical dependence (de Wit, 2009; Everitt et al., 2008; Perry & Carrol, 2008).
What is unclear, is precisely what impairment in decision making allows drug
use to dominate behaviour.
One proposal is that impulsivity reflects a dominance of sub-cortical stimulus-
response reward learning systems over prefrontal cortical goal-directed learn-
ing systems (Everitt et al., 2008; Koob & Volkow, 2010; Matsuo et al., 2009;
Nelson & Killcross, 2006; Wallis, 2007). On this view, reduced prefrontal cor-
tical volume in impulsive individuals impairs their capacity to represent the
abstract, long term consequences of behaviour, and thereby they fail to acquire
complex goal-directed strategies that are ultimately more optimal. Rather, im-
pulsive individuals acquire automatic stimulus-response (S-R) reflexes, such
that reward-seeking behaviour is elicited directly by reward paired cues or con-
texts, without retrieving a representation of the consequences. This decoupling
of reward seeking from intentional determination renders the behaviour less
tractable to regulation by knowledge of global consequences.
The idea that retrieval of consequences is impaired in impulsive individuals
is supported by several studies. First, impulsivity assessed by the Barratt Im-
pulsivity Scale (BIS-11 Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) has been associated
with an impairment in goal-directed control of action selection in the outcome
devaluation paradigm (Hogarth, 2011). In this procedure, participants first ac-
quired two instrumental responses for different rewarding outcomes (food and
water), before one outcome was devalued by specific satiety. Finally, choice be-
tween the two responses was tested in extinction, such that any reduction in
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choice of the devaluated outcome must be mediated by integration of knowl-
edge about the response-outcome (R-O) contingencies acquired in training with
knowledge about the current incentive value of the outcome to determine the
propensity to perform that response. The results showed that individuals high
in BIS impulsivity showed a reduced devaluation effect in this extinction test
despite reporting equivalent decline in the hedonic evaluation of the devalued
outcome. The study thus demonstrated that impulsivity was associated with
impairment in the retrieval of a representation of the current value of the con-
sequences of behaviour to make adaptive choices.
In a related study, Hogarth (in press) found that the relationship between sub-
jective craving to smoke and the number of puffs consumed in an ad libitum
smoking session became progressively decoupled with increasing BIS impul-
sivity. In accordance with Tiffany (1990), therefore, this finding suggested that
high BIS impulsivity conferred a propensity for drug taking behaviour to be-
come automatic, in the sense of no longer being governed by subjective desire
for the outcome. Again these results implicate a weakening of intentional de-
termination of behaviour in impulsivity.
Several other studies provide converging evidence for this view. For instance,
psychostimulant exposure increases impulsivity (Setlow et al., 2009) and im-
pairs goal-directed control of reward seeking, suggesting a predominance of
S-R learning (Jedynak, Uslaner, Esteban, & Robinson, 2007; Nelson & Kill-
cross, 2006). Similarly, impulsivity increases the perseveration of drug self-
administration that incurs shock punishment (Belin, Jonkman, Dickinson, Rob-
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bins, & Everitt, 2009; Economidou, Pelloux, Robbins, Dalley, & Everitt, 2009)
non-reward (Diergaarde et al., 2008) and financial costs (Dallery & Raiff, 2007;
Mueller et al., 2009), suggesting an autonomy of the behaviour from its conse-
quences. Impulsivity also reduces sensitivity to error feedback signals (Groen
et al., 2008; Potts, George, Martin, & Barratt, 2006) (see also: Franken, van
Strien, Franzek, & de Wetering, 2007; Garavan & Stout, 2005; Hester, Simoes-
Franklin, &Garavan, 2007), an impaired ability tomodify established stimulus-
response control of performance by instructions (Enticott, Ogloff, & Bradshaw,
2006) and a narrowing of the perceptual dimensions considered when making
free categorisation decisions (Milton, Longmore, & Wills, 2008, ; Experiment
4). These data all converge on the view that impulsivity reflects a decoupling of
action selection from control by the abstract representations of consequences,
in favour of automatic S-R based control.
The Harvard Game
A rational decision-maker should dispassionately weigh up all future conse-
quences of a decision before they decide whether to pursue a course of action
or not. Nevertheless, experiments have long suggested that human decision-
making does not take into account every eventuality and that there are situa-
tions where consequences are systematically ignored. One such situation is that
of intrapersonal externalities (R. J. Herrnstein & Prelec, 1991), where changes to
the utility of options available to the future self are not taken into account when
making a decision, in the same way that externalities in economics refer to situ-
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ations inwhich consequences to others are not taken into accountwhen individ-
uals make decisions. Intrapersonal externalities lead to an under-investment in
activities that exhibit increasing average returns to the rate of consumption (for
example, exercise becomes increasingly rewarding with increased practice, and
also has positive effects on how rewarding other life activities are), and an over-
investment in activities that exhibit decreasing average returns to the rate of
consumption (for example, use of addictive substances becomes decreasingly
rewarding with increased use, and also crucially has negative effects on how
rewarding other life activities are).
In an experiment reported by R. J. Herrnstein et al. (1993), participants were
presented with a repeated binary choice task using payoff schedules similar to
those shown in Figure 3.1. The payoff from each choice was determined by the
proportion of the previous ten choices that was allocated to each option, where
choosing the optimal long-term option (maximize) would lead to a lower im-
mediate payoff but would slightly increase the payoff from both options over
the next ten trials, leading to a higher overall payoff. Conversely, choosing the
optimal short-term option (meliorate) would lead to a higher immediate payoff
but would decrease the payoff over the next ten trials. Consistently choosing
the long-term option ultimately leads to the highest payoff, although on any
single trial the short-term option would give the greatest number of points.
The authors found that participants did not learn to optimise their behaviour,
choosing instead the option with the greatest short-term payoff. R. Herrnstein
and Vaughan (1980) suggested that choices are made according to the princi-
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ple of melioration, in which the option with the highest immediate payoff is
selected irrespective of the consequences for future payoffs.
Figure 3.1: Example payoff schedules used in the task. P(max) represents the
proportion of Max choices over the previous 10 trials.
It is not new to postulate that addicts do not fully take into account internali-
ties, although past models have generally used hyperbolic time discounting as
the theoretical reason for inconsistent preferences (Gruber & Koszegi, 2001).
Nevertheless, evidence for the ecological validity of intrapersonal externalities
was found by Heyman and Dunn (2002), who found that patients recovering
in drug-clinics were more likely to choose sub-optimally than control patients,
suggesting that addicts may be worse than others in taking into account the full
consequences of their decisions. Further evidence for the link between intraper-
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sonal externalities and addictions has come from neuropsychological research
which found that the level of prefrontal brain activity is associated with per-
formance in the task (Yarkoni, Braver, Gray, & Green, 2005; Yarkoni, Gray, et
al., 2005). This is the same area that is implicated in studies using the Iowa
Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Ernst et al.,
2002), which is related to abuse of various substances, including alcohol and
stimulants (Bechara et al., 2001). This suggests that intervention at this be-
havioural level could be effective in reducing addictive behaviour if a method
were found to improve participants’ decisions on tasks involving intrapersonal
externalities.
The use of the Harvard game to study impulsivity is hampered by the fact that
even in normal populations the majority of participants fail to optimise their
performance and select the global option. In an attempt to correct this limi-
tation, several experiments have sought to help participants to learn to opti-
mise their performance without success (R. J. Herrnstein et al., 1993; Kudadji-
eGyamfi & Rachlin, 1996; Warry, Remington, & Sonuga-Barke, 1999). Stillwell
and Tunney (2009) argued that the difficulty in learning the original Harvard
game stems from the fact that on each trial participants received a single payoff
based on both their current choice and history of choices, making it difficult to
discriminate the differential outcomes produced by each choice. In the absence
of knowledge that the local responsewas responsible for long term costs, partic-
ipants would have no basis for reducing their choice of that response. To exam-
ine this possibility, Stillwell and Tunney (2009) designed the simplifiedHarvard
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game, where choosing the local option immediately reported both themonetary
payoff and the costs to global utility signalled by a loss of ”game units”, that
is, the number of trials that remain in which a choice could be made. With the
local option now clearly associated with both a higher immediate payoff and
higher overall costs (loss of game units), participants were more successful in
learning to choose the global option across exposure to the task. In the present
study, this simplified Harvard Game was employed to determine whether dis-
tribution of responses between the local and global option would show lawful
variation with individual differences.
One question about the Harvard game concerns its association with delay dis-
counting. In delay discounting, participants choose between a lower immediate
reward versus a larger delayed reward, which is similar to the Harvard game
where participants also choose between a lower immediate reward versus a
larger delayed reward, although the length of the time delay is measured in
seconds. The question, therefore, is what psychological processes are unique to
each task. To address this question, participants in the current experiment also
completed a delay discounting task, to determine whether there would be any
dissociation with the Harvard game. On the basis of previous studies using this
procedure, it was anticipated that delay discounting should be associated with
BIS nonplanning impulsivity (de Wit et al., 2007) and higher levels of smoking
dependency (Bickel et al., 1999; Heyman & Gibb, 2006; Johnson et al., 2007;
Reynolds et al., 2007; Sweitzer et al., 2008).
Study of the Harvard Game has left a number of open questions as to whether
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the higher proportion of local responses in the drug user group was mediated
by trait impulsivity, chronic drug exposure, or acute drug exposure. The objec-
tive of the current study was to try and untangle the impact of these variables
on performance in the Harvard game. Participants in the current study were
all smokers. The rationale for recruiting this group is that they show higher BIS
impulsivity scores compared to the general population of non-smokers (Bickel
et al., 1999; S. H. Mitchell, 1999, 2004; Reynolds et al., 2007; Skinner, Aubin,
& Berlin, 2004; Spillane, Smith, & Kahler, 2010) and it was thought that indi-
vidual differences in Harvard game and delay discounting performance might
be more apparent at the high end of the impulsivity spectrum. In addition, this
sample has the advantage of allowing us to untangle smoking related variables
that might potentially impact on task performance (Dallery & Locey, 2005;
Heyman & Gibb, 2006; Sweitzer et al., 2008). Specifically, by contrasting
non-daily and daily smokers who had not smoked prior to the experiment, the
effect of dependence level/chronic nicotine exposure could be tested. Further,
by contrasting these two groups with daily smokers who had smoked prior
to the experiment, the effect of acute nicotine exposure could be tested. The
question at stake was whether performance in the Harvard game and delay
discounting task would be differentially related to BIS impulsivity, prior smok-
ing or daily smoking status. The primary hypothesis was that BIS impulsivity
would confer a preference for the local choice in the Harvard game.
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3.2.2 Method
Participants
Fifty-one healthy students from Nottingham University volunteered to take
part in the experiment after being recruited by e-mails, posters and leaflets
(54.9% female, mean age = 21.6 years, SD = 4.2 years). Only participants who
self-identified as smokers for greater than 2 years were included in the study.
Participants reported their age, gender, and then answered the questions (1)
’How often do you usually smoke’, by ticking the phrase ’At least once per
day’ or ’Less than once per day’ (which defined smoking status: Daily, non-
daily), and (2) ’Did you smoke at any point prior to the experiment today’, by
ticking the answer ’yes’ or ’no’ (which defined prior smoking).
Participants then completed the BIS-11 impulsivity questionnaire (Patton et al.,
1995). This questionnaire contains three subscales: (1) Motor impulsivity, e.g.
”I do things without thinking”, assesses propensity for action without thought,
(2) nonplanning impulsivity, e.g. ”I plan tasks carefully”, assesses capacity for
purposive future action, and (3) attentional impulsivity, e.g. ”I don’t pay atten-
tion”, assesses capacity for sustained attention. These subscales were examined
following analysis of the total BIS score to determine if there was any selectiv-
ity. The sample’s mean BIS score was 67.2 (SD=10.5) which is slightly higher
than a published norm of 62.3 (Stanford et al., 2009).
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Procedure
Participants provided written informed consent to participate followed by the
Harvard game, delay discounting task, and BIS-11 questionnaire in counterbal-
anced order. Finally, participants were debriefed and paid in accordance with
their performance in the Harvard game (see below).
Harvard Game
Participants first read the following instructions on the screen:
Your task is simple. You will have to repeatedly choose between two
buttons, marked ”Left” and ”Right”. Simply click on a button with
the mouse to register your choice. As a result of your choices you
will win Points. After every choice you will be shown your Points
from each choice as well as your cumulative Points. As you gain
more Points, Pacman will eat more dots and get larger! However,
choices will also use up Game Units. After every choice you will
be shown the Game Units used up from each choice as well as your
Game Units remaining. Once these have run out then the game is
over. You will play the game 8 times. Try and beat your previous
score in every game! Your payment from this experiment will be
based on the number of points that you gain during the games. This
will be calculated on the basis of 0.12p/point. This means you can
earn between £5 and £7.20. After each game, you will be shown
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your current earnings so far. That’s all there is to it - just try to win
as many Points from the computer as you can before you run out of
Game Units. Take as much time as you wish and please do not write
anything down during the experiment.
Participants were then told that payment for the whole experiment would be
based on the number of points that they gained and multiplied by 0.12p/point
to calculate their earnings.
The Harvard task (Stillwell & Tunney, 2009) consisted of 8 games, each with
150 game units. This equated to between 53 and 150 trials per game, depend-
ing upon participants’ choices. Figure 3.2 shows the main screen of the game.
At the top centre of the screen a horizontal bar labelled ’Game Units Remain-
ing’ provided clear feedback concerning the payoff associated with each key.
Above this, another horizontal bar labelled ’Points’ depicted the total number
of points gained during that game. This barwas based around an animated Pac-
Man figure which moved from left to right and grew larger as the total number
of Points increased. These were designed in order to increase the salience of
feedback concerning the payoff (rewards and costs) associated with each key.
Participants made their choices by selecting one button or another using the
mouse. On each trial the points gained and game units lost informationwas up-
dated, overwriting the outcome of the previous trial, so that participants would
learn the differential payoff structure associated with left and right responses
(counterbalanced between participants).
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After each choice, both buttons were disabled for between 0.5 and 1.5 seconds
in proportion to the number of game units lost on that trial. This variable de-
lay was imposed to ensure that the total duration of each game was the same
irrespective of the proportion of local or global response, given that choosing
the local key used up more game units and so would otherwise result in faster
termination of the experiment which may act as an incentive.
Figure 3.2: The main screen of the Simplified Harvard Game.
At the end of each game, a new screen summarised the total points gained dur-
ing that game and the previous games (Figure 3.3). The top-centre of the screen
displayed textually the total points gained during the game, how much those
points were worth monetarily, and the maximum number of points that it was
possible to gain during a game. Below this, a cartoon face was presented, con-
tingent upon whether the participant gained more points during the recently
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completed game than the previous game. If the participant gained more points,
the face smiled; if an equal number of points were earned, it was neutral; and if
a lesser number of points were collected, it frowned. Beneath these, a bar chart
graphically detailed the total points gained on that game and on all previous
games.
Figure 3.3: The feedback screen of the Simplified Harvard Game.
Payoff Schedules
Participants received points for every choice that they made, but lost game
units. Choosing the local button returned 10 points per trial, but increased the
96
CHAPTER 3: VALIDITY OF THE SIMPLIFIED HARVARD GAME
rate at which game units were lost over the next 10 trials for both buttons. In
contrast, choosing the global key returned 5 points per trial but cost fewer game
units in the long term. The number of game units lost after each choice was de-
termined by Equation 3.2.1.
GU = 1+ 2(P(b1−10)) (3.2.1)
Where GU is the number of game units lost, and P(b1−10) is the proportion of
choices allocated to the local button over the preceding 10 trials. In essence,
choosing the local button over the global button earned twice the number of
points but used up three times as many game units over the next 10 trials, and
so the lost game units represent a lost opportunity to earn money in the future.
By choosing the local key the participant is committed to losing an extra 0.2
game units for the next 10 trials, with each additional lost unit relinquishing
the potential to consistently earn 5 points per game unit. This is why although
for any single trial the participant would earn more by choosing the local op-
tion, in the long term it is optimal to choose the global option. Over the 150
game units of each game, consistently choosing the global button would re-
turn a cumulative payoff of 750 points whereas consistently choosing the local
button would return a cumulative payoff of 530 points.
Each Simplified Harvard Game can be split into two blocks (Stillwell & Tun-
ney, 2009); in one block participants should choose the option whichmaximises
their long-term earnings, and in the other block near the end of each Game par-
97
CHAPTER 3: VALIDITY OF THE SIMPLIFIED HARVARD GAME
ticipants should choose the short-term option because there is no long-term
remaining. In this experiment and the following one, only the analysis of the
first block of trials is presented because the experimental hypothesis concerns
self-control of melioration behaviour which is tested in the first block.
The average number of points gained by participants was 5188 (SD=420), lead-
ing to an average payment of £6.23 (maximum obtained: £7.12; minimum ob-
tained: £5.26). The proportion of responses allocated to the global button was
recorded across eight games. A low proportion of responses allocated to the
global button indicates increased discounting of the overall payoff in favour of
the immediately higher payoff.
Delay Discounting Task
Participants first read instructions on the screen: ”You are going to be asked to
make choices between an immediate monetary reward and another monetary
reward delayed by a certain length of time. Please use the mouse to select the
option that youwould prefer. Assume that the delayed amount will be adjusted
for inflation. The rewards are hypothetical, however please make the choices
as if you were given the choice for real. An example of the kind of choice you
will be asked to make is between £50 now and £100 tomorrow. Take a second
to consider which you would prefer, and then press the OK button to continue
to the experiment.” The experimenter then verbally explained that adjusting
for inflation would mean that the delayed amount would still have the same
purchasing power as having the same amount today. Participants were then
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repetitively presented with various monetary rewards on the left-hand side of
the computer screen to be earned immediately versus £1000 delayed by various
lengths of time on the right-hand side. Participants pressed the button below
the option that they preferred with the mouse, which highlighted the button,
and then chose ’New Choice’ in the centre, which confirmed their choice and
updated the screen with the next available choice. This meant that for each
decision the participant’s mouse started in the centre of the screen, and so it did
not bias a particular choice. Participants could change their mind by choosing
the other option before pressing ’New Choice’.
The delays and amounts used have been commonly used in previous delay
discounting research (Bickel et al., 1999; Rachlin et al., 1991), although the
amounts were denominated in British Pounds rather than US Dollars. The 27
immediate monetary rewards were £1000, £990, £960, £920, £850, £800, £750,
£700, £650, £600, £550, £500, £450, £400, £350, £300, £250, £200, £150, £100, £80,
£60, £40, £20, £10, £5, and ££1. The seven delays associated with the delayed
£1000 alternative were 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years,
and 25 years. Each delay was presented in a block, with the monetary amount
randomised across trials. Moreover, the order of the delays was randomised
as sequential ordering of delays can alter participants’ preferences (Robles &
Vargas, 2008). Between each delay a popup message alerted the participant to
the change in delay.
To calculate a participant’s delay discounting parameter (k), an indifference
point was first established by calculating an average between themaximum im-
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mediatemonetary amount chosen and theminimumdelayedmonetary amount
chosen (Bickel et al., 1999). This value reflects the point at which the participant
is indifferent between the immediate reward and the delayed reward. Next,
non-linear regression was used to fit the seven indifference points from each
participant to a hyperbolic function, according to the methodology established
by Bickel et al. (1999). Since the distribution of k is often found to be non-
normal (Bickel et al., 1999; Rachlin et al., 1991), the data were approximately
normalised using the natural-log transformation. The k parameter reflects the
steepness of the discount curve, whereby greater k values reflect a sharper de-
cline in the subjective value of money as the delay to obtain that money in-
creases.
3.2.3 Results
Participants
Of the 51 participants, there were 16 non-daily smokers and 11 daily smokers
who had not smoked prior to the experiment, and 24 daily smokers who had
smoked prior to the experiment. This smoker group variable (3) was analysed
to determine the impact of dependence level (daily vs. non-daily) and acute
nicotine exposure (prior vs. no prior smoking). Total BIS scores were entered
into the same ANCOVA as a continuous variable. Subsequent analysis was
undertaken to examine BIS sub-scales and potential confounding variables.
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Harvard Game
The proportion of global responses obtained in the eight games were examined
with smoker group (3) as a categorical variable and BIS impulsivity as a covari-
ate in ANCOVA. This analysis yielded a main effect of game, F(7,329) = 2.10, p
< .05, indicating that participants acquired an increased choice of the global re-
sponse across training on the Harvard game. There was no interaction between
game and smoker group or BIS impulsivity, Fs < 1, indicating that these groups
acquired a preference for the global response at a comparable rate.
There was a main effect of BIS impulsivity, F(1,47) = 6.70, p < .02, shown in Fig-
ure 2A/B. This effect could not be explained by age, because multiple regres-
sion with the proportion of global responses as the dependent variable, and BIS
impulsivity and age as predictors indicated that BIS impulsivity served as an
independent predictor in this model, t = -2.18, p < .05, whereas age did not, t =
-.56, p = .58. Moreover, there was no significant difference in BIS impulsivity be-
tween the smokers groups, F < 1, suggesting the effect shown in Figure 3.4A/B
could not be attributed to either differential tobacco dependence or prior smok-
ing across levels of BIS. Finally, separate assessment of the three BIS scales (as
continuous variables) indicated that the greater proportion of global responses
was predicted more strongly by the BIS motor scale, F(1,49) = 5.30, p < .03, com-
pared to the nonplanning, F(1,49) = 1.84, p = .18, or attentional scales, F(1,49) =
2.51, p = .12. However, none of the three scales emerged as an independent pre-
dictor of global responses in multiple regression, ts < -1.06, ps > .28, suggesting
that these scales are too highly interrelated to partial out their independent ef-
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fect. Overall, therefore, the data suggest that BIS impulsivity is associated with
discounting global consequences in the Harvard game.
Figure 3.4: Proportion of global responses in the Harvard game. Data are
shown for each of the eight games in the impulsive (A) and smoker
groups (C), as well as the average across the eight games in the
impulsive (B) and smoker groups (D).
The initial ANCOVA also yielded a main effect of smoker group, F(2,47) = 3.22,
p < .05, shown in Figure 3.4C/D. Exploration of this effect indicated that there
was no reliable difference between daily and non-daily smokers who had not
smoked prior to the experiment, F < 1, whereas these two group collapsed chose
the global response significantly more frequently than daily smokers who had
smoked prior to the experiment, F(1,49) = 4.24, p < .05. This effect of prior smok-
ing on global responses remained significant when age and BIS impulsivity
were included as covariates, F(1,47) = 6.12, p < .02, indicating that these poten-
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tially confounding variables could not explain the effect. Therefore, these anal-
yses suggest that acute smoking prior to the experiment increased discounting
of global consequences in the Harvard game.
Delay Discounting Task
The delay discounting parameters (k) were natural-log transformation entered
into ANCOVA as the dependent variable, with smoker group (3) as a cate-
gorical independent variable and BIS impulsivity as a covariate. This analysis
yielded no significant main effects of smoker group, F < 1, or BIS impulsivity,
F(1,47) = 1.39, p = .24.
3.2.4 Discussion
The current experiment found that preference for the local choice in the Har-
vard game was associated with BIS impulsivity and acute prior smoking in a
sample of 51 young adult smokers. The results showed that the proportion
of global responses in the Harvard game increased with training, suggesting
participants acquired knowledge about the higher overall payoff of the global
choice with training, and there were no group differences in the acquisition of
this knowledge. However, BIS impulsivity and acute prior smoking were as-
sociated with a greater overall proportion of local responses. These two group
effects were independent in that they were not confounded, and could not be
attributed to the other potentially confounding variables, age or daily smoking
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status. Overall, therefore, these data support the view that BIS impulsivity and
acute nicotine exposure reduced the impact of global consequences on choice
in favour of the immediate higher payoff.
It is difficult to pinpoint the psychological process underpinning the higher
proportion of local responses in the high BIS impulsive group and prior smok-
ers. Arguably, these effects were not due to a failure to acquire knowledge of
the contingency between the global response and the higher overall payoff, be-
cause the groups showed equivalent acquisition of the global choice over train-
ing. Rather, these effects were presumably driven by differential weighting of
the consequences produced by each choice. Figure 3.2 shows that there were
several sources of feedback following a choice: Points won on that trial, total
points won in that game, game units lost on that trial, and total game units
remaining in that game. Accordingly, the high BIS group and prior smokers
may have been hypersensitive to the greater increment in points won follow-
ing a local choice, hyposensitive to greater loss of game units following the local
choice, hyposensitive to the greater total points won following global choices,
and hyposensitive to the slower rate of game units lost following global choices.
Finally, the high BIS impulsive group and prior smokers may have been more
intolerant of delay. This argument can be made because the local option used
up game points more quickly, thus participants may have believed that the lo-
cal option brought the experiment to a close more quickly and thus acted as
an incentive to choose the local option (despite the lost overall earnings). Al-
though this possibility was mitigated by adding a proportionate delay at the
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end of each trial, such that the experimental duration was matched irrespective
of the portion of local/global responses, nevertheless, participants may have
been differentially sensitive to this feedback.
Although the specific impairment in impulsivity cannot be isolated with the
Harvard game, the finding of reduced global choice nevertheless converges on
the view that the core impairment in impulsivity is a weaker capacity to retrieve
an abstract global representation of consequences to control goal-directed ac-
tion selection. As noted in the introduction, converging support for this claim
comes from the finding that impulsivity is associated with a decoupling of in-
tention and action (Hogarth, 2011; Hogarth, Chase, & Baess, 2012), persever-
ation of drug self-administration under shock punishment (Belin et al., 2009;
Economidou et al., 2009) extinction (Diergaarde et al., 2008) and financial costs
(Dallery & Raiff, 2007; Mueller et al., 2009), reduced sensitivity to error feed-
back (Groen et al., 2008; Potts et al., 2006), impaired top down regulation of
prepotent responding (Enticott et al., 2006), and restricted use of perceptual di-
mensions in free categorisation (Milton et al., 2008). Moreover, Impulsivity has
been associated with reduced volume in the prefrontal cortex (Matsuo et al.,
2009), and this region is known to synthesise multiple dimensions of outcome
expectancies (Wallis, 2007), and play a role in goal-directed action (de Wit,
2009; Valentin, Dickinson, & O’Doherty, 2007). Finally, impulsivity is believed
to facilitate the transition to automatic drug use behaviour by weakening the
control of self-administration by a representation of the consequences (Everitt
et al., 2008, 2001; R. Z. Goldstein et al., 2009; Koob & Volkow, 2010). The cur-
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rent study supports this view by demonstrating that impulsivity is associated
with impaired use of knowledge about the global consequences of behaviour
to determine choice.
The other key finding was that prior smoking was associated with increased
local choice. This finding corresponds with a number of published studies.
Specifically, greater delay discounting, which is arguably related to Harvard
game performance (R. J. Herrnstein et al., 1993; R. J. Herrnstein & Prelec,
1991), has been found to be greater in smokers who report a shorter latency to
smoke in the morning (Sweitzer et al., 2008), in daily versus non-daily smokers
(Heyman&Gibb, 2006) and in smokers versus non-smokers (Bickel et al., 1999;
Johnson et al., 2007; Reynolds et al., 2007). Although these groups tend to con-
flate dependence status, chronic and acute nicotine exposure, our data go some
way to untangling these variables. Specifically, daily and non-daily smokers
did not differ in global choice, suggesting that dependence status and chronic
nicotine exposure are not important for this decision bias. Rather, only smok-
ing prior to the study was related to reduced proportion of global choices. Of
course, individuals who smoked prior to the study are arguably more depen-
dent and have received more chronic nicotine exposure, but if these two factors
were important, a difference would have been expected in the contrast between
the non-daily and daily/no prior smoking group, which was not found. Most
decisively, however, animal studies have shown that acute nicotine administra-
tion does increase delay discounting (Dallery & Locey, 2005; Locey & Dallery,
2009) and a similar effect has been found with cocaine administration (Mendez
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et al., 2010) see also (Heil et al., 2006; Setlow et al., 2009; Tsutsui-Kimura et al.,
2010). Thus, acute drug administration does induce a preference for short term
gains in the face of global costs. Arguably, this acute drug induced preference
for short term rewards may underpin the drug induced priming of drug self-
administration behaviour (Fuchs, Evans, Parker, & See, 2004; Leri & Stewart,
2001; Schmidt, Anderson, Famous, Kumaresan, & Pierce, 2005). On this view,
the loss of a representation of global consequences following acute drug ad-
ministration disinhibits automatic control of drug self-administration by drug
paired stimuli. Our effect of acute smoking on local choice is at least consistent
with this account.
The current study sheds light on the only other published study of individual
differences in the Harvard game (Heyman & Dunn, 2002). These researchers
found that illicit drug users (n=22) showed a greater proportion of local re-
sponses in the Harvard game compared to non-drug users (n=21), supporting
a role for this decision impairment in drug dependence. However, they found
no difference in BIS impulsivity between these two groups, and BIS did not cor-
relate with the proportion of global responses, in contrast to the current study.
It is difficult to account for these discrepant findings, given the multiple differ-
ences between the studies, but key sources of variance worth considering are
the demographic status of the participants and the instantiation of the Harvard
game. More decisively, the null group effect in impulsivity found by Heyman
and Dunn (2002) suggests that acute drug use may have instead driven the
increased proportion of local choices in the drug-users. The upshot of this anal-
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ysis is that both impulsive trait and acute drug state must be taken into account
when considering individual differences in Harvard game performance.
One final question is why the delay discounting task was insensitive to group
variables compared to the Harvard game. These null effects contradict studies
which have found differential delay discounting as a function of BIS impulsiv-
ity (deWit, 2009) and smoker group (Bickel et al., 1999; Heyman&Gibb, 2006;
Reynolds et al., 2007; Sweitzer et al., 2008). One explanation for the differen-
tial sensitivity of the two tasks is suggested by Heyman and Gibb (2006). In
this study, daily and non-daily smokers (n=71) completed a delay discounting
task in which the monetary rewards were hypothetical (as in the current delay
discounting task), or actual, in that participants kept the money they earned (as
in the current Harvard game). Only in the actual reward condition did daily
smokers show greater delay discounting than non-daily smokers, whereas no
group effects were seen in the hypothetical reward condition. Impulsive deci-
sion making for actual rewards seems to be more sensitive to the effects of acute
nicotine exposure than hypothetical rewards; however, Sweitzer et al. (2008)
found an effect of morning smoking on hypothetical delay discounting with a
much larger sample (n=710) and another study de Wit et al. (2007) found an
effect of BIS impulsivity on delay discounting in a much larger sample (n=606).
Thus, although impulsive choice for actual rewards may be more sensitive to
group variables than choice for hypothetical rewards, groups effects can be de-
tected with hypothetical rewards given sufficient power.
To conclude, the study found that BIS impulsivity and acute nicotine exposure
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were associated with discounting long term consequences in favour of short
term gains in the Harvard game. These data accord with the proposed role of
impulsivity in the aetiology of drug dependence, wherein impaired retrieval
of a mental representation of global consequences in the service of intentional
action favours predominance of automatic control over behaviour. Similarly,
the acute effect of nicotine exposure on increasing local choice accords with
the view that acute drug priming of self-administration is mediated by loss
of intentional regulation by knowledge of global consequences disinhibiting
automatic control by drug paired stimuli. Overall, these data favour the view
that individual differences in the capacity to represent abstract consequences is
a key process underpinning the aetiology of drug dependence.
3.3 Experiment 4: Relationship Between the Credit
Card Game, Smoking and Impulsivity
3.3.1 Introduction
The subjective value of losses and gains are asymmetrical in humans. When
individuals are presented with two pairs of probabilistically identical gamples,
one of which is presented as a gain and the other as a loss, participants system-
atically switch choices between the two pairs, from preferring a high probability
of a small gain to preferring a low probability of a big loss. This inconsistency
demonstrates that the framing of the gambles as either gains or losses affects
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subjective values (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Delayed losses have also been compared with delayed gains in delay discount-
ing experiments. Whereas in reward discounting, participants consistently dis-
count the rewards as they are delayed, in loss discounting S. H. Mitchell and
Wilson (2010) found that a ”substantial number” of participants reverse-discounted
losses, such that they would rather incur the cost now rather than delay it.
However, S. H. Mitchell and Wilson (2010) and J. G. Murphy, Vuchinich, and
Simpson (2001) both found that thosewho steeply discounted gains also steeply
discounted losses, indicating that the individual difference is inconsistent across
both frames.
The Simplified Harvard Game was modified from one of gaining rewards to
one of avoiding costs. Practically, this meant that participants were given a
high number of points to begin with but they lost points each time they made
a choice. Choosing one button meant that the participant lost a small number
of points after each choice, but the number of choices remaining until the end
of the experiment reduced slowly. Choosing the other button meant that the
participant lost a high number of points after each choice, but the number of
choices remaining until the end of the experiment reduced at a faster rate, such
that the participant had to make fewer choices overall and so ultimately kept
more points.
The choice between a big charge and smaller payments over a long time span
mirrors the decision that borrowers have to make when their credit card state-
ment arrives in the post. Borrowers can either pay back the principle quickly, in-
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curring a large immediate expense, or they can pay the minimum amount each
month, but their debt lasts longer and ultimately costs more in interest charges.
The loss framed Simplified Harvard Game is therefore named the Credit Card
Game.
Having such a clear analogy for the task is useful, since paying off a credit
card each month vs. carrying a balance forward has been associated with both
self-control and impulsivity in college students (N=165; Mansfield, Pinto, &
Parente, 2003), although overall level of credit card debt was not related to
impulsivity (Norvilitis, Szablicki, & Wilson, 2003) in college students (N=227).
This suggests that how one uses a credit card, rather than overall economic
circumstance, is related to impulsivity.
The independent variables assessed in this experiment were the same as in Ex-
periment 3: smoking behaviour and impulsivity. Two competing hypotheses
are to be examined. If impulsivity determines performance on the task, in the
sense that participants choose the immediately most rewarding option despite
knowing that the other option is better in the longer term, then since losses
subjectively loom larger than gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) all partici-
pants should perform poorly and daily smokers should perform particularly
poorly. On the other hand, the choice to smoke overweights short-term gains
over long-term losses, so daily smokers’ poor performance on the task relative
to non-daily smokers may reflect difficulty learning about small gains relative
to large losses. As the Credit Card Game gives users a choice between small
losses relative to large gains, if daily smokers are not worse than non-daily
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smokers then this suggests that the task is revealing a deficit learning about
gains.
3.3.2 Method
Themethodwas the same as in Experiment 3, except that the Credit Card Game
used reversed payoff schedules where after each choice participants lost points
rather than gained them (explained below).
Participants
Forty-four healthy students from Nottingham University volunteered to take
part in the experiment after being recruited by e-mails, posters and leaflets
(61.4% female, mean age = 20.9 years (SD=2.4 years)). Only participants who
self-identified as smokers for greater than 2 years were included in the study.
Participants reported their age, gender, and then answered the questions (1)
’How often do you usually smoke’, by ticking the phrase ’At least once per day’
or ’Less than once per day’ (which defined smoking status: Daily, non-daily),
and (2) ’Did you smoke at any point prior to the experiment today’, by ticking
the answer ’yes’ or ’no’ (which defined prior smoking). As in Experiment 3,
participants also answered the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al.,
1995). The sample’s mean BIS score was 67.6 (SD=10.0) which is slightly higher
than a published norm of 62.3 (Stanford et al., 2009).
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Credit Card Game
Participants read the following instructions on the screen (text in bold has been
added later to emphasise the main text changed from Experiment 3):
”Your task is simple. You will have to repeatedly choose between
two buttons, marked ”Left” and ”Right”. Simply click on a button
with the mouse to register your choice.
At the beginning of the experiment you will be given 1250 Points,
but as a result of your choices you will lose points. After every
choice youwill be shown the points you lost as well as the number
of points remaining.
Choices will also use up Game Units. After every choice you will
be shown the Game Units used up from that choice as well as your
Game Units remaining. Once these have run out then that game
is over and you keep whatever number of points you have still re-
maining.
You will play the game 8 times. Try and keep more and more points
after every game!
Your payment from this experiment will be based on the number
of points that you manage to keep during the games. This will be
calculated on the basis of 0.12p/point. This means you can earn
between £5 and £7.35. After each game, you will be shown your
current earnings so far.
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That’s all there is to it – just try to keep as many points as you can
from the computer by the end of each game. Take as much time as
you wish but please do not write anything down during the experi-
ment.”
The Credit Card Game (Stillwell & Tunney, 2009) consisted of 8 games, each
with 150 game units. This equated to between 53 and 150 trials per game, de-
pending upon participants’ choices. Figure 3.2 shows the main screen of the
game. As can be seen, the game is created to mirror as closely as possible the
Harvard Game used in Experiment 3. The differences were that participants
lost points on each trial, and the animated PacMan figure moved from right to
left, eating points as it went.
Figure 3.5: The main screen of the Credit Card Game.
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Payoff Schedules
Participants lost both game units and points for every choice that they made.
Choosing the local button lost 5 points per trial, but decreased the rate at which
game units were lost over the next 10 trials for both buttons. In contrast, choos-
ing the global key lost 10 points per trial but more game units were lost in the
long term. The number of game units lost after each choice was determined by
Equation 3.3.1.
GU = 3− 2(P(b1−10)) (3.3.1)
Where GU is the number of game units lost, and P(b1−10) is the proportion of
choices allocated to the local button over the preceding 10 trials. In essence,
choosing the local button over the global button lost half the number of points
but used up a third as many game units over the next 10 trials, and so the
remaining game units represent a commitment to losing further points in the
future.
By choosing the local key the participant is committed to losing 0.2 fewer game
units for the next 10 trials, with each additional unit remaining representing a
commitment to losing a further 5 points per game unit. This is why although
for any single trial the participant would lose less by choosing the local option,
in the long term it is optimal to choose the global option. Over the 150 game
units of each game, consistently choosing the global button would return a cu-
mulative payoff of 750 points whereas consistently choosing the local button
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would return a cumulative payoff of 545 points.
The average number of points gained by participants was 5157 (SD=308), lead-
ing to an average payment of £6.19 (maximum obtained: £6.93; minimum ob-
tained: £5.43). These averages are remarkably close to those in Experiment
3, indicating that the two tasks are of similar difficulty. The proportion of re-
sponses allocated to the global button was recorded across eight games. A low
proportion of responses allocated to the global button indicates increased dis-
counting of the overall payoff in favour of the immediately smaller loss.
3.3.3 Results
Participants
Of the 44 participants, there were 17 non-daily and 7 daily smokers who had
not smoked prior to the experiment, and 20 daily smokers who had smoked
prior to the experiment. As in Experiment 3, the smoker group variable was
analysed to determine if dependence level and acute nicotine exposure were
related to performance in the task.
Total BIS scores were entered into the ANCOVA as a continuous variable. The
addition of a covariate should not change the main effect of a within-subjects
factor because the two are independent. If a student scores 20% for task 1 and
30% for task two, this should be unaffected by the student’s age, which is the
same. Similarly, the means for the whole group across the two tasks should not
depend on each participant’s age. However, the covariate may interact with the
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repeatedmeasure. The students’ ages may determine whether they are better at
task 1 or task 2. This leads to an adjustment in the sums of square which makes
the main effect of the repeated measure weaker (Delaney & Maxwell, 1981).
One solution is to mean-centre the covariate prior to running the ANCOVA
(Delaney & Maxwell, 1981), which is employed in the following results.
Credit Card Game
The proportion of global responses obtained in the eight games were examined
with smoker group (3) as a categorical variable and BIS impulsivity as a covari-
ate in the ANCOVA.
This analysis yielded a main effect of game, F(7,280) = 41.02, p< .001, indicat-
ing that participants acquired an increased choice of the global response across
training on the Harvard game. There was no interaction between game and
smoker group or BIS impulsivity, Fs < 1, indicating that these groups acquired
a preference for the global response at a comparable rate.
Unlike the previous experiment, there was no main effect of BIS impulsivity,
F(1,40) = 1.21, p = .28. The initial ANCOVA also found no main effect of smoker
group, F(2,40) = .18, p = .83.
In conclusion, there is no evidence that BIS impulsivity or acute smoking prior
to the experiment affected performance in the Credit Card Game.
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Delay Discounting
The delay discounting parameters (k) were natural-log transformation entered
into ANCOVA as the dependent variable, with smoker group (3) as a categori-
cal independent variable and BIS impulsivity as a continuous independent vari-
able. This analysis yielded no significant main effects of smoker group, F(2,40)
= 1.6, p=.21, or BIS impulsivity, F(1,40) = 2.13, p = .15.
3.3.4 Discussion
Preference for the local choice in the Credit Card Game was not associated with
the smoking variables of dependency or acute nicotine influence, or with trait
impulsivity as measured by the BIS. This is unlikely to be due to the task dif-
ficulty, as participants learned to improve their performance on the task as the
experiment progressed, and also made a similar number of global choices as
in the Simplified Harvard Game in Experiment 3. These results contrast with
those of the previous experiment, where it was found that acute nicotine influ-
ence was associated with the number of global choices in the Simplified Har-
vard Game.
Of the two hypotheses, the results support the contention that the poor per-
formance by daily smokers on the Simplified Harvard Game is due to a deficit
learning about small gains relative to large losses. In the Credit Card Game,
participants choose between small losses and large gains, which does not ex-
pose this deficit. The results do not support the hypothesis that the poor per-
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formance by daily smokers in Experiment 3 was due to impulsive disinhibi-
tion, since in the Credit Card Game the subjective difference between the two
choices would be larger than in the Simplified Harvard Game because losses
loom larger than gains Tversky and Kahneman (1981). If individuals choose
based on impulsivity then this should have caused poorer performance by all
individuals on the task, and this should particularly have affected smokers’
performance. Nevertheless, this is far from strong evidence, since the statistical
power is not high, so it would be ideal to test it on a larger sample.
In conclusion, in the Credit Card Game the difficulty was similar to the Sim-
plified Harvard Game, but there was no difference between daily smokers and
non-daily smokers. This suggests that smokers perform poorly in tasks with in-
trapersonal externalities due to diffculty learning about small gains rather than
disinhibition of impulsivity.
3.4 Experiment 5: Participants’ Understanding of the
Simplified Harvard Game
The following results and those presented in the next experiment have been published
in Judgment and Decision Making (Stillwell & Tunney, 2012).
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3.4.1 Introduction
A series of laboratory experiments has tried without success to guide partici-
pants to choose optimally in the Harvard Game. Warry et al. (1999) attempted
to reduce the motivation for participants to choose impulsively by reducing the
immediate differential between the two options. They found that this decreased
the propensity for participants to choose sub-optimally, however by the end of
their experiment participants were still choosing around chance levels, and the
authors noted that extrapolation of their data suggested that participants would
reach asymptote at a level that was non-optimal. Two experiments have also
attempted to guide participants’ explicit understanding of the payoff sched-
ules by providing a fairly explicit hint on how participants could maximize
their payoffs. R. J. Herrnstein et al. (1993, ; Experiment B) found that choices
were only briefly improved by the hint but soon returned to sub-optimal lev-
els. KudadjieGyamfi and Rachlin (1996) provided a similar hint, but found no
corresponding improvement at all. Nevertheless, Tunney and Shanks (2002)
showed that participants could overcome sub-optimal behaviour, as long as
they were given regular feedback about how their behaviour compared to the
optimal outcome, and they were given around 1,000 trials to learn the sched-
ules. This suggests that suboptimal choices in the Harvard Game may not be a
stable decision-making bias or a failure of impulse control, but rather due to a
failure to fully learn the payoff schedules.
Normally in experiments studying intrapersonal externalities participants’ choices
either affect the number of points gained (e.g. Yarkoni, Braver, et al., 2005) or
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the number of choices remaining until the end of the experiment (e.g. R. J. Her-
rnstein et al., 1993). However Stillwell and Tunney (2009) modified the sched-
ules so that both the number of points gained and the number of choices re-
maining until the end of the experiment were affected by participants’ choices.
This allowed the two outcomes from each decision to be separated so that the
immediate effects were visible through the number of points gained on each
trial, and the number of choices remaining until the end of the experiment de-
creased at differing rates depending upon the participant’s history of choices.
In other words, choosing myopically led to earning high payoffs through the
experiment, but ultimately the experiment ended prematurely and the partici-
pant lost the opportunity to earn further payoffs. Separating the consequences
from each decisionmade the outcomes of each decisionmore easily discernable,
and resulted in participants learning to choose optimally much earlier than had
previously been demonstrated. This also suggests that suboptimal behaviour
in the task may not be a failure of impulse control, but rather a failure to fully
understand the payoff schedules.
In nature the outcomes from choices that are made may not be so easily di-
vided into separate simple categories. So, if the results from laboratory intrap-
ersonal externality experiments are to be useful in understanding the subop-
timal decision-making that occurs in addictions, the process whereby partici-
pants learn to choose optimally in the simpler version needs to be understood.
One process could be the result of conscious insight into the payoff schedules
that participants are able to report. This mirrors research into the Iowa Gam-
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bling task which found that participants were able to explicitly report their un-
derstanding of the task (Maia & McClelland, 2004). The present experiments
attempted to test explicit knowledge of the payoff schedules, to find out what
participants who behave optimally are able to report about the payoff sched-
ules. The experiments tested participants’ knowledge by asking a series of
questions designed to cover every scenario in the task. They used a quanti-
tative test of participants’ understanding, as these have been shown to be more
sensitive than qualitative tests (Maia & McClelland, 2004).
The experiments also tested whether making participants’ payment contingent
on the number of points that they gained during the task had an effect on their
choices. Particularly in the economics literature, it is seen as crucial to incen-
tivize participants in this way (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). Participants in the
Contingent condition were paid based on the number of points they earned,
whereas those in the Certain condition were paid a fixed amount. It is possible
that giving points-contingent payments could cause participants to have more
motivation and thus gain more points, or that participants would not explore
as fully as they would otherwise and so would settle on a suboptimal strategy,
leading to fewer points (Beeler & Hunton, 1997). If, however, it is not a moti-
vation failure that leads to poor performance during experiments using intrap-
ersonal externalities, but rather the cognitive failure to understand the payoff
schedules, then a difference might not be expected. This would suggest a cogni-
tive component in decisions that have both long and short-term consequences
that has not been fully explored.
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3.4.2 Method
Participants
Forty-nine students or staff from Nottingham University volunteered to take
part in the experiment; 33 (67%) women (mean age=27.3 years, SD=7.3 years).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 26 participants
in the Certain condition and 23 participants in Contingent condition.
Design and procedure
Participants were given standardized instructions explaining that the experi-
ment was a decision-making experiment (See appendix A). Also, those in the
Contingent condition were told that their payment from the experiment would
be based on the number of points that they gained, which would be multiplied
by 0.08p/point, and those in the Certain condition were told that they would
earn a guaranteed payment of £4. Pilot data had shown that the mean number
of points gained over eight sessions was 5220, and so both conditions would on
average earn a similar payment (minimum 4000 points = £3.20; maximum 6120
points = £4.90).
The experiment consisted of 8 sessions, each with 150 game units. This equated
to between 53 and 150 choices per session, depending upon what the partici-
pant’s choices were. On each trial, the points gained and game units lost out-
come boxes were updated with feedback from the previous trial, and then two
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buttons were enabled marked ’#’ and ’’. Participants were then prompted to
make a choice of one of these buttons. The symbol presented on each but-
ton was counterbalanced between participants, as was the payoff schedules at-
tached to each button.
After each choice, both buttons were disabled for between 0.5 and 1.5 seconds,
and the points gained and game units lost outcome boxes were cleared to en-
sure that participants were aware that the outcome boxes indicated feedback
from the preceding trial rather than the expected payoff. Choosing the short-
term button used up more game units and so the experiment ended prema-
turely. Consequently, in order to reduce the motivation to finish the experiment
quickly, choosing the short-term button increased this delay so that the total de-
lay over the experiment was similar whichever buttonwas chosen. The formula
used is shown in Equation 3.4.1.
Delay = 0.5+ (P(short− term1−10)) (3.4.1)
Where Delay is in seconds, and P(short− term1−10) is the proportion of choices
allocated to the short-term button over the preceding 10 trials. Between each
session, participants were shown the points that they gained on the previous
sessions. They then completed questions from four scenarios designed to probe
their awareness and understanding of the payoff schedules used. The scenarios
were the same each time, although they were presented in a random order after
each session.
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To ensure that participants understood the task, the experimenter sat with the
participant for the first session, its feedback, and the first set of scenarios. Par-
ticipants were then allowed to finish the other sessions in private, although the
experimenter was available to answer questions.
Payoff Schedules
Participants received points for every choice that they made, but lost game
units. Choosing the short-term key returned 10 points per single trial, however
it increased the rate at which game units were lost over the next 10 trials. In
contrast, choosing the long-term key returned 5 points per single trial but used
up fewer game units over the next 10 trials, so that as long as there were more
than 10 game units remaining choosing the long-term key would optimise par-
ticipants’ points payoff. The number of game units lost after each choice was
determined by Equation 3.2.1.
To calculate the payoff at the beginning of each session, participants started
with a history of ten successive long-term button choices. Over the 150 game
units of each session, consistently choosing the long-term button would return
a cumulative payoff of 750 points. Consistently choosing the short-term button
would return a cumulative payoff of 530 points. However, the optimal solution
was to switch from the long-term to the short-term key towards the end of the
session, for which a maximum payoff of 765 points was possible.
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Stimuli
Figure 3.6 shows themain game screen. Two buttonsmarked ’#’ and ’’ were dis-
played horizontally next to one another on the computer screen. Above these
two buttons, on the left side of the screen were two outcome boxes marked
’Points gained on previous trial’ and ’Total points’. On the right side of the
screen were another two outcome boxes marked ’Game Units lost on previous
trial’ and ’Game Units remaining’. At the top centre of the screen a horizontal
bar labelled ’Game Units’ depicted graphically how many game units remain-
ing there were. The colour of the bar was dependent upon the number of game
units remaining; between 51 and 150 it was green, between 11 and 50 it was
yellow, and between 0 and 10 it was red. Above this, another horizontal bar
labelled ’Points’ depicted the total number of points gained during that game.
This bar was based around an animated Pac-Man figure which moved from left
to right and grew larger as the total number of points increased. These were
designed in order to increase the saliency of the feedback. Participants made
their choices by selecting one button or another using the mouse.
At the end of each session, a new screen summarised the total points gained
during that session and the previous sessions. The top-centre of the screen dis-
played textually the total points gained during the session, and the maximum
number of points that it was possible to gain during a session. Participants in
the Contingent condition were also informed how much their session’s points
were worth monetarily. Below this, a cartoon face was presented, depending
upon whether the participant gained more points during the recently com-
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Figure 3.6: Screenshot of main game screen.
pleted session than the previous session. If the participant gained more points,
the face smiled; if an equal number of points were earned, it was neutral; and if
a lesser number of points were collected, it frowned. Beneath these, a bar chart
graphically detailed the total points gained on that session and on all previous
sessions.
Contingency Knowledge Probe
Four scenarios were consecutively presented to each participant between each
session. For each scenario the participants were asked to answer how many
game units would be lost and points gained if the person in it chose to continue
pressing the same button (a), or what the outcomes would be if they switched
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to the other button (b). Participants were given a free response, and did so by
typing their answer. The scenarios and their correct answers are shown in Table
3.1. Participants were not given any feedback on their contingency knowledge.
Table 3.1: Awareness probe scenarios and their correct answers. In this exam-
ple the ”left-hand button” refers to the long-term button, and the
”right-hand button” refers to the short-term button, but the posi-
tions of these were randomized.
Scenario Points Gained Game Units Lost
1. John has been choosing the left-hand button repeatedly for the last 20 turns.
The last time he chose the left-hand button, he lost 1 game unit and gained 5
points.
a) What would happen if he chose the left-hand button again?
b) What would happen if he chose the right-hand button next time?
1 (a) 5 1
1 (b) 10 1.2
2. Jane has been choosing the left-hand button repeatedly for the last 20 turns.
However, 3 turns ago she switched to the right-hand button. The last time she
chose the right-hand button, she lost 1.6 game units and gained 10 points.
a) What would happen if she chose the right-hand button again?
b) What would happen if she chose the left-hand button next time?
2 (a) 10 1.8
2 (b) 5 1.6
3. Bob has been choosing the right-hand button repeatedly for the last 20 turns.
However, 3 turns ago he switched to the left-hand button .The last time he chose
the left-hand button, he lost 2.4 game units and gained 5 points.
a) What would happen if he chose the left-hand button again?
b) What would happen if he chose the right-hand button next time?
3 (a) 5 2.2
3 (b) 10 2.4
4. Sarah has been choosing the right-hand button repeatedly for the last 20
turns. The last time she chose the right-hand button; she lost 3 game units and
gained 10 points.
a) What would happen if she chose the right-hand button again?
b) What would happen if she chose the left-hand button next time?
4 (a) 10 3
4 (b) 5 2.8
The points gained class of questions reflects whether participants knew that
the short-term button always gave 5 points whereas the long-term button al-
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ways gave 10 points. The game units lost questions reflect different levels of
knowledge. Participants that answer question 1a correctly know that the low-
est number of game units lost is always 1, and conversely question 4a reflects
that the maximum number of game units lost is 3. Questions 1b and 2a reflect
that game units lost usually increases compared to the previous trial when the
short-term button is pressed, and questions 3a and 4b reflect that game units
lost usually decreases compared to the previous trial when the long-term but-
ton is pressed. For these, participants do not necessarily have to understand
that it is the history of choices that determines the number of game units lost,
only that one button usually increases them and the other button usually de-
creases them. However, questions 2b and 3b are both examples of a situation
where the number of game units lost does not always decrease or increase com-
pared to the previous trial when the long-term or short-term button is pressed
respectively. For a participant to correctly answer this question, it must be un-
derstood that it is the history of choices that determines the number of game
units lost.
3.4.3 Results
The average number of points gained by participants in the Certain condition
was 5026 (SD=451). Participants in the Contingent condition were paid based
on the number of points gained during the experiment. The average number
of points gained was 5021 (SD=454) leading to an average payment of £4.02
(maximum obtained: £4.75; minimum obtained: £3.45).
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Learning across conditions in the Simplified Harvard Game
The proportion of responses allocated to two buttons was recorded across eight
sessions. Each session started with 150 game units, and was split into two
blocks for purposes of analysis, based on the number of game units remain-
ing. Any choices made while there were more than 10 game units remaining
were allocated to Block 1, whereas any choices made while there were 10 or
fewer game units remaining were allocated to Block 2. These two blocks rep-
resent the strategies that should be followed; for most of the game participants
should choose the long-term button, but at the end of the experiment it becomes
optimal to choose the short-term button. The precise optimal switching point
for each session depends upon the participant’s choices in Block 1, but choos-
ing the short-term button when there were fewer than 10 game units remaining
was better than choosing the long-term button. Thus, it was optimal to switch
at the beginning of Block 2.
The mean proportions of responses allocated to the long-term button in block
1 for both conditions and in each session are shown in Figure 3.7, and the fre-
quencies of the proportions in each session are shown in Figure 3.8. The data
were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA with Session as the within-
subjects factor and Condition as the between-subjects factor. In this and in
all further analyses, degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-
Geisser method in cases where the assumption of sphericity is violated. The
ANOVA revealed a reliable effect of Session (F(5.34, 250.9) = 24.31, MSE = .06,
p < .001, η2p = .34) and a reliable linear contrast indicative of an increasing trend
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towards maximization as the experiment progressed (F(1, 47) = 85.86, MSE =
0.08, p < .001, η2p = .65). However, there was no evidence of an effect of Condi-
tion ((F1, 47) = .01, MSE = .40, p > .05), suggesting that rewarding participants
for gaining points did not affect their performance.
Figure 3.7: Proportion of responses in block 1 allocated to the long-term button
as a function of session. Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
If participants’ behaviour is aimed at maximizing expected utility, then they
should switch from the long-term to the short-term button at the beginning of
Block 2. The proportions of long-term button responses for the two blocks of
each session are shown in Figure 3.9 and show that toward the end of each
session participants increasingly exhibit switching behaviour. To test this we
compared the proportions of long-term button responses in Block 1 and Block
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Figure 3.8: Frequencies of responses allocated to the long-term button in each
of the 8 sessions of Experiment 1. X axis labels indicate the frequen-
cies of respondents who scored lower than or equal to the label.
2 of each session. These data were entered into a 2x8x2 repeated-measures
ANOVA with Session and Block as within-subjects factors, and Condition as
the between-subjects factor. The ANOVA showed an effect of Block, signifying
that participants were switching responses at the end of each session (F1, 47 =
30.17, MSE = .16, p < 0.001, η2p = .39). A reliable interaction was found between
Session and Block (F5.4, 252.3 = 3.05, MSE = .04, p < 0.01, η2p = .06). The linear
trend across Sessions differed between Blocks (F1,47 = 8.91, MSE = .06, P < .01,
η2p = .16) revealing that participants’ choices between Block 1 and Block 2 in-
creasingly diverged as the experiment progressed, and pair-wise comparisons
revealed that across the 8 sessions participants increasingly switched from the
long-term button in Block 1 to the short-term button in Block 2. This switch-
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ing behaviour became consistently apparent after the fourth session. There was
no reliable between-subjects main effect of Condition, nor any interactions be-
tween Condition and Block or Session, suggesting that rewarding participants
for gaining points did not mediate their switching behaviour.
Figure 3.9: Proportion of long-term button choices in each session, in block 1
compared to block 2. Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
Probe responses indicative of optimal behaviour.
Between each session, participants answered questions from four scenarios de-
signed to test their knowledge of the payoff schedules used in the experiment.
One type of question asked how many points would be gained after the next
choice was made. However, ceiling effects were found as most people an-
swered the questions correctly even in the early sessions. Therefore, as this
type of question was not able to discriminate between individuals, they were
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not analysed further.
The second type of question asked how many game units would be lost after
the next choice was made. The percentage of participants who answered each
question correctly is presented in Table 3.2, as well as an analysis of whether
participants learned to answer the question correctly as the sessions progressed.
In order to test how effective these were in relating the knowledge that answer-
ing the question correctly represented to behaviour in the experiment, partici-
pants’ correct or incorrect answers to the probe questions were used to predict
performance in the next session. Mixed effects models using the nested data,
with response to the probe question (correct or incorrect) as a first level pre-
dictor and participant ID as the grouping variable, found significant positive
effects for Q1A, Q1B and Q2A. To our surprise, it also found a significant nega-
tive correlation for Q3B and a sizable (but non-significant) correlation for Q4A,
and so these were explored further. It was found that participants who learned
to choose the long-term button during Block 1 made systematic errors on Q3B
and Q4A; incorrectly assuming that the game units lost would increase from
the previous trial (in Q3B, from 2.4 to 2.6, and in Q4A from 3 to 3.2) when it
would not. In fact, further mixed effects models found that the misconception
in Q3B was associated with optimal behaviour in Block 1.
The systematically incorrect answers by participants who performed optimally
in Block 1 of their next game go some way to explaining the pattern of corre-
lations. In order to answer questions 1B and 2A correctly, which participants
who chose optimally weremore likely to do, it is necessary to know that usually
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pressing the short-term key leads to an increase in the number of game units
lost compared to the previous trial. It is perhaps not surprising that there is such
a close relationship between answering question 1A correctly and choosing op-
timally. Participants who chose optimally would have extensive experience of
scenario one’s position on of the payoff schedules. It is noteworthy that 3A and
4B were not associated with optimal decision making. These reflect a mistaken
understanding that pressing the short-term button always leads to an increase
in the number of game units lost on the next trial. Due to the 10 trial history
used when calculating the payoff schedules this was not always the case, but as
a heuristic it is correct more often than not.
Table 3.2: Point-biserial correlations in Experiment 1 between correct answers
on probe questions and the proportion of long-term button choices
in block 1 of the next session.
Q1A Q1B Q2A Q2B Q3A Q3B Q4A Q4B Q3B Q4A
Corr. Corr. Corr. Corr. Corr. Corr. Corr. Corr. Err.b Err.b
% Chosen 73% 51% 57% 40% 39% 30% 59% 38% 35% 28%
∆ % Chosen be-
tween session 2
and session 8a
37%** 41%** 39%** 27%** 10% 4% 4% 10% 24%* 4%
Fixed effect (t) 3.56** 3.79** 2.73** -0.12 -0.14 -2.11* -1.3 0.57 3.72** 0.1
a Evidence of learning across all sessions was tested using a within-subjects
ANOVA with the 7 payoff contingency probes as the within subjects factor
and the proportion of correct responses as the dependent variable.
b The incorrect answer for Q3B was 2.6, and for Q4A it was 3.2. Both of these
errors are participants incorrectly assuming that the game units lost would
increase from the previous trial.
* = p<.05; ** = p<.01
The overall understanding of the payoff schedules, using the proportion of cor-
rect answers across all eight questions as the dependent variable, was compared
between the Certain condition and Contingent condition using a 7x8x2 mixed
ANOVA with Session and Question as within-subjects factors, and Condition
as a between groups factor. The analysis did not find a reliable main effect of
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Condition (F1, 47 = 2.05, MSE = 3.99, p = .16), nor did it find an interaction
between Condition and Question (F4.5, 213 = .47, MSE = .45, p = .78) suggest-
ing that both groups performed equally well on each question, however it did
find a reliable interaction between Session and Condition, (F3.54, 166.5 = 2.76,
MSE = .78, p = .04, η2p = .06). The linear contrast for the Session and Condition
interaction (F1,47 = 5.20, MSE = .36, P = .03, η2p = .10) suggests that despite the
lack of a main effect, participants in the Certain condition learned the correct
answers to questions at a faster rate compared to participants in the Contin-
gent condition. It can be seen from Figure 3.10 that participants who were paid
contingent on their performance stopped improving their understanding of the
payoff schedules after the second game, whereas those who were given a guar-
anteed payment continued to improve beyond this.
In conclusion, participants in both conditions learned to optimize their behaviour
and even to switch towards the immediately beneficial option towards the end
of the experiment. There was however no evidence that paying participants
contingently on their choices changed their choice behaviour, although despite
this, those who were given a certain payment for participation benefitted from
extended learning of the payoff schedules and were ultimately able to better
predict the outcome of choices on the task. There is some indication that par-
ticipants who performed optimally did not form a full understanding of the
historical interaction between the two options affecting the number of game
units lost. Instead they generalised that the short-term key increased the num-
ber of game units lost compared to the previous trial, leading to systematically
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Figure 3.10: Proportion of correct answers to contingency probe questions in
each session, separated by condition. Error bars are standard er-
rors of the mean.
incorrect answers on some questions. This may explain why the Contingent
condition had a poorer overall understanding of the task but still performed
equally well as the Contingent condition.
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3.5 Experiment 6: Participants’ Understanding of the
Simplified Harvard Game 2
3.5.1 Introduction
The previous experiment modified the Simplified Harvard Game by providing
knowledge probe questions. It is possible that by asking these questions they
changed participants’ learning about the task payoffs. In order to test this, the
experiment was repeatedwith two new groups. One group received the knowl-
edge probes throughout, and the other group only received knowledge probes
for the final three sessions.
The previous experiment confounds the wait between trials and performance
on the task, such that acting impulsively leads to a longer wait between trials.
This had the advantage that the overall length of time on the task would be
equal for both groups, as those who behave suboptimally end the experiment
after fewer trials but have to wait longer between trials to make up for it. Unfor-
tunately this also means that participants could use the waiting time between
trials to gauge how well they were doing on the task. Therefore, in Experiment
2 the inter-trial interval was set to a fixed time rather than based on the history
of choices.
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3.5.2 Method
Participants
Forty-eight students from Nottingham University volunteered to take part in
the experiment; 33 (69%) women and 15 men (mean age=25.0 years, SD=6.3
years). Participants were assigned to one of four conditions based on the order
in which they presented.
Design and procedure
The design was largely identical to the previous experiment, with half of the
participants paid contingent on their performance and half paid a guaranteed
amount. However, an additional condition was added which was the point at
which contingency knowledge probe questions were asked. Half the partic-
ipants were asked after each game, and the other half were asked only after
the final three games. Additionally, the inter-trial interval was set to 1 second,
rather than the variable interval as in the previous experiment.
Contingency Knowledge Probe
In order to simplify the probe questions, participants’ answers were restricted
to whether the number of game units lost ”would stay the same”, ”would in-
crease” or ”would decrease”. Otherwise, the questions and were identical to
the game unit questions from the previous experiment, shown in Table 1.
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3.5.3 Results
The average number of points gained by participants in the Certain condition
was 5297 (SD=306). Participants in the Contingent condition were paid based
on the number of points gained during the experiment. The average number
of points gained was 5383 (SD=342) leading to an average payment of £4.31
(maximum obtained: £4.72; minimum obtained: £3.67).
Learning across conditions in the Simplified Harvard Game
The mean proportions of responses allocated to the long-term button in Block
1 for the four conditions and in each session are shown in Figure 3.11, and
the frequencies of the proportions in each session are shown in Figure 3.12.
The data were entered into an 8x2x2 repeated-measures ANOVA with Session
(1 to 8) as the within-subjects factor (coded numerically) and the two Condi-
tions (contingent vs. certain payment, and early vs. late knowledge probe)
as between-subjects factors. The ANOVA revealed a reliable effect of Session
(F3.49, 153.42 = 16.08, MSE = .09, p < .001, η2p = .27) and a reliable linear con-
trast indicative of an increasing trend towards maximization as the experiment
progressed (F1, 44 = 42.9, MSE = .10, p < .001, η2p = .49). The effect of Payment
Condition (F1, 44 = 1.01, MSE = .21, p > .05) was not significant, suggesting that
rewarding participants for gaining points did not affect their task performance.
For Probe Condition (F1, 44 = 3.85, MSE = .21) the effect was almost significant.
To properly analyse this, we compared the two probe conditions for Sessions
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2-6, as neither group had received the probe during the first session, and both
groups had received the probe during Sessions 7 and 8. The 5x2 within-subjects
ANOVA found an effect of Probe Condition (F1, 46 = 4.97, MSE = .14, p = .031)
indicating that the group who received the probes chose the long-term button
more often than the group who did not. One explanation for this finding is that
asking knowledge questions encouraged participants to gain explicit knowl-
edge of the payoff schedules, which in turn improved their performance on the
task.
Figure 3.11: Proportion of responses in block 1 allocated to the long-term but-
ton as a function of session. Error bars are standard errors of the
mean.
If participants’ behaviour is aimed at maximizing expected utility, then they
should switch from the long-term to the short-term button during the final
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Figure 3.12: Frequencies of responses allocated to the long-term button in each
of the 8 sessions of Experiment 2. X axis labels indicate the fre-
quencies of respondents who scored lower than or equal to the
label.
block. To test this we compared the proportions of long-term button responses
in Block 1 and Block 2 of each session. These data were entered into an 8x2x2x2
repeated-measures ANOVA with Session (1 to 8) and Block (1 to 2) as within-
subjects factors, and the two Conditions (contingent vs. certain payment, and
early vs. late knowledge probe) as the between-subjects factors. The ANOVA
showed an effect of Block, signifying that participants were switching responses
at the end of each session (F1, 44 = 58.34, MSE = .21, p < 0.001, η2p = .57). A
reliable interaction was found between Session and Block, signifying that par-
ticipants switched more as the experiment progressed (F4.4, 192 = 7.90, MSE =
.05, p < 0.01, η2p = .15). The linear contrast for the Session and Block interaction
(F1,44 = 29.74, MSE = .04, P < .001, η2p = .40) revealed that participants switched
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more as the experiment progressed, and pair-wise comparisons revealed that
this switching behaviour became consistent from the second session onwards.
There was no reliable interaction between the two Conditions and Block or Ses-
sion, suggesting that rewarding participants for gaining points did not mediate
their switching behaviour.
Probe responses indicative of optimal behaviour
The percentage of participants who answered each probe question correctly is
presented in Table 3.3. As in the previous experiment, mixed effects models
were used to test for a relationship between responses to the probe questions
and proportion of long-term choices in Block 1 of the next Session, while hold-
ing the participant ID constant in order to account for the different skill levels
amongst participants. A significant positive relationship was found between
both Q1A and Q2Awith Block 1 of the next session; participants who answered
those questions correctly were more likely to choose the long-term button more
often in Block 1 of the next Session. As in the previous experiment, correct
answers for Q3B and Q4A were negatively related to performance in the next
ask (although not significantly in this experiment). In order to be consistent
with the previous experiment, the equivalent incorrect answers for these ques-
tions were analysed. The direction of the effect was the same as in the previous
experiment; participants who behaved optimally incorrectly assumed that the
rate that game units were lost would increase from the previous trial, although
this was not a significant effect.
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The smaller number of significant effects in this experiment may be due to the
format of the probe questions. In the previous experiment, participants were
given a free response, so guesses were unlikely to be correct by chance. But in
the current experiment, participants were given a multiple response option, so
guesses were more likely to be correct.
Table 3.3: Point-biserial correlations in Experiment 6 between correct answers
on probe questions and the proportion of long-term button choices
in block 1 of the next session.
Q1A Q1B Q2A Q2B Q3A Q3B Q4A Q4B Q3B Q4A
Corr. Corr. Corr. Corr. Corr. Corr. Corr. Corr. Err.a Err.a
% Chosen 74% 58% 68% 46% 39% 34% 57% 46% 40% 33%
Fixed effect (t) 3.02** 2.60* 1.44 0.32 0.77 -0.78 -0.2 0.86 1.08 0.52
a The incorrect answer for both Q3B and Q4A was that the game units ”would
increase”. * = p<.05; ** = p<.01
The overall understanding of the payoff schedules, using the proportion of cor-
rect answers across all eight questions as the dependent variable, was compared
between the Certain condition and the Contingent condition using a mean of
the final three sessions where all participants answered contingency knowledge
probe questions. A 3x8x2x2 mixed ANOVA with Session (6-8) and Question
(q1a to q4b) as the within-subjects factors, and Probe Condition and Payment
Condition as between groups factors. The analysis found a reliable main effect
of Payment Condition (F1, 44 = 4.40, MSE = 1.17, p = .04, η2p =.09), indicating
that those who were given a certain payment answered more questions cor-
rectly in the final three sessions than those given a contingent payment. There
was no main effect of Probe Condition (F1, 44 = .06, MSE = 1.17, p = .81) indicat-
ing that the timing of the probes did not affect participants’ understanding of
the task. It can be seen from Figure 3.13 that participants who were paid contin-
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gent on their performance generally stopped improving their understanding of
the payoff schedules after the second session, whereas those who were given a
certain payment continued to improve beyond this, although they took longer
before they reached their optimal understanding of the task.
Figure 3.13: Proportion of correct answers to contingency probe questions in
each session, separated by condition. Error bars are standard er-
rors of the mean.
In conclusion, this experiment replicated the behavioural and contingency knowl-
edge results of the previous experiment and there was no evidence that the
probe questions changed participants’ behaviour in the task or their under-
standing. Participants optimized their behaviour whether they were paid con-
tingent upon their performance or not, and thosewho performed the best seemed
to follow a heuristic that did not fully characterise the complexity of the pay-
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off schedules. There was also evidence that those paid contingently on their
responses did not learn as much explicit knowledge about the payoff sched-
ules. Finally, there was no evidence that fixing the inter-trial interval altered
participants’ performance in the task.
Discussion
In the Harvard Game experiments reported here, participants learned to take
account of the intrapersonal externalities inherent in the task, maximizing their
expected utility. By the final session, most participants chose the long-term op-
tion for the majority of the session, and switched responses to the short-term
option towards the end. In real-world terms, participants learned to choose ac-
tivities that would increase their long-term welfare rather than those that gave
immediate gratification, but once they realised that the end was close partici-
pants learned to prioritise their short-term needs.
By asking participants to complete quantitative questions about their predic-
tions in the experiment we could distinguish between the different conceptu-
alisations of the task that participants held. Based on the questions that par-
ticipants who made more optimal choices answered correctly, and the errors
that participants made, we found evidence that participants appeared to use a
generalised heuristic that one option would usually increase the rate at which
choice opportunities remaining in the experiment decreased. There was no ev-
idence that participants who made more optimal choices realised that the other
option would usually decrease the rate at which the number of choice opportu-
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nities remaining in the experiment decreased.
In addition, the experiments found that paying participants based on their
choices had no observable effect on their choice behaviour, despite the claims
of Hertwig and Ortmann (2001). The finding that payment type does not affect
choice behaviour is consistent with similar research using the Iowa Gambling
Task (Bowman & Turnbull, 2003) which found no difference between real or
facsimile money.
It is possible that contingent payments increased participants’ motivation but
this was offset by a decrease in exploratory behaviour. Supporting evidence
for this was found from the analysis of how participants’ understanding of the
payoff schedules changed across the eight sessions. In the group who were
paid contingent on their performance, their ability to successfully predict the
outcome of choices in the simplified Harvard Game plateaued after the second
game, whereas the group who were given a guaranteed payment continued to
improve beyond this. In both experiments, the participants who were paid a
fixed amount learned more about the payoff schedules by the end of the ex-
periment than participants who were paid contingent upon their performance.
This is consistent with previous research by Schwartz (1982), who found that
participants’ learning of complex sequences was impaired by giving them con-
tingent reinforcement. Schwartz (1982) concluded that participants repeated
what worked in the past rather than trying to understand the task. Since explicit
knowledge of the payoff schedules is overall related to performance on the task,
it is an open question whether, given enough trials, participants not paid con-
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tingent on their reinforcement would ultimately understand the task better and
so also learn to perform better than those paid contingent on their performance,
or whether participants paid contingent on their performance would extend
their initial exploratory period so that they gained more understanding before
settling into a pattern of responses that seems to work.
The experiments provide insight into what people who take into account in-
trapersonal externalities understand. As we found evidence that explicit un-
derstanding is related to performance in the task, but found no difference in
performance based on how participants were paid, this suggests that the task is
predominantly a cognitive one. It is possible that an intervention could be pi-
loted to increase the occurrence of behaviours with positive intrapersonal exter-
nalities, or decrease the occurrence of behaviours with negative intrapersonal
externalities. An intervention could use pervasive digital devices to provide
immediate and personalized feedback each time an individual engages in be-
haviour with intrapersonal externalities.
As well as intrapersonal externalities, other factors are associated with appar-
ently impulsive behaviour. For example high rates of time-discounting are
also related to addictive behaviour (Kirby et al., 1999; J. M. Mitchell, Fields,
D’Esposito, & Boettiger, 2005; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998). The difficulty
that the human decision-making system has in taking account of intrapersonal
externalities should be considered as an additional factor leading to addictive
behaviour.
To conclude, if the results of experiments on intrapersonal externalities are to
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be useful in understanding suboptimal behaviour in the real world, the differ-
ences in understanding between participants who learn to behave optimally
and those who do not needs to be understood. Our results suggest that ex-
plicit awareness is useful for making optimal decisions in the simplified Har-
vard Game, but that participants who make more optimal choices do not have,
and do not need, a full knowledge of the historical interaction that leads to each
payoff. Instead participants learn a simpler conception which emphasises that
one option generally seems to make an aspect of their situation worse than it
was previously, on a myopic choice by choice basis. When the two aspects (his-
tory of choices and current choice) are combined into a single outcome in the
full Harvard Game, and presumably in real life intrapersonal decision-making,
it is much more difficult to learn this relationship and this may explain why the
simplified Harvard Game is simpler to learn.
3.6 Chapter Discussion
In this Chapter, Experiment 3 found that performance in the Simplified Har-
vard Game is related to smoking behaviour; high nicotine dependency was re-
lated tomyopic choices on the task. Experiment 4 reversed the payoff schedules
from the Simplified Harvard Game from a gain frame to a loss frame, and was
unable to distinguish smoking behaviour. This suggests that the reason that
smokers chosemyopically is because they have a deficit in learning about gains,
rather than due to impulsive disinhibition. Experiments 5 and 6 found that
149
CHAPTER 3: VALIDITY OF THE SIMPLIFIED HARVARD GAME
conscious understanding of the task was associated with high performance,
which further backs up the assertion that the Simplified Harvard Game mea-
sures learning rather than simply impulsive disinhibition. Additionally, it was
found that rewarding participants for performance rather than participation
did not affect the number of myopic choices made in the Simplified Harvard
Game, which provides further evidence that the Simplified Harvard Game is a
learning challenge rather than a challenge of withholding impulses.
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Effects of Advice in the Factory
Manager Game
Advice is often given to smokers and drinkers, and yet advice-seeking and
advice-taking have not been studied experimentally in self-control situations.
This is because if poor long-term decisions are due to impulsivity then the indi-
vidual understands that a decision would be suboptimal but is unable to avoid
making it anyway. If poor long-term decisions are due to discounting future
rewards then the individual already has the ability to make an optimal decision
and so does not need advice. But if the individual is struggling to make an op-
timal decision given the difficulties of intrapersonal externalities, such as not
knowing the payoffs from all choices, then advice might improve their choices.
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4.1 Chapter Introduction
Self-control decisions are not made in a social vacuum. Applied research al-
ready implicitly accepts this and has studied the prevalence and effectiveness
of general practitioners’ advice given to smokers (Russell, Wilson, Taylor, &
Baker, 1979), problem drinkers (Fleming, Barry, Manwell, Johnson, & London,
1997; Wallace, Cutler, & Haines, 1988), and obese patients (Galuska, Will, Ser-
dula, & Ford, 1999). Nevertheless, although there has been research in the past
two decades into the method by which people integrate advice into their de-
cision making, little is known about how individual differences may alter this
process. Even less is known about situations where decisions are made that
involve self-control, defined as a situation where one has to choose between an
immediate smaller reward and a future larger reward.
4.1.1 The Simplified Harvard Game
One reason that self-control situations have not been studied in the context of
advice is that many of the laboratory methods that are used as proxies to mea-
sure self-control implicitly assume that self-control is a trait and so not influ-
enced by advice. Individuals answering trait questionnaires such as the Barratt
Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995) cannot be given advice as to
which response option to choose. Similarly in delay discounting, which asks
questions to determine howmuch immediate reward an individual would give
up in order to obtain a delayed reward, individuals cannot be advised on their
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own preferences. Both of these methods are associated with behaviours such as
smoking and problem drinking that are typically seen as demonstrating a lack
of self-control (Flory &Manuck, 2009; J. M.Mitchell et al., 2005; S. H. Mitchell,
1999, 2004).
The Simplified Harvard Game is appropriately placed to fulfil this role, as it
is a behavioural measure of self-control that has already been demonstrated to
be related to both trait impulsivity as measured by the BIS-11 and smoking be-
haviour (See Experiment 5 and 6). In the SHG, participants choose repeatedly
between two options. One option (the local choice) leads to a high immediate
reward but decreases the reward for future choices of either option. The other
option (the global choice) leads to a lower immediate reward, but has no long-
term effects. Choosing the global choice repeatedly leads to a better outcome,
even though on any one trial it is advantageous to choose the local option. Par-
ticipants are never told the reward contingencies for each button, butmust learn
them through experience. An advisor can encourage the participant to choose
the global option, and so effectively encourage them to act in a self-controlled
manner.
4.1.2 The Judge-Advisor System (JAS)
In JAS experiments, a judgemakes a final decision on a task but receives advice,
or at least has advice available, from one or more advisors (Sniezek & Buckley,
1995). JAS experiments can be split into two types, ”choice” tasks and ”judge-
ment” tasks (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). Choice tasks are those involving discreet
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categories, and so the advisor recommends a particular choice, whereas judge-
ment tasks involve quantitative judgements, and the resulting advice is another
participant’s estimate.
A separate feature that differs across experiments is whether advice is imposed
or whether it must be sought by the judge (Gino, Shang, & Croson, 2009). In
the following experiments 7 to 10, we investigate advice-seeking, and in exper-
iment 11 we investigate advice-taking. For this reason, we split up our analysis
of previous JAS findings into the two aforementioned categories.
4.1.3 Advice Taking
The majority of JAS research has concentrated on how judges change their ini-
tial opinions when they are given advice. Generally, judges do not change their
initial opinions enough, and so exhibit egocentrism of advice discounting (Har-
vey &Harries, 2004). Advice commonly weighs around just 20-30% in the final
judgement (Harvey & Fischer, 1997). Although this may only be the case on
tasks where the judge is confident in their ability to decide, as Gino and Moore
(2007) found that in difficult tasks advice was actually over-weighted.
Judges do not weight all advice equally. The opinions of advisors are given
more weight when they are believed to be experts (Harvey & Fischer, 1997;
Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004), when they are believed to be well-intentioned
(Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001), when their opinion is not considered to be an out-
lier (Harries, Yaniv, & Harvey, 2004), and when they have to pay for the advice
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(whether this is obligatory or not) (Gino et al., 2009). Judges are also more
confident in their decisions when they are given advice from lots of advisors
(Budescu & Rantilla, 2000), and they solicit advice more often from advisors
who have unshared information rather than advice that they already possess
(Van Swol & Ludutsky, 2007) although the authors did not find evidence that
the judges actually changed their decisions.
Neuropsychological patient research has found that individuals with right dor-
solateral and orbito-frontal lesions may be especially likely to discount ad-
vice due to interference with assessment and weighting of advice (Gomez-
Beldarrain, Harries, Garcia-Monco, Ballus, & Grafman, 2004)). Interestingly,
these areas are also related to performance in theHarvard game (Yarkoni, Braver,
et al., 2005; Yarkoni, Gray, et al., 2005).
Advice is not homogenous. Dalal and Bonaccio (2010) studied five types of
advice. ”Receommended for” represented the advice traditionally used in JAS
experiments where the advisor recommended one alternative. ”Recommended
against” counselled against one alternative, ”Information” provided details about
one or more alternatives, ”decision-support” gave assistance on how to make
the decision, and ”social support” provided interpersonal assistance. They
found that in certain situations, judges preferred receiving more information
rather than a specific recommendation.
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4.1.4 Advice Seeking
Traditionally in the JAS advice is automatically provided to decision-makers.
But there has been a paucity of research into when judges ask for advice and
whom they ask for it from. It has been found that advisors are subject to rep-
utation formation, and so judges seek advice from advisors who have been
shown to be more accurate (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), and judges tend to ac-
quire their own information before they seek advice (Schrah, Dalal, & Sniezek,
2006). Some studies find that judges do not always solicit free advice (Gardner
& Berry, 1995, Exp 3), but other studies found that free advice from experts
was nearly always solicited (Schrah et al., 2006). Similarly contradictory find-
ings have been found for unsolicited versus explicitly solicited advice, which is
either discounted to a greater extent (Gibbons, Sniezek & Dalal, 2003, cited in
Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006) because it is intrusive (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997), or
there is no difference (Gino & Moore, 2007).
4.1.5 Individual Differences in Advice Utilisation
Of particular relevance to self-control situations is how individual differences
affect the use of advice. Dalal and Bonaccio (2010) found a range of differ-
ences in the personalities of those who appreciated different types of advice,
including that those high in agreeableness and females are more likely to wel-
come social support, and those with a dependent decision making style were
thankful for decision support. Koestner and colleagues (1999) found individu-
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als high in reflective autonomy followed the recommendations of credible advi-
sors whereas individuals high in reactive autonomy rejected their recommen-
dations. A more subtle finding is that when asked to make decisions about
their own likely behaviour, judges were more swayed by advisors who they
were told were demographically similar to them, but when asked to make de-
cisions about others they were more swayed by advisors who were dissimilar
to them (Gino et al., 2009). Judges stated that this was due to the perceived
informativeness of the advice.
4.2 Experiment 7: Advice Seekingwith Predominantly
Impulsive Advice
4.2.1 Introduction
Given the amount of advice available in the real world for self-control situa-
tions, such as choosing whether to smoke or drink, we might expect that in-
dividual differences in cognition which manifest themselves in high trait im-
pulsivity might also be related to differences in the acquisition of advice. This
would help to go some way to explain why those who score high in trait im-
pulsivity also tend to engage in behaviours that demonstrate low self-control,
perhaps not seeking out the advice that would help them.
In order to test this, we created the Factory Manager Game, which was an ex-
tension of the Simplified Harvard Game (Stillwell & Tunney, 2009). Instead
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of choosing between two extremes, to be self-controlled or to meliorate, par-
ticipants were able to choose on a gradient between them, in order to mostly
meliorate for example. This allows us to give the participant advice to be more
or less self-controlled, without hinting to the participant that their payoff is
based on their history of choices. This concrete setup has face validity for par-
ticipants also, as they take control of a machine and decide on its production
level. Although participants are naïve to begin with, they come to learn that
the machine can be run quickly, which produces lots of goods immediately, but
that doing this causes the machine to wear out faster than simply running it at
a slower speed.
We therefore measured individuals’ propensity to seek advice in a task that
mirrored the Harvard Game. We expected that individuals high in trait impul-
sivity would solicit advice differently from individuals low in trait impulsivity,
although made no prediction as to whether it would be more or less frequently.
On the one hand, impulsive individuals may be more susceptible to peer pres-
sure and thus solicit advice more often, but on the other hand they might be
more independent and so solicit advice less often.
4.2.2 Method
Participants
Fifty students from Nottingham University volunteered to take part in the ex-
periment after being recruited by posters and e-mails. Their mean age was 23.5
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years (SD=5.2 years) and 32 (64%) were female. Participants completed the BIS-
11 impulsivity questionnaire, and a total score was derived in accordance with
established criteria (Patton et al., 1995). Participants were categorised as high
or low impulsive in this and in all subsequent experiments by a median split of
the BIS-11 total score.
Procedure
Following arrival, participants were seated in a testing room where they com-
pleted a consent form, followed in counterbalanced order by the BIS-11 (Patton
et al., 1995) and TAS-20 (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) questionnaires, and
the Factory Manager Game. Finally, participants were debriefed and paid in
accordance with their performance in the Factory Manager Game (see below).
Factory Manager Game
The experimenter read the following instructions to the participant:
You have been promoted to the position of factory manager. Your
factory uses a machine to produce ”Goods”. Fortunately the factory
manager’s job is a simple one. Simply set the speed of the machine
in order to produce as many Goods as possible.
As a result of your choices your machine will produce Goods. After
every run you will be shown the number of Goods produced that
run as well as the total Goods produced. However, your machine
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will also wear out. After every run you will be shown the machine
integrity lost that time as well as the total machine integrity remain-
ing. Your machines start at 100% but will eventually wear out to 0%.
Once this happens then the machine is completely worn out and the
game is over.
You have also been given access to some advisors, who were previ-
ously factory managers like you. After playing the Factory Manager
game, they left a recommendation for the speed that you should run
the machine. However, you will only be told whether the speed that
you last ran the machine is slower or faster than they recommended.
Ultimately it will be your decision to set the machine speed to what-
ever you want, but there is no cost to receiving advice.
You will play the Factory Manager game 8 times. Try and beat your
previous score in every game!
Your payment from this experiment will be based on the number
of Goods that you produce. This will be calculated on the basis of
0.12p/good. This means you can earn between £3.20 and £4.90. Af-
ter each game, you will be shown how much you earned.
That’s all there is to it – just try to produce as many Goods as you
can before your machine wears out, and use the available advice
whenever you want it. Take as much time as you wish and please
do not write anything down during the experiment.
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The experimenter then took the participant through an on-screen tutorial using
the following text:
Before you play the game for real, there will be a short practice to
ensure that you are used to the controls. Beware that the practice
console will not reflect how production in the real Factory Manger
game works. Please follow the instructions below.
1) To make a choice, drag the production level slider to the machine
speed that youwant. Do not let go of the slider until it is at the speed
that you want because as soon as you let go then that will be your
choice. Go ahead now and set this to 150%.
2) You do not have to change the production level each time if you
do not want to. If you just click once on the slider without dragging
it then it will choose the speed you chose last time. Go ahead now
and choose 150% again.
3) You can click on the ask advisor button to get advice. Go ahead
now and ask Advisor 1 what (s)he thinks. That’s it. Press the con-
tinue button to start the Factory Manager game.
In the tutorial, the feedback that appeared on the screen did not reflect the real
payoff schedules in the Factory Manager Game. Participants were only able
to go through the steps shown; the game prevented them from further explo-
ration.
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The simplified Harvard task consisted of 8 games, each with 150 game units.
This equated to between 53 and 150 trials per game, depending upon partici-
pants’ choices. Figure 4.1 shows the main screen of the game. At the top centre
of the screen a horizontal bar labelled ’Machine Integrity’ provided clear feed-
back concerning the payoff associated with each key. Above this, another hori-
zontal bar labelled ’Goods’ depicted the total number of Goods gained during
that Game. These were designed in order to increase the salience of feedback
concerning the payoff (rewards and costs) associated with a given production
level. Participants made their choices by dragging the production level slider
using the mouse. On each trial the points gained and game units lost informa-
tion was updated, overwriting the outcome of the previous trial, so that par-
ticipants could learn the payoff structure associated with the production level
slider.
After each choice, the production level slider was disabled for between 0.5 and
1.5 seconds, and this variable delay was used to ensure that the total dura-
tion of each game was the same irrespective of the participant’s choices, given
that increasing the production level used up more machine integrity and so the
experiment ended more quickly. To reduce the motivation to finish the exper-
iment quickly, increasing the production level increased this delay according
to Equation 4.2.1, where D is the delay in seconds, and µ(lvl1−10) is the mean
production level over the preceding 10 trials.
D = 0.5+
µ(lvl1−10)− 100
100
(4.2.1)
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Figure 4.1: Factory Manager main screen
Payoff Schedules
On each production run, participants produced goods but their machine’s in-
tegrity reduced. Choosing the maximum production level (200%) returned 10
goods per run, but increased the rate at which the machine’s integrity reduced
over the next 10 trials. In contrast, running themachine at its minimumproduc-
tion level (100%) returned 5 goods per run, but did not have long-term ramifi-
cations. The percentage of machine integrity lost after each runwas determined
by Equation 4.2.2.
Itg = 1+ 2
µ(lvl1−10)− 100
100
(4.2.2)
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Where Itg is the amount of integrity lost, and µ(lvl1−10) is the mean production
level over the preceding 10 trials. In essence, running the machine at full speed
produced twice as many goods but used up three times the machine integrity
over the next 10 trials, and so the lost machine integrity acts as a punisher as it
represents a lost opportunity to produce more goods.
In each game, consistently running the machine at 100% produced 500 goods,
and consistently running the machine at 200% produced 363 goods. However,
the optimal solution was to switch from running the machine at 100% to run-
ning it at 200% when there was seven percent machine integrity remaining.
Adopting this strategy would return a cumulative payoff of 510 goods. Conse-
quently, in the analysis, we examined choice of the two buttons separately in
trials either side of seven percent machine integrity remaining. This was the
point at which it was optimal to switch from running the machine slowly to
quickly. Any choices made while there was more than seven percent machine
integrity remaining were allocated to Block 1, whereas any choices after this
were allocated to Block 2. Groups are therefore contrasted in Block 1 to exam-
ine cost-discounting, and in Block 2 to examine their basic understanding of the
payoff structure of the task, as only those who understand the schedules would
learn to switch at the end of each session.
At the end of each game, a new screen summarised the total goods produced
during that game and the previous games. The top-centre of the screen dis-
played textually the total goods produced during the game, how much those
goods were worth monetarily, and the maximum number of goods that it was
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possible to gain during a game. Below this, a cartoon face was presented, con-
tingent upon whether the participant produced more goods than in the previ-
ous game. If the participant producedmore, the face smiled; if an equal number
of goods were produced, it was neutral; and if a lesser number of goods were
produced, it frowned. Beneath these, a bar chart graphically detailed the total
goods produced on that game and on all previous games.
Procedure and Advice
Advice was available from three advisors. Participants could ask for an advi-
sor’s recommendation at any point in the game by clicking on one of the ”Ask
Advisor” buttons. Each of the advisors had an ideal production level in mind,
and so every time their advice was asked the advisor would give advice rela-
tive to the previous production level set by the participant. They would tell the
participant to either set the production level higher, lower, or to leave it about
the same. An example of the advice given was, ”Advisor 1: Last time you set
the production level at 163%. I recommend that you set it higher than that.”
Participants were told that the advisors were participants who had previously
done the experiment, and who had left a recommendation for the speed to run
the machine. The three advisors’ ideal production levels were 180%, 175% and
120%. It is not uncommon in JAS experiments for the advice to be created by
the experimenter but that the participant is told it is real advice (e.g. Brehmer
& Hagafors, 1986; Budescu & Rantilla, 2000).
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4.2.3 Results
Simplified Harvard Game
Figure 4.2 shows the average production level in block 1 of the 8 Factory Man-
ager games, for the high and low impulsive groups. These data were entered
into an 8x2 mixed ANOVA with game as the within-subjects factor and impul-
sivity as the between-subjects factor. Degrees of freedom in this and all sub-
sequent analyseswere adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser method in cases
where the assumption of sphericity is violated. This revealed a reliable effect
of game (F(4.29, 206.1) = 20.46, MSE = .06, p < .001, η2p = .30), which had a sig-
nificant linear contrast (F(1, 48) = 51.76, MSE = .09, p < .001, η2p = .52), demon-
strating that participants learned to optimise the number of goods produced by
running the machine slower as the games progressed. There was no reliable
between-subjects effect of impulsivity (F(1, 48) = 2.16, MSE = .36, p = .15, η2p
= .04), indicating no difference in performance in the task between those high
and low in impulsivity, nor was there an interaction (F(4.29, 206.1) = .32, MSE
= .06, p = .87, η2p = .01), indicating that the two groups improved on the task at
the same rate.
To maximize their payoff, participants should switch from the lowest produc-
tion level to the fastest production level between block 1 and block 2 at the end
of each game. To test this and any effect of impulsivity on switching we com-
pared mean production level in block 1 and block 2 across each game. These
data were entered into an 8x2x2 mixed ANOVA with game and block as the
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Figure 4.2: Learning in the Factory Manager game
within-subjects factors, and impulsivity as the between-subjects factor. There
was an effect of block (F(1, 48) = 7.35, MSE = .05, p = .009, η2p = .13), which
shows that participants increased the production level at the end of each game.
However, there was no interaction between block and game (F(5.23, 250.85) =
1.81, MSE = .02, p = .11, η2p = .04), or between block and impulsivity (F(1, 48) =
.15, MSE = .01, p = .7, η2p < .01), and so there was no evidence that participants
increasingly switched as the sessions progressed or that the two impulsivity
groups reliably differed in their switching behaviour.
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Advice Seeking
Participants asked for advice between 0 and 334 times (mean = 45, SD=60.7).
The number of times participants in the two groups asked for advice was com-
pared using Kendall’s τ. This is a non-parametric correlation coefficient, which
is applicable since the number of times that participants ask for advice is an
ordinal variable (Howell, 2007). The test found a significant relationship (τ(50)
= .34, p = .004), providing some evidence that those high in impulsivity asked
for more advice. This was not simply an artefact of the groupings we used, as
a correlation between participants’ BIS-11 scores and the number of times that
they sought advice produced a similar, albeit marginally non-significant, result
(τ(50) = .19, p = .059).
4.2.4 Discussion
Our results demonstrate that those high in impulsivity soughtmore advice than
those low in impulsivity. A very simple hypothesis (1) from this could be that
participants who were high in impulsivity just clicked the advice button more
and would have done so whatever the button did, and the BIS-11 does include
a subtrait called ”motor impulsiveness” (Patton et al., 1995). There are alterna-
tive hypotheses however. One could be individual differences in the perceived
difficulty of the task (2). People have little reason to pay attention to others’
advice when they find the task easy and believe that they are better than oth-
ers, but when they perform worse than expected they are more likely to believe
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that others have useful information (Gino&Moore, 2007). It could be that those
high in impulsivity found the task difficult, and so solicited more advice. An-
other explanation could be to do with the type of advice offered (3). Individuals
may not see advice that is far from their initial expectations as credible (Yaniv,
2004). As we previously found that those high in impulsivity were more likely
to choose myopically in the SHG, it may be that those low in impulsivity saw
the generally impulsive advice as poor, and so did not continue asking for it.
Concerning performance in the Factory Manager version of the SHG, we found
that switching did not increase as the experiments progressed – this was incon-
sistent with previous SHG data. This is probably due to the slider allowing
participants to hedge rather than have to choose purely myopically or self-
controlled. Similarly, there was no main effect of impulsivity, but again this
may have been due to allowing participants to hedge and so reducing differ-
ences. Finally, participants did not improve on the task as much as in the SHG.
Nevertheless, they do learn the task above chance level and they do switch,
which demonstrates that they understood the contingencies, so as their per-
formance on the task was not the main focus of our scrutiny, but rather their
advice-seeking, we continued with the Factory Manager paradigm. Chapter
5 presents regressions across all of the studies in this thesis which include the
BIS-11 questionnaire and a measure of performance on the SHG.
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4.3 Experiment 8: Advice Seekingwith Predominantly
Self-Controlled Advice
4.3.1 Introduction
We tested whether those high in impulsivity still sought more advice when
the advice was generally encouraging them to be self-controlled and so was
far from their initial expectations. The Discussion section of Experiment 7 for-
warded three hypotheses. If hypothesis 1 (impulsivity leads to clicking on ad-
vice button) or 2 (participants who find the task hard ask for more advice) was
correct, participants high in impulsivity should still seek more advice no mat-
ter what the advice was. If hypothesis 3 (participants ask for advice that meets
their expectations) was correct, participants high in impulsivity should not seek
more advice.
4.3.2 Method
Participants
Fifty-seven students from Nottingham University volunteered to take part in
the experiment after being recruited by posters and e-mails. Their mean age
was 20.5 years (SD=2.4 years) and 74% were female.
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Advice
The experiment was identical to the previous one, except that the advice pre-
dominantly suggested that participants should be self-controlled by setting the
production level low. The three advisors’ ideal production levels were 120%,
125% and 180%.
4.3.3 Results
Simplified Harvard Game
The mean production levels in block 1 of the 8 Factory Manager Games, split
by the two impulsivity groups, were entered into an 8x2 mixed ANOVA with
game as the within-subjects factor and impulsivity as the between-subjects fac-
tor. This revealed a reliable effect of game (F(4.14, 227.9) = 18.24, MSE = .06, p
< .001, η2p = .25), which had a significant linear contrast (F(1, 55) = 52.03, MSE =
.09, p < .001, η2p = .49), demonstrating that participants learned to optimise the
number of goods produced by running the machine slower as the games pro-
gressed. There was no reliable between-subjects effect of impulsivity (F(1, 55) =
1.18, MSE = .30, p = .28, η2p = .02), indicating no difference in performance in the
task between those high and low in impulsivity, nor was there an interaction
(F(4.14, 227.9) = .86, MSE = .06, p = .49, η2p = .02), indicating that the two groups
improved on the task at the same rate.
To maximize their payoff, participants should switch from the lowest produc-
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tion level to the highest production level between block 1 and block 2 at the end
of each game. To test this and any effect of impulsivity on switching we com-
pared mean production level in block 1 and block 2 across each game. These
data were entered into an 8x2x2 mixed ANOVA with game and block as the
within-subjects factors, and impulsivity as the between-subjects factor. There
was an effect of block (F(1, 54) = 7.29, MSE = .13, p = .009, η2p = .12), which shows
that participants increased the production level at the end of each game. Unlike
in the previous experiment, there was a reliable interaction between block and
game (F(3.75, 202.43) = 4.59, MSE = .04, p = .002, η2p = .08), demonstrating that
participants increasingly switched as the sessions progressed. However, there
was no interaction between block and impulsivity (F(1, 54) = .27, MSE = .13, p
= .61, η2p = .01), and so there was no evidence that the two impulsivity groups
reliably differed in their switching behaviour.
Advice Seeking
Participants asked for advice between 3 and 188 times (mean = 37.5, SD=33.9).
A non-parametric correlation between impulsivity group and the number of
times that advice was sought did not find a reliable relationship (τ(57) = .16,
p = .16). A correlation between participants’ BIS-11 scores and the number of
times that they sought advice produced a similar non-significant result (τ(57) =
.14, p = .14).
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4.3.4 Discussion
This experiment provided equivocal evidence that the type of advice givenmay
have affected participants’ advice-seeking behaviour, as those high in impul-
sivity did not seek more advice when the advice generally disagreed with their
natural inclinations. Nevertheless, the significance value was not far from bor-
derline, and so we continued this line of enquiry by conducting another exper-
iment using a within-subjects design.
Of note is that we did find increasing switching as the games progressed this
time, consistent with previous research using the SHG.
4.4 Experiment 9: Within Subjects Advice Seeking
4.4.1 Introduction
We tested whether the type of advice (either self-controlled or impulsive) that
participants were given influenced their advice-seeking behaviour. In order to
reduce the inclination for participants to click on the advice button indiscrimi-
nately, we added a cost to the advice. This was expected to have the additional
benefit of reducing the strongly positively skewed data on the number of times
that participants ask for advice. This was useful because we were testing an
interaction between advice type and individuals’ impulsivity, which requires
an ANOVA with normally distributed data.
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4.4.2 Method
Participants
Forty-nine students from Nottingham University volunteered to take part in
the experiment after being recruited by an online experiment system. Their
mean age was 20.4 years (SD=1.6 years) and 59% were female.
Procedure and Advice
The experimental procedure was identical to the previous one, except that the
advice system changed. There were four advisors, two of whom predominantly
recommended that the participant should set the production level high, somax-
imizing their short-term gain, and two of whom recommended setting the pro-
duction level low, so as to be self-controlled. The independent variable was how
often participants sought advice from the two impulsive advisors and from the
two self-controlled advisors.
The self-controlled advisors’ ideal production levels were 119.5, 124.5, and the
impulsive advisors’ ideal production levels were 175.5 and 180.5. This averages
out to setting the production level at 150, the mid-point of the scale. The rea-
son that non-integers were chosen was because the machine’s production level
was always an integer, so participants were never advised that they had set the
production level ”about right”, thus they were always told to either run the ma-
chine faster or slower. This prevented the situation where a participant could
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quickly learn what an advisor’s ideal speed was just by chance, and not have
to ask again. Unlike in previous experiments, the position of the advisors was
randomised. This was because participants tend to begin by asking advisor 1,
and so since in this experiment we were measuring which advisors they asked,
as well as how often, it was crucial that there was no positioning bias.
A cost was also added to the advice, so that each time a participant asked for
advice it would cost them 0.5p. This was set as low enough that participants
would not be too discouraged from asking for advice.
The instructions to participants were changed to reflect the new advice system.
The advice paragraph was changed to:
”You have also been given access to 4 advisors, who previously
played the factory manager game like you are about to. After fin-
ishing, they left a recommendation for the speed that you should
run the machine in order to produce as many Goods as possible.
Each time you ask for their advice, they will tell you whether the
speed that you last ran the machine is slower or faster than their
ideal speed. Each time you ask for advice it will also cost you 0.5p.
Ultimately it will be your decision to set the machine speed to what-
ever you want.”
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4.4.3 Results
Simplified Harvard Game
The mean production levels in block 1 of the 8 Factory Manager Games, split
by the two impulsivity groups, were entered into an 8x2 mixed ANOVA with
game as the within-subjects factor and impulsivity as the between-subjects fac-
tor. This revealed a reliable effect of game (F(3.8, 180.6) = 23.31, MSE = .07, p <
.001, η2p = .33), which had a significant linear contrast (F(1, 47) = 53.86, MSE =
.10, p < .001, η2p = .53), demonstrating that participants learned to optimise the
number of goods produced by running the machine slower as the games pro-
gressed. There was no reliable between-subjects effect of impulsivity (F(1, 47) =
2.43, MSE = .31, p = .13, η2p = .05), indicating no difference in performance in the
task between those high and low in impulsivity, nor was there an interaction
(F(3.84, 180.6) = .90, MSE = .07, p = .46, η2p = .02), indicating that the two groups
improved on the task at the same rate.
To maximize their payoff, participants should switch from the lowest produc-
tion level to the highest production level between block 1 and block 2 at the end
of each game. To test this and any effect of impulsivity on switching we com-
pared mean production level in block 1 and block 2 across each game. These
data were entered into an 8x2x2 mixed ANOVA with game and block as the
within-subjects factors, and impulsivity as the between-subjects factor. There
was an effect of block (F(1, 47) = 8.27, MSE = .09, p = .006, η2p = .15), which shows
that participants increased the production level at the end of each game. There
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was a reliable interaction between block and game (F(3.47, 245.86) = 3.47, MSE
= .03, p = .004, η2p = .07), demonstrating that participants increasingly switched
as the sessions progressed. However, there was no interaction between block
and impulsivity (F(1, 47) = .15, MSE = .09, p = .70, η2p < .01), and so there was
no evidence that the two impulsivity groups reliably differed in their switching
behaviour.
Advice Seeking
Overall, the number of times that participants asked for advice was positively
skewed with a mean comparable to its standard deviation (mean = 8.65, SD =
7.8, skewness = 1.1, range 0 – 31). Since our hypothesis tested an interaction,
this is not possible with a non-parametric ANOVA, and so it was necessary to
have normally distributed data. Howell (2007) recommends that for data that
are counts, where the mean is proportional to the variance, and where values of
the counts are less than 10, then the square root transformation in Equation 4.4.1
is appropriate. This was applied and reduced the skewness towithin acceptable
levels (mean = 2.7, SD = 1.3, skewness = .3, range = .71 – 5.61).
Y =
√
X+ 0.5 (4.4.1)
Participants could solicit advice from four advisors, two of whose advice was to
run the machine at a fast pace, which would maximize the short-term outcome,
and two of whose advice was to run the machine slower, which would equate
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Figure 4.3: Advice seeking in the Factory Manager game
to being self-controlled. We compared the transformed number of times that
the two impulsivity groups (high/low) asked for advice from the two types
of advisor (short-term / self-controlled). These data were entered into a 2x2
repeated-measures ANOVA with advice type as the within-subjects factor and
impulsivity group as the between-subjects factor. There was no main effect of
advice type (F(1, 47) = .01, MSE = .33, p = .918, η2p < .01), indicating that both
types of advisor were asked a similar number of times overall. Nor was there
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a main effect of impulsivity group (F(1, 47) = .85, MSE = 1.5, p = .36, η2p = .02),
indicating that the two impulsivity groups asked for advice a similar number of
times. However, the interaction was significant (F(1, 47) = 4.11, MSE = .33, p =
.048, η2p = .08), indicating that the two groups asked for different types of advice
more often. The mean number of untransformed times that the two impulsivity
groups solicited advice from the two types of advisor is shown in Figure 4.3. It
shows that the two groups asked for advice from the self-controlled advisor
a similar number of times, but that the number of times they solicited advice
from the short-term advisor differed markedly, with those high in impulsivity
asking more often.
4.5 Experiment 10: Advice Seeking by Experience
These data were collected by Claire Watson as part of her third year undergraduate
research project. The study was conceived by me, although refined by both of us, and
the analysis presented here is my own.
4.5.1 Introduction
It has previously been found in JAS experiments that advisors who judges be-
lieve to be experts have their advice weighted more heavily (Harvey & Fischer,
1997; Sniezek et al., 2004). We test whether the propensity for judges to seek
advice from experts or novices is related to their trait impulsivity. A naïve hy-
pothesis is that those high in impulsivity may not weight the advice from ex-
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perts as heavily as those low in impulsivity.
4.5.2 Method
Participants
Forty-eight students from Nottingham University were opportunity sampled.
Their mean age was 21.9 years (SD=.84 years) and 46% were female.
Procedure and Advice
The experimental procedure was largely identical to the previous one, except
that the recompense and advice systems changed. In this experiment partici-
pants were not paid based on their performance in the task. Nevertheless, the
task has previously been found to be intrinsically motivating, we found similar
results whether participants are paid contingent upon their performance or not
(see Experiments 5 & 6).
There were three advisors, each with a different level of experience of playing
the SHG, for 2 minutes, 20 minutes or 180 minutes. The independent variable
was how often participants sought advice from the three advisors with different
levels of experience.
The advisors’ ideal production levels were randomized, as was their order in
the game as advisor 1, advisor 2 and advisor 3. The ideal production levels
were 119.5, 150.5 and 180.5. A cost was also added to the advice, so that each
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time a participant asked for advice it would cost them 5 goods. This was set
as low enough that participants would not be too discouraged from asking for
advice.
The instructions to participants were changed to reflect the new advice system.
The advice paragraph was changed to:
You have also been given access to advice from three people who
were previously factory managers like you, who played the factory
manager game for 2 minutes, 20 minutes or 180 minutes. Afterward,
they left a recommendation for the speed that you should run the
machine. However you will only be told whether the speed that
you last set the machine at is slower or faster than they recommend.
Ultimately it is your decision to set the machine speed to whatever
you want. It is also your decision as to how many times you ask for
advice, but there will be a 5 Good ”cost” each time you do.
4.5.3 Results
Simplified Harvard Game
The mean production levels in block 1 of the 8 Factory Manager Games, split
by the two impulsivity groups, were entered into an 8x2 mixed ANOVA with
game as the within-subjects factor and impulsivity as the between-subjects fac-
tor. This revealed a reliable effect of game (F(4.4, 200.7) = 7.8, MSE = .07, p <
.001, η2p = .15), which had a significant linear contrast (F(1, 46) = 17.96, MSE
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= .10, p < .001, = .28), demonstrating that participants learned to optimise the
number of goods produced by running the machine slower as the games pro-
gressed. There was no reliable between-subjects effect of impulsivity (F(1, 46) =
1.44, MSE = .37, p = .24, η2p = .03), indicating no difference in performance in the
task between those high and low in impulsivity, nor was there an interaction
(F(4.36, 200.7) = .60, MSE = .07, p = .67, η2p = .01), indicating that the two groups
improved on the task at the same rate.
To maximize their payoff, participants should switch from the lowest produc-
tion level to the highest production level between block 1 and block 2 at the end
of each game. To test this and any effect of impulsivity on switching we com-
pared mean production level in block 1 and block 2 across each game. These
data were entered into an 8x2x2 mixed ANOVA with game and block as the
within-subjects factors, and impulsivity as the between-subjects factor. There
was an effect of block (F(1, 46) = 10.5, MSE = .12, p = .002, η2p = .19), which shows
that participants increased the production level at the end of each game. There
was a reliable interaction between block and game (F(5.03, 231.47) = 5.10, MSE
= .03, p < .001, η2p = .10), demonstrating that participants increasingly switched
as the sessions progressed. However, there was no interaction between block
and impulsivity (F(1, 46) = .08, MSE = .12, p = .78, η2p < .01), and so there was
no evidence that the two impulsivity groups reliably differed in their switching
behaviour.
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Advice Taking
Overall, the number of times that participants asked for advice was again posi-
tively skewed with a mean comparable to its standard deviation (mean = 10.3,
SD = 8.4, skewness = 1.3, range 0 – 33). We again transformed the data using
the same square root transform as in the previous experiment. This reduced
the skewness to within acceptable levels (mean = 3.0, SD = 1.2, skewness = .4,
range .71 – 5.79).
Participants could solicit advice from three advisors, each of whom was said to
have differing experience playing the Factory Manager Game. We compared
the transformed number of times that the two impulsivity groups (high/low)
asked for advice from the three advisors (2 mins, 20 mins, 180 mins). These
data were entered into a 2x3 repeated-measures ANOVA with advice type as
the within-subjects factor and impulsivity group as the between-subjects factor.
Therewas amain effect of advice type (F(1.78, 82.1) = 23.16, MSE = .623, p < .001,
η2p = .34), with a reliable linear contrast (F(1, 46) = 37.45, MSE = .67, p < .001, η
2
p
= .45) indicating that participants asked for more advice from those with more
experience. There was not a main effect of impulsivity group (F(1, 46) = .92,
MSE = 1.1, p = .34, η2p = .02), indicating that the two impulsivity groups asked
for advice a similar number of times. Nor was there an interaction (F(1.78, 82.1)
= .83, MSE = .62, p = .43, η2p = .02), indicating that the two groups did not differ
in the type of advice that they sought. The mean number of untransformed
times that the two impulsivity groups solicited advice from the two types of
advisor is shown in Figure 4.4. It shows that the two groups both asked for
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advice from the more experienced advisors more.
Figure 4.4: Advice type sought in the Factory Manager game
4.5.4 Discussion
We find no evidence that impulsivity affects the relative importance given to
seeking advice from experts or novices, although it could be that the effect is
small and the statistical power of the experiment was not enough to find it.
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4.6 Experiment 11: Advice Taking
4.6.1 Introduction
Egocentric advice discounting has been found to increase as the distance be-
tween judges’ initial opinions and advisors’ recommendations increases (Yaniv,
2004). This, combined with evidence from Experiment 10 that judges continue
to seek advice from those whose opinions agrees with their initial views, might
suggest that providing participants with the same advice will differentially af-
fect their performance in the FactoryManager Game. We hypothesise that those
high in impulsivity will have their performance in the task particularly badly
hampered by advice telling them to run the machine quickly and so act my-
opically. Based on Experiment 10, we expected no difference when participants
were given advice to be self-controlled.
4.6.2 Method
Participants
Forty-five students from Nottingham University participated after being re-
cruited by an online system. Their mean age was 21.5 years (SD=3.3 years)
and 80% were female.
185
CHAPTER 4: EFFECTS OF ADVICE IN THE FACTORY MANAGER GAME
Procedure and Advice
Participants played exactly the same Factory Manager Game as in previous ex-
periments, and received recompense contingent on their performance. How-
ever, participants did not ask for advice but were instead periodically given it
during the game.
Participants were allocated to one of two conditions, based on the order that
they participated with consecutive participants allocated to alternate condi-
tions. In the self-controlled advice type condition, the advice given told the
participant to run the machine relatively slowly, with advice randomly selected
between 100% and 130%. In the impulsive advice type condition, the advice
given was randomly selected between 170% and 200%, so running the machine
relatively quickly and maximizing short-term gain at the expense of the long-
term. In both conditions, advice was displayed three times in each game, when
the participant went below 90, 55 and then 20 game units. This equated to re-
ceiving unsolicited advice 24 times. The advice appeared in front of the Factory
Manager console, so participants had to acknowledge it by pressing OK before
they could continue.
The instructions to participants were changed to reflect the new advice system.
The advice paragraph was changed to:
You will also be given advice from people who previously played
the Factory Manager Game. After playing, each left a recommen-
dation for the speed that you should run the machine in order to
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produce as many Goods as possible. Advice from these people will
pop up throughout, but you do not have to follow it and ultimately
it is your decision to set the machine speed to whatever you want.
4.6.3 Results
Simplified Harvard Game
The mean production levels in block 1 of the 8 Factory Manager Games, split
by the two impulsivity and advisor type groups, were entered into an 8x2x2
mixed ANOVA with game as the within-subjects factor and impulsivity and
advisor type as the between-subjects factors. This revealed a reliable effect of
game (F(4.6, 190.2) = 16.8, MSE = .05, p < .001, η2p = .29), which had a signifi-
cant linear contrast (F(1, 41) = 51.5, MSE = .07, p < .001, η2p = .56), demonstrating
that participants learned to optimise the number of goods produced by running
the machine slower as the games progressed. There was no reliable between-
subjects effect of impulsivity (F(1, 41) = .93, MSE = .41, p = .34, η2p = .02), indi-
cating no difference in performance in the task between those high and low in
impulsivity, nor was there an interaction (F(4.64, 190.2) = 1.34, MSE = .05, p =
.25, η2p = .03), indicating that the two groups improved on the task at the same
rate. There was however a main effect of advice type (F(1, 41) = 11.05, MSE =
.41, p = .002, η2p = .21), indicating that those who received self-control advice
subsequently ran the machine slower and produced more goods in the long
run. But there was no interaction between advice type and game (F(4.64, 190.2)
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= .11, MSE = .01, p = .99, η2p < .01), indicating that no matter what advice partici-
pants were given they improved on the task at the same rate. Finally, there was
no three-way interaction between advice type, game, and impulsivity (F(4.64,
190.2) = .40, MSE = .02, p = .84, η2p = .01), indicating that no matter what im-
pulsivity group participants were in, they used the advice in the same way to
change their performance on the task. Figure 4.5 shows the mean production
level in block 1 across all 8 Factory Manager Games for each of the 4 groups.
Figure 4.5: Performance in the Factory Manager game by impulsivity and
advice-type groups
To maximize their payoff, participants should switch from the lowest produc-
tion level to the highest production level between block 1 and block 2 at the
end of each game. To test this and any effect of impulsivity or advice type
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on switching we compared mean production level in block 1 and block 2 across
each game. These data were entered into an 8x2x2x2 mixed ANOVAwith game
and block as the within-subjects factors, and impulsivity and advice type as the
between-subjects factors. There was an effect of block (F(1, 41) = 22.2, MSE =
.13, p < .001, η2p = .35), which shows that participants increased the production
level at the end of each game. There was a reliable interaction between block
and game (F(4.93, 201.9) = 3.83, MSE = .04, p = .003, η2p = .09), demonstrating
that participants increasingly switched as the sessions progressed. However,
there was no interaction between block and impulsivity (F(1, 41) = .01, MSE =
.13, p = .93, η2p < .01), or between block and advice type (F(1, 41) = 1.04, MSE =
.13, p = .31, η2p = .03) and so there was no evidence that the two levels of trait
impulsivity or the advice type they were given reliably changed their switching
behaviour.
4.6.4 Discussion
We found no reliable relationship between trait impulsivity and utilisation of
different types of advice. This may suggest that impulsivity does not affect the
reputation formation system that is used to assess advisors’ advice (Yaniv &
Kleinberger, 2000), such that both impulsivity groups learned to discount the
impulsive advisors’ advice to the same degree.
A limitation is that it is possible that as advice was provided for free and was
unsolicited, that this may have caused participants to underweight its value
(Gibbons, Shiezek & Dalal, 2003, cited in Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Gino et
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al., 2009). However, the consistent and long-lasting difference in performance
in the Factory Manager Game between groups given self-control advice and
groups given impulsive advice disagrees with this conclusion.
4.7 Chapter Discussion
Perhaps surprisingly, impulsivity mediated who advice was sought from, such
that advice was sought from advisors who agreed with the judge’s initial in-
clinations, but when it came to actual performance on the self-control task,
judges did not underweight advice from advisors who disagreed with their in-
clinations. This supports the importance in the literature of separating advice-
seeking from advice-utilisation. It also supports the relatively new interest in
individual differences in JAS experiments. The evidence suggests that those
who are high in impulsivity, and thus more likely to engage in myopic be-
haviours such as smoking and drinking, will tend to seek advice from those
whose advice agrees with what they already think. However, they will solicit
the opinions of experts, and when they are given unsolicited advice, this will
sway their behaviour asmuch as those low in impulsivity. These would suggest
that policy makers should concentrate on making as much advice available as
possible from credible sources, in order that it counteracts the natural tendency
of those high in impulsivity to seek the opinions of people who they know are
likely to tell them to act impulsively.
There is also contradictory findings in the literature concerning whether judges
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solicit free advice (Gardner & Berry, 1995; Schrah et al., 2006). In most of my
advice-seeking experiments, there were participants who, despite being told
about the advice and even being given a tutorial where they had to ask for
it, did not ask for advice at all during the task. This is puzzling, given that
the cost to soliciting advice was so low, and it is worthy of follow-up study to
understand who these independent judges are.
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CHAPTER 5
Individual Differences Related to
Intrapersonal Externalities
5.1 Chapter Introduction
Through the course of this thesis, there have been seven experiments using
intrapersonal externalities. Participants in all of these experiments completed
the Barratt Impulsivity Scale. The following chapter analyses the relationship
between trait impulsivity and performance on tasks with intrapersonal exter-
nalities.
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5.2 Experiment 12: BIS-11 Impulsivity and Intraper-
sonal Externalities
5.2.1 Introduction
Experiment 3 found that performance on the Simplified Harvard Game was
related to smoking status, independently from trait impulsivity. This agrees
with other research that has compared psychometric measures of impulsivity
with behavioural measures, such as delay discounting or the Balloon Analog
Risk Task (Crean, de Wit, & Richards, 2000; S. H. Mitchell, 1999; Reynolds et
al., 2006; Reynolds, Richards, Horn, & Karraker, 2004; J. L. White et al., 1994),
although some other experiments do show links (Kirby et al., 1999; Richards,
Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 1999; Swann, Bjork, Moeller, & Dougherty, 2002).
In the individual experiments it was not advisable to compare performance on
the tasks with intrapersonal externalities with trait impulsivity scores, because
both are noisy variables with measurement error, so fifty participants would
not provide enough experimental power; however, by combining all of the in-
trapersonal externality tasks the pattern should be clear.
5.2.2 Method
Participants were pooled from Experiments 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. This totalled
351 participants who had completed a task with intrapersonal externalities.
Participants gave their e-mail addresses when they participated in an experi-
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ment, which were used to ensure that there were no repeat participants across
experiments. The characteristics of participants are shown in Table 5.1. There
are more participants in Experiment 4 than were included in the report of the
experiment because some smokers participated but later inspection revealed
that they had not smoked long enough (more than 2 years) to meet the criterion
for the experiment, and so they were excluded.
Table 5.1: Summary of individual characteristics of participants in intraper-
sonal externalities experiments
Exp. Number N %Male Mean Age/yrs (SD) % Smoker Mean BIS-11 (SD)
3 51 45 21.6 (4.2) 100 67.3 (10.5)
4 51 39 20.6 (2.4) 100 66.9 (9.8)
7 50 36 23.5 (5.2) 12 63.6 (8.0)
8 57 26 20.5 (2.4) 4 65.0 (9.3)
9 49 41 20.4 (1.6) 16 63.2 (9.6)
10 48 54 21.0 (0.8) 29 67.3 (11.1)
11 45 20 21.3 (3.3) 13 65.4 (9.8)
Total 351 37 21.3 (2.9) 39 65.5 (9.7)
5.2.3 Results
To test the link between performance in experiments with intrapersonal exter-
nalities and impulsivity, a regression was run with the proportion of maximis-
ing responses in the task (pmax) as the dependent variable. The predictors were
experiment number as dummy categorical variables, age, gender, smoker type
(1 = daily, 0 = non-daily or non-smoker), and BIS-11 impulsivity. Table 5.2 sum-
marises the results of the personality and demographic predictors; impulsivity
was not a significant predictor.
The regression was repeated twice; with the six first order factors (Table 5.3),
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Table 5.2: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics, smoker type, and impulsivity, with performance in games
with intrapersonal externalities.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.07 -1.37 0.17
Age -0.07 -1.18 0.24
Smoker Type 0.00 0.06 0.95
Impulsivity (BIS-11) 0.01 0.25 0.81
and with the three second order factors (Table 5.4). Both analyses found no
subfactors related to performance on the tasks.
Table 5.3: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics, smoker type, and BIS-11 first order factors, with perfor-
mance in games with intrapersonal externalities.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.08 -1.38 0.17
Age -0.06 -1.12 0.26
Smoker Type 0.03 0.33 0.74
BIS-11 Attention 0.02 0.25 0.80
BIS-11 Motor 0.03 0.57 0.57
BIS-11 Self-Control 0.07 1.06 0.29
BIS-11 Cognitive Complexity -0.06 -0.98 0.33
BIS-11 Perseverence -0.05 -0.95 0.34
BIS-11 Cognitive Instability -0.04 -0.64 0.52
Three further analyses were conducted to exhaust all possibilities, but all sup-
ported the above findings. In order to exclude the possibility that extra noise
was added bymixing SimplifiedHarvardGameswith FactoryManager Games,
the above analyses were repeated but only for the Factory Manager Games (Ex-
periments 7-11; reported in Appendix D). In order to exclude the possibility
that a significant effect was not found because smoking group accounted for
variance that would have been accounted for by impulsivity, the above anal-
yses were repeated without smoking group (reported in Appendix E). In an
abundance of caution, the above analyses were repeated using as the depen-
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Table 5.4: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics, smoker type, and BIS-11 second order factors, with per-
formance in games with intrapersonal externalities.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.08 -1.40 0.16
Age -0.07 -1.21 0.23
Smoker Type 0.03 0.32 0.75
BIS-11 Attentional Impulsiveness -0.01 -0.15 0.88
BIS-11 Motor Impulsiveness 0.00 0.05 0.96
BIS-11 Nonplanning Impulsiveness 0.02 0.31 0.75
dent variable the z-scores of performance on the task standardized within an
individual experiment. This has the advantage that using dummy variables to
take account of between-experiment variance is unnecessary (reported in Ap-
pendix F). All analyses found no link between BIS-11 trait impulsivity and
performance on tasks with intrapersonal externalities.
5.2.4 Discussion
Given the number of statistical analyses reported here, it is remarkable that
there were none where trait impulsivity or a subfactor of the BIS-11 scale were
predictive of performance on tasks with intrapersonal externalities. This pro-
vides consistent evidence that there is no link between performance on tasks
with intrapersonal externalities and impulsivity. Although there was no rela-
tionship between smoking status and performance on the tasks, this was not
unexpected because Experiment 3 found that the distinction between morning
smokers and morning abstaining smokers was most indicative of performance,
whereas these analyses compared smokers with non-smokers.
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These results add to the growing body of research which finds no relation-
ship between psychometric measures of impulsivity and behavioural measures
(Crean et al., 2000; S. H. Mitchell, 1999; Reynolds et al., 2006, 2004; J. L. White
et al., 1994). These results also support those from Experiment 3, which found
that performance on the Simplified Harvard Game and trait impulsivity were
independent predictors of smoking status.
Reynolds et al. (2006) analysed four behavioural tasks measuring aspects of
impulsivity. Principle components analysis found two components, the first in-
cluded the Stop Task and the Go/No-Go task. The second was composed of a
delay discounting task and the Balloon Analog Risk Task. The authors explain
the components by suggesting that the first is related to impulsive disinhibi-
tion, because the challenge in the two tasks is to withhold a response, and the
second is related to decision-making, because the individual makes a conscious
decision. It would be useful to find out where the intrapersonal externalities
tasks fit into this model. The second component seems most clearly related;
on the one hand, a conscious decision is made on the task, but on the other
hand Experiment 3 showed a weak, statistically non-significant, link between
delay discounting and choices in the Simplified Harvard Game. Intrapersonal
externalities could reflect a separate differential learning component.
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CHAPTER 6
General Discussion: Do
intrapersonal externalities improve
our understanding of addicted
behaviour?
6.1 Why do only some people become addicts?
Approximately 15-17% of humans who try a drug become addicted, as defined
by pathological use in the face of adverse consequences (Anthony et al., 1994).
Well-controlled animal research found a similar percentage (Deroche-Gamonet
et al., 2004), indicating that evenwhen individuals experience the same stimuli,
there is an internal process which determines whether the individual will go on
to becoming addicted.
198
CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION: DO INTRAPERSONAL EXTERNALITIES
IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF ADDICTED BEHAVIOUR?
Two literatures have a bearing on the question of why some people go on to
become addicts. From economics, delay discounting assumes that individu-
als choose in their best interest; the reason that some people smoke is because
they steeply discount the long-term future consequences of a decision. From
psychopharmacology, models of impulsivity assume that some individuals are
compelled to choose an option that they realise is not in their best interest.
A third theory, of intrapersonal externalities, takes a middle road. It draws on
research showing that individuals attempt to make the best choices possible,
but sometimes they can make systematically irrational decisions. The theory
of intrapersonal externalities hypothesises that an individual will not take into
account externalities imposed on its future self. Payoffs from decisions with in-
trapersonal externalities include both long-term and short-term consequences.
The short-term consequences are easy to associate with the decision, but the
long-term consequences are diffuse and therefore difficult to link with the de-
cision that caused them; therefore, such consequences are difficult to learn be-
cause an individual’s cognitive architecture is not up to the task (Stillwell &
Tunney, 2009).
As intrapersonal externalities are abstract, they explain a range of situations.
Typically, behaviours with negative intrapersonal externalities (such as smok-
ing) are over-performed, and those with positive intrapersonal externalities
(such as exercising) are under-performed. There are two questions which limit
the use of intrapersonal externalities in research. First, are our current expla-
nations of addiction sufficient for describing addicts and for suggesting inter-
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ventions to solve addictions? Second, little work has been done to validate the
theory of intrapersonal externalities, so do they relate to addictions in the real
world?
6.2 Intrapersonal externalities are a valid and flexi-
ble tool to study addictions
The two experiments in Chapter 2 used individual difference measures which
measured aspects of the two broad theoretical areas of why addictive behaviour
can be difficult to overcome. In the behavioural economics literature, delay dis-
counting is assumed to measure how willing individuals are to wait for a re-
ward. Delay discounting assumes that individuals make choices in their best
interest but future rewards are discounted according to a personal discounting
function. Some individuals steeply discount the future and so choose myopi-
cally. On the other hand, a cluster of theories from the psychopharmacological
literature, which can collectively be described as impulsivity, posit that individ-
uals do not choose in their best interest. This could be because they are unable
to inhibit their impulses, or because their cognitions are present-oriented.
In Experiment 1, which investigated the relationship between individual differ-
ences and addictive behaviours, demographics were controlled for and big five
personality was measured because they are fundamental and broad individual
differences which are important across a range of behaviours (Barrick, Mount,
& Judge, 2001; Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 2006). Then, trait impulsivity was
200
CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION: DO INTRAPERSONAL EXTERNALITIES
IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF ADDICTED BEHAVIOUR?
measured using a broad questionnaire inventory (the Barratt Impulsivity Scale,
BIS-11; Stanford et al., 2009), and delay discounting was measured using a
behavioural task. The results showed that although the impulsivity and delay
discounting measures were reliably related to a range of impulsive behaviours,
the percentage of variance accounted for by all of the demographic, personal-
ity, impulsivity and discounting measures was in some cases as low as 3.9%
(for alcohol dependency), and never higher than 20.9% (for drug dependency).
Although there is measurement error from the questionnaires and behavioural
tasks, which if accounted for would boost the variance explained, there is space
for additional explanation.
In experiment 2, the method of measuring delay discounting was investigated
in detail. It was possible that delay discountingwas confoundedwith impulsiv-
ity by its method of measurement, and therefore the relationship between delay
discounting and addictive behaviours could have been illusory. When individ-
uals complete a delay discounting questionnaire, it is possible that impulsive
individuals would switch earlier than self-controlled individuals simply to fin-
ish the questionnaire earlier. The results showed that delay discounting was
related to smoking, no matter how it was measured, and with an equal effect
size. This provides strong support that the amount that a reward’s value is dis-
counted the longer the individual has to wait for it is an independent predictor
of addictive behaviour.
Chapter 3 took the first step to validating whether a task which measured in-
trapersonal externalities is related to real-world addictive behaviour. In the
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Simplified Harvard Game (SHG), participants chose between two options. One
option gave a higher immediate reward, but reduced the payoffs from both op-
tions over the next ten choices. Ultimately, the best strategy was to choose the
button with the lowest immediate reward. In Experiment 3, participants who
did not take intrapersonal externalities into account and so performed poorly
on the SHG, were more likely to be daily smokers than non-daily smokers. In
Experiment 4, the Credit Card Game, participants were given points at the be-
ginning of each game, but lost points at a differential rate depending upon their
choices in the task. The best strategy was to choose the button with the high-
est immediate loss, because the lowest immediate loss would prolong the task
and ultimately lead to a greater loss. This mirrors the choices made each month
when a credit card bill arrives. An individual can either pay off the full balance,
taking a large hit immediately, or pay off the minimum amount but accepting
the interest charge. The results from the experiment were that there was no
relationship between smoking and intrapersonal externalities when the SHG
was presented as one of avoiding costs. Taken together, these experiments in-
dicate that the reason that smokers find it difficult to learn about intrapersonal
externalities is due to a difficulty in learning about small gains.
Experiments 5 and 6 explored participants’ understanding of the Simplified
Harvard Game by asking questions that probed their knowledge of the payoff
schedules, and found that participants who performed well on the task explic-
itly learned that one option made their situation worse, but did not understand
the full schedule of payoffs. This result suggests a way to change behaviour, by
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telling an individual the full consequences of their behaviour immediately af-
ter (or before) making a decision. Current anti-smoking campaigns emphasise
the risk to the average person. Individuals may respond better to personalised
feedback based on their individual risk of developing a disease. This could be
calculated and presented through a smartphone application.
Having established the validity of intrapersonal externalities as amarker for ad-
dictive behaviour, Chapter 4 used the Factory Manager Game to study advice-
seeking and advice-taking. The FactoryManager Game differs from the Simpli-
fied Harvard Game in two important ways. First, by allowing the participant
to choose a production level on a sliding scale, it was possible to advise the
participant on the speed to set the machines without having to give away the
fact that the ultimate payoff was determined by the history of choices. Second,
setting the speed of a machine is a concrete task and therefore more amenable
to providing advice.
Theoretically, using intrapersonal externalities to study advice-seeking and advice-
taking is a new development because delay discounting assumes that the in-
dividual already has an internal discounting function which is presumably
largely immune to outside influence, and impulsive disinhibition states that an
individual makes a choice outside of their control. The effect of advice is conse-
quently difficult to study under these paradigms in the laboratory. In contrast,
the challenge of the FactoryManager Game is to learn to maximize incomewith
limited knowledge and experience, and so advice can help or hinder.
The experimental results of advice seekingwere that impulsivity mediatedwho
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advice was sought from; judges preferred to ask advisors who agreedwith their
initial inclinations. By contrast, when advice was mandatory, judges did not
underweight advice from advisors who disagreed with their inclinations. Prac-
tically, this supports the UK government’s current policy, to advertise advice
from credible sources in order to counter individuals’ natural tendency to seek
advice from those who support their impulsive inclinations.
Chapter 5 analysed the results of all Simplified Harvard Games and Factory
Manager Games so that trait impulsivity could be compared with performance
in the games with a large sample size. The results showed no relationship be-
tween trait impulsivity as measured by the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (Stanford
et al., 2009) and performance in the task. Additionally, in Experiment 3, there
was no relationship between delay discounting and trait impulsivity. Explo-
ration of the impulsivity literature found that it is common to find no relation-
ship between questionnaire measures and behavioural measures of impulsivity
with modest sample sizes (N = 70; Reynolds et al., 2006, cites 5 other instances
as well as their own), despite different questionnaire measures correlating with
one another. One explanation for this discrepancy is that the behavioural mea-
sures are narrow but objective, whereas the self-report measures are subjective
but broad and so are able to account for a range of motives behind impulsive
behaviours (Reynolds et al., 2006).
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6.3 Further theories of addictive behaviour
This thesis concentrated on impulsivity, delay discounting and intrapersonal
externalities, because these are broad constructs which account for a range of
addictive behaviours, because they do not theoretically overlap, and because
they are important in the literature and it is not practically possible to measure
all constructs. Nevertheless, researchers have identified other factors that are
involved in the formation or perseverance of substance use, some of which are
evaluated here as potential missing links.
6.3.1 Emotion Regulation
The process by which individuals modulate their emotions in order to appro-
priately respond to life’s demands is known as emotion regulation (Aldao,
Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). Poor emotion regulation has been linked
with a range of disorders, including pathological gambling (Williams, Grisham,
Erskine, & Cassedy, 2012), eating disorders (Davis, Strachan, & Berkson, 2004)
and substance abuse (Fox, Axelrod, Paliwal, Sleeper, & Sinha, 2007). The
most important regulatory strategy in determining psychopathologies, includ-
ing substance abuse, is rumination (Aldao et al., 2010). Ruminating on a prob-
lem is where an individual repetitively focuses on their experience of the emo-
tion and its causes and consequences.
Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister (2001) linked emotion regulation with im-
pulse control and hypothesised that impulsive tendencies were indulged when
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an individual was feeling in a short-term bad mood, which they believed could
be solved by a short-term hedonic solution. On the other hand, individuals
who believed their bad mood was unchangable were less likely to indulge
their impulses. In decision-making terms, this indicates a remarkably optimal
self-awareness; an individual evaluates the expected utility of an addictive be-
haviour, taking into account their current mood and whether they think it can
be changed. But evaluating the expected utility of options is central to conven-
tional utility theory, so it is unclear how far emotion regulation overlaps
Emotion regulation is unique because it takes into account that some individ-
uals may be more likely to experience (and notice) short-term negative moods
than others, and thus would be more likely to benefit from short-term hedonic
boosts. Additionally, it emphasises how an individual deals cognitively with
the negative emotion.
6.3.2 Executive Function and the Iowa Gambling Task
Executive function broadly describes a cortical system which controls other
functions. In order for the brain to estimate economic utility, it must predict
and then signal the value of future events, taking into account the current state
for comparison. Neuroscientists have located this systemwithin the pre-frontal
cortex (Schoenbaum, Roesch, & Stalnaker, 2006). A problem in this system,
which predicts the expected value of decisions, could theoretically underlie the
maladaptive choices that addicts make, and there is consistent evidence that ad-
dicts have abnormalities in blood flow in the orbito-frontal cortex (Dom, Sabbe,
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Hulstijn, & Van Den Brink, 2005).
Although it is interesting to find neurological substrates which underlie be-
haviour, the evidence does not help to explain the cognitions that occur or how
an individual could be helped to overcome them. For that, the Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994) measures executive function. In the IGT, indi-
viduals are given a starting amount of money and are told to maximize profit
by choose among four decks of cards. Two of the decks give consistently large
profits, but these are more than offset by rare but massive losses, such that these
decks ultimately incur a loss. The other two decks give consistently small prof-
its, which are slightly offset by small losses, such that these decks are the most
advantageous. The IGT has recently become available as a clinical instrument
(Bechara, 2007).
The IGT has been used as a behavioural measure of risky decision making, and
in this capacity significant impairments on the IGT have been found to be re-
lated to dependency on various substances, including alcohol (Bechara et al.,
2001; Fein, Klein, & Finn, 2004; Goudriaan, Grekin, & Sher, 2011), cocaine
(Bartzokis et al., 2000; Bolla et al., 2003), opioids (Mintzer & Stitzer, 2002)
and marijuana (Bolla, Eldreth, Matochik, & Cadet, 2005). Similarly, patholog-
ical gamblers do not learn to switch to the advantageous decks (Glicksohn &
Zilberman, 2010; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & Van den Brink, 2004).
Finally, individuals with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Bechara
et al., 2001), as well as those with more diffuse frontal lobe lesions (Manes et
al., 2002), choose poorly on the IGT.
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The limitations of the IGT in understanding addiction are that it is unclear
whether premorbid personality affects both addiction and performance on the
IGT, and the IGT is a complex behavioural measure that correlates with brain
structure but does not measure it (Buelow & Suhr, 2009).
6.3.3 Attentional Bias
Individuals who abuse alcohol, tobacco, or illicit drugs have an attentional bias
towards cues that reflect their addiction (Field & Cox, 2008). The bias towards
drug cues even predicts future drinking behaviour in excessive drinkers (Cox,
Pothos, &Hosier, 2007). Field et al. (2011) found that heavy drinkers looked for
longer at alcohol pictures than control pictures, regardless of whether the pic-
tures were likely to lead to a reinforcement, whereas light drinkers only showed
an attentional bias when the alcohol pictures were paired with reinforcement.
Attentional bias would increase the automaticity of drug-seeking behaviour in
addicts, supporting the impulsivity view of addiction. On the other hand, it
is presumably driven by a (perhaps pre-conscious) valuation of expected util-
ity from that reward, which attests to expected utility theory. This presumes
that expected utility is computed and so affects attentional bias, but another
hypothesis could be that the amount of attention given to a cue determines its
expected utility.
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6.4 Global addictions: the Global Warming Game
This thesis has predominantly limited itself to discussion of individual decision-
making, but intrapersonal externalities can theoretically apply to group decision-
making. Essentially, the Harvard Game is a series of repeated Prisoner’s Dilem-
mas (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) but playedwith one’s future self rather than
another player (Rachlin, 2000). Choosing to defect (meliorate) means that one’s
future self only has choices between two suboptimal outcomes. Choosing to co-
operate (self-invest) means that one’s future self has the best possible options
available. Unlike some versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, one’s future self
has no ability to affect one’s current choice.
The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) generalised the Prisoner’s Dilemma
to social dilemmas. Each member of a group has the option of investing in the
group or keeping their income. At the end of each round, the group’s invest-
ment is multiplied and distributed evenly to all members of the group. Invest-
ing in the group is essentially the same as co-operating, with the risk that other
members of the group might decide to keep their money and so free-ride.
The Tragedy of the Commons can further be generalised to take account of the
fact that consequences take some time before they become apparent. I propose
a new game called the Global Warming Game. At the end of each round, partic-
ipants can choose to pollute (defect) or recycle (co-operate). Polluting leads to
a higher immediate payoff than recycling, but unlike the Tragedy of the Com-
mons, negative effects of polluting, or positive effects of recycling, do not oc-
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cur immediately but accrue over time. The challenge is for the group to learn
to maximise their income, given the individual incentive to be selfish and the
group delay in experiencing the full consequences of each decision.
Several research questions immediately present themselves from such a game.
First, how can participants be helped to overcome the challenge of the task?
This is a topical question, given concerns over climate change, and it is also
relevant in other areas of intergenerational conflict, such as financing pensions
(each generation’s selfish incentive is to pay as little as possible yet take asmuch
as possible from future generations). It is common to call the world’s use of oil
an "addiction" even in academic papers (Mason, Prior, Mudd, & Giurco, 2011;
Trevors, 2011; Vilenchik, Peled, & Andelman, 2010). Mason et al. (2011) de-
fines society’s addiction to a resource as "its centrality and criticality to eco-
nomic, social and environmental systems" (p.958), but it might be, however,
that society is also more literally addicted to the resource, in that it has trou-
ble taking into account the embedded future consequences of a decision, in the
manner of an individual’s addiction.
In experimental economics, there has been much fanfare over altruistic punish-
ment as a method of helping groups to maximise their income in Tragedy of the
Commons experiments (Fehr & Gachter, 2002). This is where participants have
the option of sacrificing some of their own income in order to punish free-riders.
It is an open question whether altruistic punishment would also overcome the
Global Warming Game. Another method of limiting the socially negative con-
sequences of a Tragedy of the Commons dilemma is to allow participants to
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communicate (Cooper, Dejong, Forsythe, & Ross, 1992). It would be interest-
ing to see in the Global Warming Game whether communication overcomes the
dilemma (it clearly does not in the real world), and also what participants dis-
cuss in the game, such as whether they articulate selfish motives towards the
future recipients of their payoffs.
A second research area using the Global Warming Game would be in situations
where a group passes the long-term consequences of their decisions to another
group – the next generation. In game terms, one group would start the Global
Warming Game and receive their payoffs based on their performance, and then
another group would take over the game from the situation that the first group
left behind. This presents an extremely strong challenge to altruism, because
both the individual and the group have an incentive to be selfish.
6.5 A new way to do cognitive research?
It is a common in undergraduate psychology reports that a student will lament
that the sample size was too small and that if only it was multiplied then sta-
tistically significant effects would be found. I will do the same, but hopefully
with more persuasion.
In terms of sample size, typically individual differences or personality research
has a few hundred participants, whereas cognitive research has around 30 per
condition. Bertamini and Munafo (2012) checked studies published in Cogni-
tion in 2007 and found amedian number of participants (N) of 80 for regular ar-
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ticles and 52 for brief articles. Partly this is due to effect sizes: cognitive research
expects big effect sizes (due to well controlled studies) whereas individual dif-
ference research has to use lots of people in order to find effects. But addiction
is a fusion of individual differences and cognition; many people try addictive
substances but few become addicted. It therefore presents unique challenges.
It can be frustrating to read studies where the N was small, such as the two val-
idations of the Balloon Analog Risk Task mentioned in the Introduction, which
had 60 and 64 participants (Dean et al., 2011; Lejuez et al., 2003) and found
conflicting results.
More generally in Psychology, there is growing concern that samples are homo-
geneous and tend to be taken from among university students. Henrich et al.
(2010) called the typical participant WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized,
rich, democratic), but more importantly for cognitive psychology they reported
studies showing that such participants are frequently outliers compared to the
rest of the species. This included studies of cooperation and fairness from be-
havioural economics, and so closely relates to decision-making.
More generally across all the sciences, there has been concern that apparently
large effect sizes shrink over time and studies cannot be replicated. Begley and
Ellis (2012) attempted to replicate 53 landmark studies from the field of pre-
clinical medical research, but were only successful for 11% of them. Ioannidis
even goes as far as to say that "simulations show that for most study designs
and settings, it is more likely for a research claim to be false than true" (p.0696;
Ioannidis, 2005). Bertamini and Munafo (2012) identified the phenomenon of
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"bite-size science" as one that has undesired side effects such as decreasing the
number of participants.
The challenge is to increase the N without increasing research costs to the same
power. The Internet is a solution to this. Once a study is online it can be par-
ticipated in by 10 million people almost as easily as 50 people, as proved by
myPersonality. Motivated online participants ("citizen scientists"; Wiederhold,
2011) whowant to take part also provide good quality data as well as increasing
the inclusiveness of the scientific method.
There is no reason that Internet studies should be limited to those measuring
individual differences - who are just the researchers who got there first because
they need large Ns. Today or Tomorrow, the online version of a delay dis-
counting task on myPersonality, showed that cognitive tasks will also be an-
swered by thousands of people, providing they are created to provide interest-
ing feedback. Harvard’s Project Implicit (www.projectimplicit.net) has already
collected data online using Implicit Association Tests (Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998) from thousands of individuals on the thoughts and feelings
that are, according to the authors, outside of their conscious control.
Facebook also, with users’ consent, can provide a key to bring studies together
by providing a unique identity for each user. Whereas many people may use a
single computer, only one person tends to use a Facebook account. Addition-
ally, Facebook is already where users’ online social interactions take place, so it
comes with access to a wealth of online behavioural data. For example: know-
ing a user’s Facebook friends could allow a researcher to measure whether im-
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pulsive individuals tend to be friends with other impulsive individuals, know-
ing what people write about in their status updates can allow a researcher to
measure what kinds of things impulsive people talk about and how they say
it, and knowing that an individual who retakes a study 12 months later is the
same individual would allow longitudinal analyses which makes the data ex-
ponentially more valuable over time. There are legitimate privacy concerns,
and individuals should have control over their data. But the potential benefits
call for greater attention by the academic community.
6.6 Conclusions
Intrapersonal externalities provide an additional theory and method to under-
stand addictions. Whereas rational economic actors in the behavioural eco-
nomics literature discount future rewards, and irrational individuals in the psy-
chopharmacological literature cannot suppress their impulses, decision-makers
subject to intrapersonal externalities struggle to learn the full consequences of
their decisions, and so choose suboptimal outcomes even while they attempt
to maximise their subjective utility. As an extension of the economic decision-
making literature, the theory also has the advantage that it can be described
mathematically.
This thesis established the necessity to build upon the two currently dominant
theories of impulsive behaviour, in that current measures do not account for a
large proportion of variance in addictive behaviour, and in that intrapersonal
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externalities do not highly correlate with either delay discounting or trait im-
pulsivity, but do correlate with smoking behaviour. It then shows that using
the theory of intrapersonal externalities has advantages in both the laboratory
and potentially in practice. In the laboratory, it allows a researcher to explore
areas that are normally incompatible with the research area of choice over time,
such as advice seeking and taking. In practice, it suggests a new way to change
behaviour, by providing individual advice and feedback on choices.
The theory of intrapersonal externalities is still relatively unexplored; there are
potential areas of unexplored timely research such as extending them to group
situations. They still need to be validated in a wider set of self-investment cir-
cumstances (including in positive self-investment such as in exercise), and the
limits of their use in the laboratory need to be quantified. Nevertheless, the
theory has demonstrated potential, and so researchers should pay attention.
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Today or tomorrow: Instructions to
participants
’Today or Tomorrow’ information
1. Important information about the questionnaire
”Today or Tomorrow?” measures what economists call your delay discount-
ing function. This describes how much you prefer the present over the future,
or how willing you are to wait for a reward. You will be asked to answer 7
blocks of 15 questions asking whether you would prefer money now or in the
future. Once you have done so, we will calculate your delay discounting func-
tion which estimates how much any reward drops in value as the delay to re-
ceive it increases. We will also compare this to others’ delay discounting func-
tions and will tell you whether you value the present or the future more than
most others do.
The survey will take about 12 minutes to complete. Allow yourself enough
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time so that you do not have to rush. If you are interrupted you can return to the
questionnaire and the questions that you have already submitted will be saved.
To receive the most accurate results, you should complete the questionnaire in
a quiet environment. You should specifically avoid taking the questionnaire
while others are watching your responses. All answers you provide will be
treated as confidential. We will only do research with your answers after the
data has been anonymised so that it cannot be linked back to you.
Sadly we cannot actually give you the rewards that you prefer, but we would
still ask you to answer as honestly as you can as if the rewards were for real.
This will also give you the most accurate results.
The questionnaire has been made available as part of research by David Still-
well and Dr. Richard Tunney from the School of Psychology at the University
of Nottingham. We are also grateful to Dr. Lee Hogarth for his invaluable as-
sistance.
I have read and understood all of the above, and I will follow its recommenda-
tions. I know that I can withdraw at any time by closing my browser window
and not answering further questions.
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Individual differences in
discounting: Controlling for
demographics
The following section repeats the analyses from Experiment 2, but controls for
age and gender.
B.1 Results
The daily, non-daily, and non-smoker groups differed by demographic char-
acteristics, particularly age (Table B.1); daily smokers were older than non-
daily smokers, who were older than non-smokers. This would be unlikely to
cause spurious delay reward discounting (DRD) effects, because previous re-
sults have found that age negatively correlates with discounting rate (Green,
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Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999), and so this group age difference would likely
decrease the relationship between smoking and DRD. In order to control for the
effects of age and gender, the major analyses of the three methodological DRD
differences were repeated with age and gender as covariates.
Table B.1: Demographic characteristics of smoking groups
Smoking Group % Male Mean Age (SD)
Daily Smokers 36% 28.3 (9.5)
Non-Daily Smokers 41% 23.6 (8.2)
Non-Smokers 38% 21.8 (8.6)
Using the 5953 respondents who reported their smoking behaviour, gender and
age, a 3 x 3 between groups ANOVA was conducted to test whether the order
that the items are presented in is related to delay discounting. Condition (as-
cending, descending, and randomized) and smoking status (daily smoker, N =
1073; non-daily smoker, N = 453; non-smoker, N = 4427) were the factors, age
and gender were covariates, and log(k) was the dependent variable. A main ef-
fect of smoking status was found (F(2,5942) = 58.72, MSE = .32, p <.001). Amain
effect of condition was found (F(2, 5942) = 9.27, MSE = .32, p < .001). However,
no interaction was found between smoking status and condition (F(4, 5942) =
.67, MSE = .32, p = .61). Both gender (F(1, 5942) = 6.19, MSE = .32, p = .013) and
age (F(1, 5942) = 36.27, MSE = .32, p < .001) were significant predictors.
To find out whether there were differences in the estimated DRD parameters
at different delay lengths, and whether any differences were different for the
three smoking statuses, a 3x3x6 mixed ANOVA was conducted with condition
(ascending, descending, and randomized) and smoking status (daily smoker,
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non-daily smoker, non-smoker) as the between groups factors, delay length (1
week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years) as the within groups fac-
tor, and the covariates of age and gender. There was a strong effect of delay
length (F(5, 29710) = 179.48, MSE = .20, p < .001), such that shorter delays led
to a steeper discounting parameter being estimated. The three-way interaction
was not significant (F(20, 29710) = .76, MSE = .20, p = .77), but there was an
interaction between delay length and smoking status (F(10, 29710) = 2.80, MSE
= .20, p = .002).
In order to investigate the effects of differing delayed rewards, the DRD pa-
rameters for $1000 in 1 month were compared to the parameters for $100 in 1
month. A 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA with smoking status (daily smoker, non-daily
smoker, and non-smoker) as the between-groups factor, delayed amount ($100,
$1000) as the within-subjects factor, and age and gender as covariates found a
main effect of delayed amount (F(1, 5847) = 61.11, MSE = .17, p < .001), but no
interaction (F(2, 5847) = 1.28, MSE = .17, p = .28).
Overall, when controlling for age and gender the pattern of results replicated
the findings in the main analysis.
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Individuals’ insight into
intrapersonal externalities:
Instructions to participants
Thank-you for agreeing to take part in this experiment.
Your task is simple. You will have to repeatedly choose between two buttons,
marked # and . Simply click on a button with the mouse to register your choice.
As a result of your choices you will win Points. After every choice you will be
shown your Points from each choice as well as your cumulative Points. As you
gain more Points, Pacman will eat more dots and get larger!
However, choices will also use up Game Units. After every choice you will be
shown the Game Units used up from each choice as well as your Game Units
remaining. Once these have run out then the game is over.
Youwill play the game 8 times. Try and beat your previous score in every game!
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At the end of every game, you will be asked a series of questions relating to
potential scenarios within the game. Your answers to these questions will have
no effect on the games that you play.
Your payment from this experiment will be £4.
[Participants in condition contingent were shown the following text in re-
place of the previous paragraph]
Your payment from this experiment will be based on the number of points that
you gain during the games. This will be calculated on the basis of 0.08p/point.
After each game, you will be shown your current earnings so far.
That’s all there is to it – just try to win as many Points from the computer as
you can before you run out of Game Units. Take as much time as you wish and
please do not write anything down during the experiment.
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Relationship between impulsivity
and performance in Factory
Manager Games
The following analyses show the relationship between trait impulsivity, as mea-
sured by the Barratt Impulsivity Scale, and performance on the Factory Man-
ager Games. All analyses use linear regressions, and include Experiment num-
ber as a dummy variable. Table D.1 shows the overall BIS-11 score relationship,
Table D.2 shows the relationship for the BIS-11 first order factors, and Table D.3
shows the relationship for BIS-11 second order factors. There are no signicant
relationships for any of the impulsivity scores.
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Table D.1: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics, smoker type, and impulsivity, with performance in the
Factory Manager Game.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.09 -1.40 0.16
Age -0.07 -0.95 0.34
Smoker Type -0.01 -0.14 0.89
Impulsivity (BIS-11) 0.05 0.73 0.47
Table D.2: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics, smoker type, and BIS-11 first order factors, with perfor-
mance in the Factory Manager Game.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.09 -1.38 0.17
Age -0.06 -0.90 0.37
Smoker Type -0.01 -0.07 0.94
BIS-11 Attention 0.01 0.13 0.89
BIS-11 Motor 0.06 0.83 0.41
BIS-11 Self-Control 0.09 1.04 0.30
BIS-11 Cognitive Complexity -0.07 -0.87 0.39
BIS-11 Perseverence -0.04 -0.53 0.60
BIS-11 Cognitive Instability -0.04 -0.58 0.56
Table D.3: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics, smoker type, and BIS-11 second order factors, with per-
formance in the Factory Manager Game.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.09 -1.38 0.17
Age -0.07 -0.97 0.33
Smoker Type -0.01 -0.13 0.90
BIS-11 Attentional Impulsiveness -0.01 -0.16 0.88
BIS-11 Motor Impulsiveness 0.04 0.50 0.61
BIS-11 Nonplanning Impulsiveness 0.03 0.37 0.71
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Relationship between impulsivity
and performance in intrapersonal
externality tasks: Excluding
smoking status
The following analyses show the relationship between trait impulsivity, as mea-
sured by the Barratt Impulsivity Scale, and performance on the intrapersonal
externality tasks. All analyses use linear regressions, and include Experiment
number as a dummy variable. Smoking group was excluded, in case it ac-
counted for variance that would have been accounted for by trait impulsivity.
Table E.1 shows the overall BIS-11 score relationship, Table E.2 shows the rela-
tionship for the BIS-11 first order factors, and Table E.3 shows the relationship
for BIS-11 second order factors. There are no signicant relationships for any of
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the impulsivity scores.
Table E.1: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics and impulsivity, with performance in games with intrap-
ersonal externalities.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.07 -1.38 0.17
Age -0.07 -1.18 0.24
Impulsivity (BIS-11) 0.01 0.24 0.81
Table E.2: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics and BIS-11 first order factors, with performance in games
with intrapersonal externalities.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.08 -1.36 0.17
Age -0.06 -1.12 0.26
BIS-11 Attention 0.02 0.24 0.81
BIS-11 Motor 0.03 0.54 0.59
BIS-11 Self-Control 0.07 1.10 0.27
BIS-11 Cognitive Complexity -0.06 -1.00 0.32
BIS-11 Perseverence -0.05 -0.93 0.35
BIS-11 Cognitive Instability -0.04 -0.64 0.53
Table E.3: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics and BIS-11 second order factors, with performance in
games with intrapersonal externalities.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.08 -1.40 0.16
Age -0.07 -1.21 0.23
BIS-11 Attentional Impulsiveness -0.01 -0.14 0.88
BIS-11 Motor Impulsiveness 0.00 0.04 0.97
BIS-11 Nonplanning Impulsiveness 0.02 0.33 0.74
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Relationship between impulsivity
and performance in intrapersonal
externality tasks: Using z-scores
The following analyses show the relationship between trait impulsivity, as mea-
sured by the Barratt Impulsivity Scale, and performance on the intrapersonal
externality tasks. Performance is measured using z-scores, standardized within
experiment. This means that there is no need to use Experiment number as a
dummy variable. Table F.1 shows the overall BIS-11 score relationship, Table
F.2 shows the relationship for the BIS-11 first order factors, and Table F.3 shows
the relationship for BIS-11 second order factors. There are no signicant relation-
ships for any of the impulsivity scores.
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Table F.1: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics, smoker type, and impulsivity, with within-experiment
standardized performance in gameswith intrapersonal externalities.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.07 -1.35 0.18
Age -0.06 -1.18 0.24
Smoker Type 0.03 0.48 0.63
Impulsivity (BIS-11) 0.00 0.06 0.95
Table F.2: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics, smoker type, and BIS-11 first order factors, with within-
experiment standardized performance in games with intrapersonal
externalities.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.08 -1.34 0.18
Age -0.06 -1.14 0.26
Smoker Type 0.04 0.66 0.51
BIS-11 Attention 0.02 0.28 0.78
BIS-11 Motor 0.03 0.50 0.62
BIS-11 Self-Control 0.07 1.04 0.30
BIS-11 Cognitive Complexity -0.07 -1.09 0.28
BIS-11 Perseverence -0.06 -1.05 0.29
BIS-11 Cognitive Instability -0.04 -0.61 0.54
Table F.3: Regression coefficients showing the relationship between demo-
graphics, smoker type, and BIS-11 second order factors, with within-
experiment standardized performance in games with intrapersonal
externalities.
Measure Beta t p
Gender -0.08 -1.36 0.18
Age -0.07 -1.19 0.23
Smoker Type 0.03 0.48 0.63
BIS-11 Attentional Impulsiveness -0.01 -0.10 0.92
BIS-11 Motor Impulsiveness 0.00 -0.07 0.95
BIS-11 Nonplanning Impulsiveness 0.01 0.20 0.84
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